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The roadmap which led to Simla accord
Kuldip Nayar
Gulf News
| New
Delhi
Roadmap is the neologism added to the political jargon of conciliation
efforts. Therefore, it may be worthwhile to recount how India and Pakistan
went about reaching the Simla agreement in June 1972. It may help the two
countries hold negotiations.
After 30 years of embargo, the records are now available to tell what
transpired between D.P. Dhar, India's representative, and Pakistan's Aziz
Ahmed, before the meeting between Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
The modalities were worked out by the Swiss Embassy which was looking
after the affairs of both countries following the snapping of diplomatic
ties. How they went about their business is relevant as efforts are afoot
to fix the talks between Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and
Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf.
The first two-day session between DP and Aziz was as calm as the climate
in hilly Murree where they met. The discussions were in English - though
Dhar wanted to switch over to Urdu to make them more informal. Aziz
frankly admitted that even though Urdu was the official language of
Pakistan, he for one found it difficult to use, especially in talking to
Dhar who, like other Kashmiri pandits, spoke chaste Urdu.
Both of them had different briefs. A durable settlement was on top of the
tentative agenda that Dhar carried from New Delhi. But he was specifically
directed to include Kashmir in the items for discussion at the summit
meeting. From the Pakistan side, Aziz had been told to give top priority
to the 90,000 Pakistani POWs and the territory which came under India
after the Bangladesh war in December 1971.
In the opening speech itself Aziz talked about the need for a step-by-step
approach and also referred to reports in some Delhi newspapers that DP
would "demand" recognition of the ceasefire line in Kashmir as
the international border.
In reply, Dhar said that the past history of Indo-Pakistan relations
should itself indicate that the step-by-step approach had not succeeded
and that they could turn over a new leaf by having straightaway a durable
peace. He contradicted press reports that he had come to dictate anything.
Aziz said Pakistan's proposals were essentially India's own case in a
"capsule form". Dhar said the point to note was whether it kept
in view the "total concept". Raza Ali, who was Aziz's aide, said
that what India wanted was a "protective umbrella" for the
summit meeting while Pakistan was seeking "guidelines for subsequent
developments".
Dhar said India was willing to prove its bona fides about seeking a
permanent peace with Pakistan by decreasing its defence expenditure. His
government would agree to consider a proposal of joint inspection or any
other to satisfy Pakistan on this point.
It was Aziz who first gave Dhar a draft agenda:
a) Elimination of the consequences of war - return to peace:
1. Repatriation of POWs and civilians,
2. Withdrawal of forces;
b) Normalisation of relations:
1. Resumption of diplomatic relations,
2. Cessation of hostile propaganda,
3. Restoration of post and telegraph services,
4. Restoration of air and sea links, including over flights,
5. Opening of border posts;
c) Improvement of relations:
1. Resumption of trade,
2. Cultural exchanges;
d) Long-term measures:
1. Ways to solve disputes,
2. Economic co-operation wherever possible,
3. Co-operation as far as possible in international organisations.
Dhar said that the draft had some good points but was lopsided in its
priorities. He gave his own draft:
a) Elements of a durable peace:
1. Renunciation of conflict and confrontation and adoption of a policy of
ensuring peace, friendship and co-operation,
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of each other,
3. Settlement of disputes by peaceful means,
4. Non-use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of each other,
5. Re-affirmation of the obligation arising out of the UN Charter,
6. Inviolability of the frontiers and boundary between India and Pakistan,
7. Prevention of the formation of private armies aimed at subversion of
the legally constituted authority of the two countries;
b) Withdrawal of forces and repatriation of prisoners;
c) Normalisation of relations:
1. Resumption of diplomatic relations,
2. Settlement of properties seized by either party during the conflicts of
1965 and 1971,
3. Resumption of air and sea traffic, including over flights,
4. Resumption of postal and telegraph facilities,
5. Opening of border posts,
6. Adequate travelling facilities,
7. Prohibition of hostile propaganda,
8. Promotion of trade and commerce and cooperation in economic matters,
and
9. Exchange in fields of science, culture and sports.
Even though there were some common points in the two drafts - Dhar listed
them - the priorities were different. No progress seemed possible. DP told
Aziz that he would send for the plane and return to India. When Bhutto
heard this, he invited DP for a meeting.
Bhutto agreed that a peace settlement should have priority over the POWs
and other problems. He thought that a step-by-step approach was the
"best one". He concurred with DP's proposal to have a durable
peace as the number one item.
When the two came to discuss Kashmir they did not talk about any
particular formula. Bhutto only said that the solution should be such as
would be acceptable to the people of Kashmir. He promised that he would
have detailed talks on Kashmir with Mrs Gandhi at the summit meeting.
Bhutto told DP what Nehru had said to him in November 1961 in London:
"Zulfi, I know that we must find a solution for Kashmir. But we have
got caught in a situation which we cannot get out of without causing
damage to the systems and structures of our respective societies."
DP assured Bhutto that India was anxious to hold negotiations with
Pakistan without any loss of time because it had a stake in "the
continuance" of Bhutto, an elected leader, in office and in the
integrity of Pakistan.
"We do not want you to fail and get another Yahya Khan (martial law
chief during the Bangladesh war) or any other military man," added
Dhar. He also said that India honestly believed that a weak Pakistan would
be a danger to India's security, but added that first things must come
first.
The document the two signed to facilitate a meeting between Indira Gandhi
and Bhutto enunciated 10 principles which would govern the talks. They
were:
1. Need to normalise relations.
2. Willingness to think afresh, casting aside the shackles of past
policies.
3. Recognition of the underlying desire of peoples in both countries for
peace and harmony in the subcontinent.
4. Need for establishment of durable peace.
5. Need for ending military conflict, and starting a new chapter of good
neighbourliness.
6. Desirability of diverting resources towards development.
7. Necessity that the summit should not fail.
8. Cooperation in other agreed fields.
9. Desirability of adequate travel facilities to both sides.
10. Cessation of hostile propaganda.
Kashmir as such was never discussed between the two sides. However, Dhar
wrote a letter to Aziz saying that he hoped that Kashmir and the
settlement of firm borders between India and Pakistan would be discussed
at the summit meeting.
The Simla agreement listed steps to normalise relations between the two
countries on the lines of documents exchanged at Murree. "A final
settlement on Jammu and Kashmir" was included in a clause relating to
the "establishment of durable peace and normalisation of
relations".
The writer, a former Indian High Commissioner to the UK and a Rajya
Sabha MP. He can be contacted at knayar-@gulfnews.com
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| Earth, a planet hungry for peace |
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| The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03). |
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| The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers in the West Bank (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03). |