Opinion, May 2003, Al-Jazeerah.info
Human Price of the Israeli Occupation of Palestine
Israeli daily aggression on the Palestinian people
Mission and meaning of Al-Jazeerah
Cities, localities, and tourist attractions
Military actions are bound to backfire,
Farhan Bokhari
Gulf
News, 29-05-2003
Chants of "death to Americans"
resonating outside the U.S. embassy in Kabul as a group of Afghan
protestors threw rocks this weekend, marks a chapter from a new episode in
Washington's entanglement with one of the world's most war ravaged
countries.
As demonstrators smashed windows of cars belonging to members of the
international peacekeeping force parked nearby protesting the killing of
four Afghans by American soldiers in an earlier incident, the challenge of
winning peace following the war, was far more glaring to be easily
ignored.
As the world waits anxiously to see the outcome of the fragile U.S.
dominated peace-building pro-cess currently underway in Iraq, the fate of
Afghanistan must be an important guiding principle for the future. In
time, experience from Afghanistan must work as an important lesson in
handling post-conflict situations, essentially pulling together the pieces
of an almost decimated political and economic system, further complicated
by the challenge of putting together a much too fragmented society.
While George W. Bush, the U.S. president, conveniently celebrates
the twin victories over Afghanistan and Iraq, his words could easily
become hollow in the face of complicating factors, not made any easier by
the periodic turmoil waiting to burst into the open. The protestors, who
gathered outside the U.S. embassy in the first round where four
demonstrators were killed, may have been the victims of accidental firing,
as American soldiers believed they were about to attack the embassy
compound.
But just as this incident demonstrates the possibility of accidental fire
looming large, so must be the danger of miscalculation leading to flawed
choices. For instance, a major political and economic power such as the
United States may well be led in to another conflict in the belief that
its many resources give it the opportunity to clearly piece together all
of the essential blocs to facilitate nation building.
The United States is clearly not in such a position of convenience,
especially at a time when Washington's capacity to rebuild nations is in
question from not only its foes but also its friends. While senior U.S.
planners believe that they're slowly but surely tackling Afghanistan,
their assumption could be no further from the honest truth. If winning the
physical turf was the parameter for judging success, Washington's success
was beyond any question.
But if winning the hearts and minds of the citizens of an occupied country
to give them the basis for a Washington led new beginning was the
essential criteria, the U.S. victory remains unconvincing.
In the case of Afghanistan, a largely tribal country, Washing-ton's
victory claim is now in danger of being further jeopardised in the face of
defiance shown by the central Asian country's many resourceful warlords,
who have traditionally accepted only a weak central government.
To this day, the failure of the U.S. backed regime of Afghan President
Hamid Karzai to establish control over large parts of Afghanistan amply
demonstrates its weakness in giving birth to a new and viable structure of
government. Historically, Afghanistan's peripheral areas outside Kabul,
the capital, have been controlled by powerful tribal leaders who have
traditionally taken it upon themselves to keep charge of their territories
while expressing loyalty to a modestly placed monarchy at the centre.
Faced with such an overwhelming historical legacy, Afghanistan's new
political masters in the shape of leaders such as Hamid Karzai may never
receive the full backing of regional leaders. For Washington, the choice
remains between overseeing an unruly transition to a government which
never assumes full control, as opposed to the far more desirable option of
a regime which at least begins overseeing relative peace over a period of
time. But such a relatively more desirable transition requires the United
States to actively work towards a four-fold set of objectives:
First, Washington's military presence in Afghanistan has unfortunately
created the basis for the Afghan public to only see the United States as
an occupying force. Even measures such as dispatching troops to parts of
Afghanistan to pursue developmental projects hardly help to dramatically
improve Washington's image. The challenge of restoring Washington's
battered image can only be pursued through working with agencies of the UN
as well as the community of international non-governmental organisations
to promote the cause of development.
Many Afghans are waiting to be assured that a community which undertakes
the long overdue reconstruction of their country is indeed not an
occupying military force which comes on its own with the fear that it
would not leave willingly.
Second, Washington's undertakings in Afghanistan, both military and
developmental, must be based on the premise that terrorism cannot be the
only driving force behind its actions.
For too long, the military campaign in Afghanistan has been pursued with
the singular objective of combating hardline militants who dabble in
terrorism. But such a singular view is bound to distort a much too
necessary wider perspective on the central Asian country. Rather than
driving its campaign only to combat terrorism, the U.S. should look upon
Afghanistan as a case where its own enlightened self-interest prompts it
to take action.
The danger of being driven mostly by the cause of combating terrorism is
mainly that such a direction only serves to reinforce the point that the
U.S. is simply incapable of taking a wider perspective.
The danger with such a narrow perspective is essentially that actions in
Afghanistan would be seen mostly as an attempt to curb a source of
terrorism without recognition that a war ravaged state left on its own
could produce fresh militant trends in times to come.
The consequence of such an approach may well be that once an objective
such as the apprehension or killing of Osama bin Laden is fulfilled,
Washington may well turn its back on Afghanistan, assuming that its end
objective has been met.
Third, in dealing with Afghanistan's future, the U.S. may choose not to
remain oblivious to militant trends across countries bordering the central
Asian state. Yet, dealing with such potentially troublesome situations has
to be done with extreme care, noting that hostile reaction to the mere
suspicion of members of militant groups such as Al Qaida existing in one
country or another does not necessarily warrant military action.
For weeks, fears have made the rounds over a possible U.S. entanglement
with Iran over unconfirmed reports that members of Al Qaida have taken
refuge there. Since the so-called evidence on the subject remains
inconclusive, its difficult to support any consideration of military
action against a country like Iran. But even if proved, Washington's
decision to use its military might in dealing with such countries must
only further complicate an already difficult situation in Afghanistan. At
a time when U.S. military campaigns in countries such as Iraq and
Afghanistan are raising the fear of Washington's hand being
over-stretched, opening yet another front promises to stretch it even
more, only to the cost of America's capacity to extract the necessary
political gains.
Ultimately, when so many military fronts are opened, Washington must live
with the prospect of loosing track of its peace-building objectives.
Finally, the capacity of the U.S. in dealing with external situations is
bound to suffer back on its home turf, faced with the difficult issue of
retaining the support of its domestic opinion.
While the war on Afghanistan appeared to have the overwhelming support of
the U.S. public, the campaign on Iraq saw the emergence of a modest
anti-war lobby. Washington's push to press ahead with its military option
in cases such as Afghanistan, or, indeed, opening new fronts, is bound to
press domestic public opinion, bringing in to question the support for the
war.
Eventually, the modest anti-war opinion of today is bound to begin turning
against such a policy. Such a change is unlikely to be the consequence of
idealism coming out on top. Indeed, the opposition to a pro-war posture
may well be driven from the all too obvious outcome which must be that
open-ended military actions are bound to eventually backfire.
Farhan Bokhari is a Pakistan-based commentator who writes on political
and economic matters. The writer can be contacted at fbokhari@gulfnews.com
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| Earth, a planet hungry for peace |
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| The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03). |
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| The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers in the West Bank (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03). |