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India's constitution can block movement of troops to Iraq,
Abdullah
Al Madani
Gulf News, Bahrain |
Hong Kong-based Asia Times Online recently
published a report quoting reliable Indian sources on the U.S.
administration's request to New Delhi to send Indian troops to Iraq as a
part of a stabilisation force to help restore order in the country, having
been liberated from Saddam Hussain's regime.
According to Asia Times, New Delhi is now much closer to approving the
U.S. request, thanks to the intervention of the pro-Washington lobby
within the Indian decision-making institutions, said to be led by National
Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra.
The latter was in Washington in early May during which he met with senior
U.S. officials and held several lengthy meetings with his American
counterpart Condo-leezza Rice, one of which was partially attended by
President George W. Bush.
Such reports coincide with press leaks from Poland concerning the same
issue. Poland is the only country other than Albania that has so far
expressed enthusiasm about sending its military forces to Iraq for the
above-mentioned purpose.
They also coincide with news emanating from Moscow about a meeting held in
the Russian capital in mid-May between India's External Affairs Minister
Yashwant Sinha and his American counterpart Colin Powell.
It was reported that the two men discussed several issues including
India's military and humanitarian role in Iraq.
If these reports are true, the sending of Indian troops to Iraq will
repeat an old scenario that took place some 70 years ago. In the 1920s and
1930s Great Britain sought the assistance of the British Indian army to
control Iraq.
However, the only difference between that and today's scenario lies in the
fact that the Indian forces will now go to Iraq voluntarily and by a
decision of their independent government to achieve political, economic
and strategic interests for India. In other words they are not compelled
to serve in Iraq for the benefit of a colonialist power, as was the case
in the past.
The proposed Indian participation in the "Stabilisation Force"
– that Washington is seriously considering forming to enable the return
of as many of its soldiers as soon as possible in order to save them from
getting in harm's way – is an acceptable idea.
But it is not free of perils and could face fierce domestic criticism.
Indian troops are, of course, more acceptable to Iraqis than any other
foreign forces, given the close and old historical bonds between the two
peoples and the friendly relations between their governments during most
periods of contemporary history.
Moreover, the fact that the Indian army has never left the Indian
territories, whether in the past or in modern history, for invasion or
occupation of other nations and subjugating their peoples could eliminate
any misgiving in Iraqis' minds about theirrole in Iraq.
The Indian forces could also be ideally suited for undertaking their
mission in Iraq thanks to the experiences accumulated from their
participation in several international peace keeping operations.
However, deploying Indian troops in a divided Iraq and under the current
tense situations in the Middle East and South Asia, could bring India into
a Middle Eastern quagmire that it would rather do without.
In this context, some reports said that the recent explosions in the Saudi
capital, Riyadh, on May 12 may prompt New Delhi, if not already prompted,
to change its mind about sending troops to Iraq to avoid the possibility
of being targeted or rather Indian interests in the Arab and Islamic world
of being targeted by fundamentalist terrorist groups.
This is particularly relevant as the latter classify Indians on the same
level as Zionists and the Crusaders because of the dispute over the state
of Jammu and Kashmir.
Meanwhile, the Indian political forces and parties will not fail to voice
their opposition of any government decision to send Indian soldiers to
Iraq even if some economic and strategic benefits could be reaped by
India. Economic benefits may include Indian firms' guaranteed involvement
in the huge contracts for rebuilding Iraq and ensuring the flow of Iraqi
oil.
Strategic benefits may be in the form of winning Washington's friendship
and trust vis-a-vis Pakistan, enabling New Delhi to avoid U.S. pressure
for accepting unwanted arrangements towards resolving the thorny issue of
Kashmir.
Other less important gains may include steering the American attention
back to Afghanistan to rid the latter of remnants of the Taliban and Al
Qaida, both of whom are accused by the Indians of escalating the situation
in Kashmir.
It will not be a surprise to see the Congress Party leading the campaign
of opposition to the idea and creating obstacles to prevent its
implementation.
During India's national struggle for freedom and independence in the
1930s, the Congress Party's prominent leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, often
expressed through speeches and public statements his anger and displeasure
at forcing Indian citizens to join Britain's military and security
activities in Iraq.
Even though there is a great difference between the past and present, the
Congress Party may show opposition on the grounds that the government of
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee has yielded to Washington's pressure.
It is common knowledge that there is a powerful trend within the Congress
Party that holds the view that Washington's military action in Iraq and
its victory against Saddam's regime without an international authorisation
could be a precedent that would tempt the Americans to take the same
action in South Asia, hence depriving India of its nuclear capabilities.
The former Foreign Minister J. N. Dixit, who has recently joined the
Congress Party in protest against the government's mishandling of the
massacres of Muslims in the State of Gujarat, is one of the advocates of
such a view.
In addition, the idea of sending troops to Iraq will certainly be met with
opposition from the Indian Parliament.
The latter had voted unanimously against any plan involving Indian forces
in overseas military operations.
The proposal could also lead to a division within the Indian government
itself. It should be noted that the latter was divided over the U.S. war
against Iraq before announcing its disapproval of any military action that
was not backed by an international resolution.
India's relations with Iraq have been characterised by intimacy and
friendly cooperation throughout the years since the fall of General Abdul
Karim Qassim's regime in 1963.
An Indian observer holds that New Delhi will find it difficult to justify
sending its forces to Iraq to operate under American command given its
opposition to the latter's invasion of Iraq.
He argues that such a decision will make India appear as supportive of the
invasion, hence contradicting itself.
Moreover, sending Indian forces to other countries to take part in
military operations is contrary to the Indian constitution. It is true
that India has sent its forces several times to overseas trouble spots,
such as during the crises of the Korean Peninsula, Congo and Middle East,
but such forces were sent abroad as part of UN peacekeeping forces and
according to Security Council resolutions.
Indeed, India cannot deny having sent its troops in military operations to
Sri Lanka and the Maldives in the 1980s without having international
mandates. However, these two precedents can only be looked at from the
perspective of their direct link to Indian national security and being
within the scope of the overall Indian subcontinent rather than being
outside it.
In this context, it would be useful to recall the Indian position during
the war of liberation of Kuwait. The war was indeed a predicament for New
Delhi, making it face two bitter options.
This situation forced the feeble coalition government at the time to opt
to take no clear position.
In spite of the temptations of siding with the U.S.-led coalition forces
and gains from outbidding Pakistan which was one of the first group of
nations that sent forces to the Gulf (with the pretext of protecting the
holy mosques in Makkah and Madina against an Iraqi invasion), New Delhi
decided not to participate in the military effort.
Its foreign minister at that time and subsequent prime minister, Inder
Kumar Gujral justified his country's position by the existence of
constitutional restrictions.
If New Delhi is currently facing American pressure to send its forces to
Iraq, it can repeat what it had done before; citing the Indian
constitution as an excuse.
Further, it can avoid disagreement with the United States by saying that
it is prepared to send its troops to Iraq to help Washington in the
post-Saddam Hussain era but domestic considerations and safety of its
forces require having an international cover for such an operation.
The writer is a Bahrain-based Gulf researcher and writer on Asian
affairs. He can be contacted at aelmadani@gulfnews.com
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| The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03). |
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| The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers in the West Bank (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03). |