Musharraf faces the Peshawar dilemma, Abdullah Al Madani

Opinion, June 2003, Al-Jazeerah.info

Musharraf faces the Peshawar dilemma

Abdullah Al Madani
29-06-2003

It is gratifying to hear Pakistan's President, General Pervez Musharraf, denouncing the Talibanisation of his country. On several occasions, the most recent of which was his interview with the BBC on June 21, Musharraf clearly stated that he would not allow the Talibanisation of Pakistan and that the great majority of Pakistanis shared with him the view that the government must oppose any attempt to impose the miserable Taliban laws and practices upon aspects of life in Pakistan.

This, of course, came in response to the initiative taken by the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) to apply the Taliban-style Islamic rule in the mountainous North West Frontier Province (NWFP) where the MMA won control of the provincial assembly during the October 2002 general elections. The MMA, an alliance of six religious parties known for their strong backing of the Taliban movement, hastened to impose Shariah laws even before the Shariah bill was passed.

In NWFP's capital, Peshawar, the MMA militants challenged the central authority by tearing down advertising billboards showing women, closing cinema houses and photo shops, destroying cable TV dishes, forcing women to stay at home, forcing girls 12 years and older to wear the head-to-toe veil, and even flogging law-breakers in public squares.

In denouncing these acts, President Musharraf ignored the fact that things would not have reached this level of challenge to his authority, and to Pakistan's structures, institutions and laws, if it was not for the excessive abetting by his regime, and previous Pakistani regimes, of the Islamic fundamentalist forces to achieve short-term gains in the Kashmir and Afghan issues or to prolong their stay in power.

Needless to say that such a policy resulted in bolstering Islamic vis-à-vis liberal forces, ultimately leading to violence and intolerance in the Pakistani community, destroying the country's unity, and challenging the rule of law and state prestige.

This has reached the extent that some Pakistani cities have been turned into private states by the Islamic extremists. Perhaps the most obvious example is the city of Peshawar which, due to Islamabad's enthusiasm to intervene in neighbouring Afghanistan's affairs and the consequent promotion of Islamic Jihad, has become a stronghold of local extremist forces, an incubator for hard-line fighters from all over the world, and a refuge for every fugitive or terrorist.

For years Peshawar has played this role with the central government and ISI's backing on the plea that the outcome would be disastrous to the enemies of Pakistan in India and Afghanistan, hence achieving Islamabad's strategic interests.

Even when it was found that Peshawar served as a meeting point for dissidents and terrorist groups wanted by some Arab states, Islamabad did not take any decisive action. It preferred to disguise behind the slogan of "Pakistan's strategic interests" instead of showing its gratitude to these Arab countries, whose financial aid has always been crucial for Pakistan's survival.

For further elaboration on the way the Pakistani leaders made concessions to the hard-line forces and consequently damaged the country's future, one must focus on the developments that have taken place since the early days of the creation of Pakistan on the issue of the state and its ideological identity. It is true that Pakistan was founded by Qaid-I-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah as a religion-based state vis-à-vis secular India. However, it is also true that Jinnah's political thought, practices and way of life were closer to that of secularists.

It has been argued that his insistence on establishing an entity on a religious basis had been dictated by his political ambitions to be a sole leader. Since fulfilling such ambitions was not possible in Hindu-dominated British India, he promoted the view that Hindus and Muslims derived their inspiration from different sources of history and therefore they could not be yoked together under a single state.

In fact, following the emergence of independent Pakistan, Jinnah was of the view that religion must be limited to private life, and Pakistan should be based on democratic values, social justice, equality, and brotherhood of man. But because of his sudden death in 1948, these ideas did not materialise, marking the beginning of Pakistan's problems.

Yielded partially

Jinnah's successor, Liaquat Ali Khan, was not in a position to enter into a confrontation with the Ulama. To provide a sop to the fundamentalists, Liaquat Khan, a Western-oriented politician with a secular outlook, partially yielded to the Ulama's demands by incorporating many Islamic terms and provisions in Pakistan's first constitution of 1949.

Nevertheless, Pakistan's expectations of Muslim states rushing to embrace its idea or to draw closer to its efforts did not materialise owing to the prevalence in the Arab and Islamic worlds at that time of national independence and Pan Arabism.

Because of their failure in turning Pakistan into a state fully ruled according to Islamic law, the country's fundamentalist forces increased their pressures against the government. As a result, a new constitution based on broader ideological contents was introduced in 1956.

In this constitution, the title of the state was changed to the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan", the state became based upon Islamic principles, and no law contrary to the Quran and Sunnah could be enforced.

In addition, the constitution contained provisions whereby the head of state should be a Muslim and the government would reconstruct Pakistani society on a truly Islamic basis. Another provision underlined the need to strengthen bonds of unity and solidarity with the Islamic world.

Apart from the latter stipulation, none of the above provision was actually implemented because of the 1958 military coup led by Marshal Ayub Khan. With his powerful figure, prestige and firmness, Ayub Khan tried to bring about many modern changes in various fields including the civil administration, judiciary, personal status law, family planning.

Additionally, the 1956 constitution was abolished and a new one was introduced in 1962. In the new constitution the word "Islamic" was omitted from the state's official name and Islam only became synonymous with justice, equality and tolerance.

Moreover, Ayub Khan imposed a ban on all political parties that were demanding a purely Islamic state on the grounds that they had gone too far in focusing upon ideology, hence contributed to destroying Pakistan's national unity.

Although it was natural that such measures would be met by opposition from the conservative forces, prompting them to try and overthrow Ayub Khan's regime, yet the lack of democracy pushed the progressive and liberal forces to follow the same avenue. As a result, an era during which Pakistan witnessed a period of economic growth, stability and prosperity came to an end.

When General Yahya Khan took power following the 1967 and 1968 disturbances, the powers of the Ulama increased, a development which could be attributed to Yahya Khan's ambitions to retain the country's leadership without challenges. This had serious implications on the next phase as the fundamentalist forces managed to reinforce their position on Pakistan's political scene.

Following the secession of East Pakistan, which proved that statehood needed more than religion to survive, democracy was restored and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto became Pakistan's Prime Minister despite the attempts made by the Islamists to prevent him from coming to power.

Some 90 religious scholars issued a fatwa in 1970 calling upon Pakistanis to refrain from voting for his party on the grounds of his socialist slogans and Western lifestyle.

However, Bhutto made the mistake of his predecessors when he tried to undermine the Islamic forces by outbidding them, firstly through giving an Islamic character to his socialist policies, secondly through relinquishing the latter in favour of an Islamisation process, and thirdly through presenting himself as the major architect of Islamic solidarity in national and international politics.

It was Bhutto who introduced in 1973 a constitution with unprecedented Islamic provisions.

All these measures, could not win him the approval of fundamentalist forces as their eyes were focused on seizing power to implement their own Islamic agenda. However, General Zia-ul-Haq's coup in June 1977 provided a situation in which part of their dreams came true.

The question now is how can Musharraf deal with the current dilemma in Peshawar where the extremist forces have crossed all red lines, including ridiculing the head of state, publicly describing him as an American stooge, and warning him not to interfere? Will he dissolve the provincial assembly or launch a second coup to eradicate democracy that has allowed such a situation in Peshawar to emerge?

The writer is a Bahrain-based Gulf researcher and scholar in Asian affairs. He can be contacted on his e-mail at elmadani@batelco.com.bh

Earth, a planet hungry for peace

The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03).

The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers in the West Bank (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03).