The Arab stand in 1956 in comparison to this year aljazeerah.info

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The Arab stand in 1956 in comparison to this year

Adnan Abu Odeh, the Daily Star, 3/31/03

The problem of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pitted Iraq against the UN (read Iraq against the US) for 12 years, during which, at no time did WMD become a problem between the Arabs and the UN (or the Arabs and the US). The repeatedly avowed Arab position has been, to the very contrary, that Iraq must uphold international resolutions, a phrase that first and foremost means the removal of WMD in keeping with the relevant UN resolutions. In other words, the problem is one of Iraq versus the UN.
Even when the US began to use the term “regime change in Iraq” as a synonym or alternative phrase to “removal of WMD,” the Arabs didn’t pay much attention in general, and continued to deal with the problem as one that pitted Iraq against the US or against the world body. That situation persisted until the beginning of last October, when the US resorted to the UN for the issuing of a resolution authorizing it to lead a military alliance to remove Iraq’s WMD through armed force. The move was the first turning point that signaled a transformation of the issue of Iraqi WMD into an Arab-American or even Arab-UN problem.
The official Arab position, like that of most states around the globe, crystallized around a rejection of the proposed US method, although it remained in agreement with the US aim of removing Iraq’s doomsday weapons.
When the US and Britain launched their war on Iraq the US-Iraqi conflict turned into an Arab-US conflict, in which the vast majority of Arab peoples support Iraq as an Arab state under attack, rather than an aggressive country as it was in 1990-1991. Hence, it was America that transformed a bilateral conflict between it and one Arab state into a US-Arab conflict that is, a conflict between the Arabs as a nation and the US, allied to Britain and Spain.
This is reminiscent of the 1956 tripartite aggression on Egypt, when the conflict arising from Egypt’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal was transformed from a legal dispute between one Arab state and two Western countries into a conflict between the Arabs as a nation and a British-French-Israeli alliance. Despite the many similarities between the present war on Iraq and the 1956 tripartite aggression on Egypt, there are several differences.
The first is that the 1956 tripartite aggression took place during the Cold War era, when the world was divided between two rival camps, allowing events to develop to Egypt’s advantage. But the current aggression occurs as the US tries to establish itself as the leader of the world in the absence of a counterbalancing military force that rejects its aggression.
The power confronting it is not a superpower, such as the former Soviet Union, but a legal power that expressed itself through protest demonstrations in most countries and through the stand taken by most members of the UN Security Council. The US paid no heed to either power, and went ahead with its plan.
The second difference is that the support of Arab peoples for Egypt in 1956 was prompted by a desire to preserve an Arab victory that had already been achieved, rather than by the need for an absent victory. The 1956 tripartite aggression against Egypt was in response to Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, which at the time was considered by Egypt and the Arab world as a nationalist, pan-Arab achievement against foreign colonialism. Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel-Nasser emerged from the conflict as an undisputed pan-Arab hero, giving a huge boost to the pan-Arab movement that was only stopped by the defeat of 1967.
The 2003 aggression occurs at a time when the Arabs have long complained of accumulated frustrations and pent up anger. The Arab peoples feel the powerlessness of their regimes to protect the Arab nation’s dignity, which has been humiliated by political setbacks; the failure of national economic development programs; an increase in poverty and unemployment; and the fragmentation of the Arab position vis-a-vis pan-Arab issues, particularly the Palestinian cause as the Palestinians suffer more than two years of Israeli brutality while the Arabs appear to lack the will to do anything to save the Palestinian people or regain their occupied land.
The third dissimilarity is that the Arab governments supported Egypt as it fought against the 1956 tripartite aggression. But in 2003, the Arab governments appear hesitant and frightened. This has made them less mindful of allowing their duplicity to be exposed to their peoples and the countries of the world, when, on the one hand, they sign regional or international declarations opposing aggression against Iraq, while on the other hand, they behave in line with their bilateral relations with the US, aiding it in its war on Iraq.
This gives rise to fears that the 2003 conflict will create renewed frustration amongst the Arab peoples, and the resulting anger could be directed against the entire Arab order, in contrast to the results of the 1956 aggression that gave a boost to Abdel-Nasser and uplifted the pan-Arab movement.

Adnan Abu Odeh, a former Jordanian ambassador, information minister and chief of the Royal Court

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