Opinion, June 2003, Al-Jazeerah.info

 

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Message From Camp David: Special Not Strategic

 Nasim Zehra 

 Special to Arab News

 

Arab News

CAMBRIDGE, Mass., 27 June 2003 — The prestige of a Camp David Summit is merely symbolic. But while the substantive outcome of the Musharraf-Bush meeting is moot, the content of their Camp David discussions and what they told the press are nonetheless relevant. Within this context, six factors flowing from the Bush-Musharraf are noteworthy. The first is the acknowledgement of Pakistan’s operational support for counter-terrorism. Bush categorically stated: “We have had no better partner to fight terrorism than President Musharraf.” Musharraf spelt out steps taken by Pakistan in its tribal areas bordering Afghanistan to round up “non-Afghan Al-Qaeda” operators.

The second point is that there are areas where differences between Pakistani and US policy over counter-terrorism were evident. For the first time Pakistan’s president qualified Islamabad’s support against Al-Qaeda operators who “are not Pakistanis and Afghans.” He has also reportedly conveyed his disagreement — to the Blair government and now to the Bush administration — of anti-Taleban sentiment that demonizes all Talebans. Similarly, Musharraf has not agreed to the continuing US request to send troops to fight a counter-insurgency war in Iraq under US command. US and UK casualties promise to mount as Iraqis stiffen their resistance against occupation forces.

The third point is that the bilateral package contained mutual accommodation of the respective concerns of the two countries. Yet to be cleared by Congress, this projected 3 billion dollar package will comprise social sector and defense support. This reflects that the US administration accepts Pakistan’s demand to drop its opposition to military support for Pakistan. It also shows Pakistan’s acceptance of the ceiling set by the Bush administration on defense cooperation. At this point, the F-16s remain out of bounds for Pakistan, indicating that this may be special but not strategic to Pakistan-US relations.

Fourth, the signing of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) shows mutual agreement on the need to expand trade relations. This has been driven by a commitment on both sides to work for a Free Trade Agreement. The significance of TIFA is that it opens an intensive negotiations track for US and Pakistan on ways to expedite the agreement. When signed the agreement will give Pakistani products preferred access to US markets.

A fifth issue is the mutual agreement between Pakistan and the US on how to move forward in resolving the Kashmir issue. Common elements include dialogue between Pakistan and India, an end to violence by both sides and the willingness of the Pakistani and Indian leadership to acknowledge the existence of the Kashmir dispute. While categorically stating that no cause can justify terrorism, Musharraf reiterated the need to address the “core issue of Kashmir” for peace in South Asia.

The final point is US support for Musharraf’s plan for “sustainable” democracy in Pakistan. Bush acknowledged the need for democracy and, curiously, highlighted Musharraf’s commitment to improved education as an important indicator of the military president’s commitment to democracy. Musharraf meanwhile acknowledged that there is a contradiction between his commitment to democracy and his military identity, and he repeated his plan to replace “dysfunctional” democracy with sustainable democracy.

Musharraf must have shared his plans to create more space for mainstream political parties like the PPP and PML(N), with Bush anxious to increase the political space the MMA currently occupies in Pakistan’s pro-democracy struggle.

The stamp of approval for Musharraf’s “courageous leadership” from Camp David augurs well for the national security policy that is being crafted by Pakistan’s civil-military institutions, which factor in national interest, national aspirations and international realities.

However, this approval will not help him on the domestic political front. He needs to be more flexible with Pakistan’s political players and work for political national reconciliation, a factor indispensable for national progress, democracy and stability.


 

 
Earth, a planet hungry for peace

 

The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03).
The Israeli apartheid (security) wall around Palestinian population centers in the West Bank (Ran Cohen, pmc, 5/24/03).

 

 

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