We Must Talk to Hamas By Richard W. Murphy and Basil Eastwood

We Must Talk to Hamas

By Richard W. Murphy and Basil Eastwood

statesman.com, May 20, 2006.

In the coming days, delegates of the Quartet of Middle East peacemakers (the United States, European Union, Russia and United Nations) will produce a formula to ease the economic boycott of the Hamas-led Palestinian authority. This is welcome.

The far-reaching boycott in place since the Hamas government was established in March — based on the longstanding ban on any assistance to Hamas as a terrorist organization — seems likely to create a failed state, which would mean more violence and danger for Israel and end hopes for a two-state solution.

The relaxation envisioned, however, does not mean the West is ready for a political dialogue with Hamas; it is only temporary and partial, and the United States agreed to discuss it with palpable reluctance.

The West's current policy seems to assume that:

•Hamas can soon be forced out of office by starving it financially.

•Fatah, the former governing party, will be returned to office and govern no more ineffectively than it did before.

•The Palestinian Authority will survive the collapse of the Hamas government.

•The Palestinian people will not suffer unduly during this process.

But each of these assumptions is highly dubious:

•Outside pressure aimed at destroying Hamas will probably strengthen its popularity among Palestinian voters. This will prolong its life in office and allow it to blame all its problems on Western, and especially American, pressure.

•Hamas won the election against Fatah not just because the Fatah leadership was inefficient, and in some cases corrupt, but because of the prevailing Palestinian opinion that Fatah's conduct of the peace process cost the Palestinians dearly. There is no reason to assume that a Fatah government could return to power under present circumstances with any democratic legitimacy or ability to govern.

•Without the financial ability to pay salaries, including to the security forces, the Palestinian Authority, in the best of times fragile, will founder.

•Non-governmental charitable organizations cannot expand their operations sufficiently to replace the operations of the Palestinian Authority, especially in the vital fields of heath and education. The U.N.'s own assessment is that a full boycott will cause the collapse of security, making external assistance impossible.

Based on the long history of Hamas-led terrorist violence against Israeli civilians, Washington views Hamas as incorrigible and has adopted regulations forbidding any contact between American and Hamas officials.

Admittedly, the evidence is slight that Hamas is prepared to alter its long-held positions. But why assume this will be impossible? Recently, some Hamas government ministers have been signaling possible flexibility towards Israel. They have said, for example, that for them to recognize Israel's existence is not the real issue. They ask "Which Israel? Is it pre 1967 Israel? The Israel of the Oslo accords? Of the 2001 Clinton parameters?"

This is not just a word game but an existential question for a government living next door to an Israeli state that has never defined its own borders. In any case, now that Hamas has become the government, it must confront the realities of its new situation. Israel is a clear reality.

Hamas believes there are no prospects for an overall peace agreement, an opinion shared by many Israelis. Hamas has adhered to a self-imposed truce for over a year, and some Israelis find Hamas's ideas of a long range truce appealing — even as they balk at Hamas' position that this should be conditioned on an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 line. Another sign that Hamas might recognize the need to adapt to its new role as government authority is the recent agreement between itself and Fatah that outlaws the carrying of arms by militants.

The present impasse recalls the period from 1975 to 1988, when Washington scrupulously refused to talk with PLO representatives until that organization accepted Israel's right to exist and U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Thirteen years were lost — years when Washington could have played a mediating role, encouraged exchanges between the PLO and Israelis and perhaps produced an earlier and more successful result than the Oslo Accords of 1993. Instead, those years saw growing radicalization within the region followed by the establishment of al Qaeda, whose basic recruitment strategy continues to exploit the endless Israeli-Palestinian confrontation.

The quartet's agreement to adopt some yet to be agreed on mechanism for broader assistance to the Palestinians gives us a breathing spell to explore with elected Palestinian officials whether their government intends a stable truce and future Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. If the outcome of those meetings is positive, the West should start to dismantle its boycott — but upon the clear condition that Hamas maintain the present truce for itself and cooperate with the Palestinian president to impose it on all Palestinian factions. If a way is not found to allow more flexibility in the use of foreign assistance, we will be giving powerful ammunition to the men of violence.

Murphy was Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs in the Reagan Administration from 1983-89.

Basil Eastwood was director of research for the UK Foreign Office, 1991-96, and the British Ambassador to Syria from 1996-2000.

Earth, a planet hungry for peace

Apartheid Wall


The Israeli Land-Grab Apartheid Wall built inside the Palestinian territories, here separating Abu Dis from occupied East Jerusalem. (IPC, 7/4/04).

The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers in the West Bank, like a Python. (Alquds,10/25/03).

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