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Emerging Shiite bloc has massive potential,

William O. Beeman

The Daily Star, 5/26/03

 

The war in Iraq has produced an unintended consequence ­ a formidable Shiite geographical bloc that will dominate politics in the Middle East for many years. This development is also creating political and spiritual leaders of unparalleled international influence.
It is easy to see the Shiite lineup. Iran and Iraq have Shiite majorities, and so does Bahrain. In Lebanon, Shiites are a significant plurality. In Syria, although they are a minority, they are the dominant power in government. They are the majority in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, and have a significant presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. The United States is used to thinking of the world in terms of individual nation-states. But the Shiites are a transnational force.
The United States unwittingly supplied the key linkage for this bloc. By destroying the secular government of Saddam Hussein, it brought that country’s Shiite majority to the fore, creating a solid line of Shiite majority nations from the Gulf to the Mediterranean.
This force is magnified because devout Shiite followers have a primary loyalty to spiritual leaders rather than secular officials, and that leadership is supremely well equipped to secure the loyalty of its followers. Shiite leaders are organized, well funded, and set up to provide charitable aid, healthcare and social welfare, a notable weakness in US occupation forces thus far.
The task of keeping tabs on Shiism is made somewhat easier for Washington since the city of Najaf, in the heart of the American occupation, is rapidly becoming the Vatican of the Shiite world. Najaf is where Ali, grandson of the Prophet Mohammad, is buried. His descendants are revered by Shiites as the only legitimate spiritual leaders of Islam.
On Monday, more than 1,000 Shiite protesters marched in Baghdad to protest the American presence in Iraq. Listening to the chants of the protesters provides a key to understanding the logic of Shiite organization: The crowd cried “No, no for America! Yes, yes for al-Hawza!” The Hawza is the influential council of Islamic clerics in Najaf. Understanding the Hawza is a key to understanding how the Shiite community is organized.
The strength of the Shiite community lies in its independent and dynamic leadership. Unlike the Sunni community, Shiites have no legal schools, and therefore no absolute fixed interpretations of Islamic law. Each believer chooses a spiritual leader ­ a person “worthy of emulation,” usually an ayatollah. The Imam Ali Foundation, run by Ayatollah Sayyed Ali al-Husseini Sistani, perhaps the most revered of all Shiite religious leaders, provided the following explanation in response to a query about the role of the spiritual leader. “You do what the (leader’s) expert opinion says you should do, and refrain from what his expert opinion says you should refrain from without any research  … on your part. It is as though you have placed the responsibility of your deeds squarely on his shoulders.” The spiritual leader is also well financed by his followers. Since Muslims must give alms as a basic religious duty, ayatollahs provide a place for these alms to be deposited. Most of them run extensive charitable organizations, many with enormous monetary resources.
The combination of financial resources and untrammeled influence over their followers makes the clerics very powerful men indeed. Fortunately, most are responsible to a fault with their power.
The Hawza assembly is necessary because ayatollahs are in competition for authority and influence. Therefore some sort of council helps provide a unified voice for the community of believers. This does not entirely prevent rivalry, especially since a number of ayatollahs are returning from decades of exile. The latest is Ayatollah Baqer al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq, who has a military group, the Badr Brigade, at his beck and call.
A rival to Hakim is Muqtada al-Sadr, whose father, revered cleric Mohammed al-Sadr, was assassinated by Saddam Hussein in 1999. Muqtada is charismatic, and is set to inherit his father’s mantle, but he is still a religious student in his 20s. Therefore he proclaims loyalty to a more senior cleric, Kadhem al-Husseini al-Haeri, who still lives in Qom, Iran. Another follower is Mohammed al-Fartusi, who runs Muqtada’s operations in Baghdad.
Sistani, as the most revered cleric, has enormous influence. He seems reluctant to make dramatic pronouncements, favoring the politics of balance, giving him effective control over the Hawza. A few savvy officials in the Bush administration hope Sistani will serve as a stabilizing force. However, they should not be too sanguine about this. Sistani is committed to Shiite rule in Iraq, and has indicated that he is losing patience with US occupation. The loyalty of his followers could make him one of the most powerful spiritual and political figures in the world.
 
William O. Beeman (William_beeman@brown.edu) teaches anthropology and is director of Middle East Studies at Brown University. He is author of Language, Status and Power in Iran, and two forthcoming books: Double Demons: Cultural Impediments to US-Iranian Understanding, and Iraq: State in Search of a Nation. He wrote this commentary for The Daily Star

 

 

 

 
Earth, a planet hungry for peace

 

The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03).

 

The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers in the West Bank (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03).

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