The UN role in the reconstruction of Iraq

 By Dr Tayseer Abdel Jaber

The antiwar countries, namely, France, Germany and Russia, asked for a “central role” for the UN, which would go beyond humanitarian assistance to include a role in the reconstruction and political transition of Iraq.

The Arab and other countries neighbouring Iraq took a decision at their Riyadh meeting that the UN should be given an “expanded role”. This position is closer to that of the antiwar countries.

When discussing the role of the UN in the new Iraq, the following principal factors are, or should be, taken into consideration:

The UNMOVIC and IAEA, that were entrusted by the UN Security Council to inspect and destroy weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, were not allowed, by the war, to finish their task. They needed few months to conclude their work and upon their recommendation, the economic sanctions on Iraq will be lifted. The issue of WMD, that was used by the coalition as the main justification for the war, has been recently raised in Washington and London. Was it only a pretext or a real threat? But where are those WMD?

Though this might appear now as a historical issue, it will remain an important matter that will reflect on the credibility of the coalition countries. While UN Security Council Resolution 1483 referred to WMD in an ambiguous manner, the UN role in settling this issue will remain standing and will have to be “revisited”.

In accordance with the UN Charter, the UN Security Council is the international organ in charge of maintaining peace and security. While Resolution 1441 of Nov. 8, 2002, warned Iraq of “serious consequences” if it violates UN Security Council resolutions, another resolution was required to allow war on Iraq. The US and UK tried very hard to get such a resolution but without success. Therefore, as Professor Joseph Nye, Dean of the JFK School of Government at Harvard University pointed out, the war on Iraq needed international legitimacy which only the UN Security Council can provide. However, what was lacking prior to the war was offered in its aftermath. UN Security Council Resolution 1483, adopted on May 22, offered this legitimacy and, more than that, recognised the US and UK as “the occupying powers” with full authorities (and responsibilities) to rule Iraq, its people and its resources.

The UN played a major role, since 1996, in implementing the “oil-for-food” programme which was financed by Iraqi oil revenues. Such revenues were deposited in an escrow account that was used to finance Iraqi imports of civilian goods, compensations and UN-related staff and expenses. The UN used, through a special committee, to approve contracts, effect payments, pay compensations and take part in the distribution of monthly rations to 15 million or 60 per cent of the Iraqi population through thousands of outlets.

The “oil-for-food” programme was to expire on June 3. However, it was extended, it seems for the last time, and as stipulated in the UN Security Council Resolution 1483, for six months, or till Nov. 22, 2003. That is another role or function which the coalition conceded to the UN.

Another important UN role is humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people. Given that millions are unemployed, poor and lack medical care, the UN agencies can contribute to mitigating their suffering. This role is already granted to the UN by the coalition and the international community, and the door was and is still open for the operations of World Food Programme, UNICEF, World Health Organisation, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNDP and others. This role is not disputed and should be intensified and financed from their budgetary and outside sources.

Aside from the above roles of the UN which have been recognised and accepted, there are other roles that are more fundamental but have been monopolised by the occupying powers. These roles are crucial to the economic and political reconstruction of Iraq. They also reflect on the time frame of occupation (whether it will last for one, two or more years) and the credibility of its policies and actions in administering Iraqi resources. These roles are:

— Maintaining safety and security in Iraq, which the coalition has not so far been able to achieve. This can be done under the UN flag with less human casualties and better acceptance and cooperation by the Iraqi people. The UN had similar experience in other regions where UN peacekeeping forces were mobilised from among member countries. However, the UN Security Council Resolution 1483 does not give this role to the UN and has left it completely to the occupying powers.

— Reconstruction of the infrastructure and basic facilities (water, electricity, schools, health and other) which have been destroyed by the war or depreciated over the thirteen years of sanctions. The estimates for reconstruction range from $25 to $100 billion, depending on the time frame for such activities. Resolution 1483 gives full authority to the occupying powers to administer reconstruction activities through their control of oil revenues and their disbursements. The role of the UN, the IMF and World Bank will be only advisory, through the International Advisory and Monitoring Board of the newly established Development Fund at the Central Bank of Iraq.

The UN secretary general special representative to Iraq, Sergio de Mello, has only an advisory and coordinating role. The contracts that have already been awarded provide a strong indication of the future trends. The American companies Bechtel and Halliburton, and their subsidiaries, have been the main contractors to the Iraqi projects.

If a bigger role, not only advisory, were given to the Iraqi interim authority (which has been delayed) or the UN, contractors of various nationalities would compete in bidding for Iraqi projects, which will be to the advantage of both Iraq and many other countries.

The UN also has been sidelined in the political reconstruction of the new Iraq. This is a serious task and the UN had gained experience in East Timor and Kosovo. The Iraqi army and security forces have been dismantled by Paul Bremer, the coalition chief administrator of Iraq. All Baath Party cadres have been dismissed from government positions. This has created millions of unemployed Iraqis. The National Assembly that was going to be elected as a political body from which the Iraqi interim authority would have been established has been replaced by a council whose members will be appointed by the occupying powers.

The question that is raised here is the following: Can the transition from the authoritarian regime that ruled Iraq for four decades be replaced over one or two years by a democratic and market-oriented system? Empirical examples and cases show in retrospect that this desired change requires much longer time, which may extend to ten years. According to Business Week (June 2, 2003), “successful nation building takes a minimum of five years.” This will reflect on the duration of occupation and its cost and stability.

As the Time magazine (May 22, 2003) stated, “the (UNSC) resolution creates a legal framework for the US and Britain to run Iraq and sell its oil to help finance reconstruction. The antiwar nations had hoped to put the UN in charge of that reconstruction effort, and the political process of creating an Iraqi government, but UN officials will be appointed in various advisory capacities.”

While the coalition may have a clear vision of what the new Iraq should become, it does not, so far, provide a blueprint for the transition. Its actions appear to be based on trial and error, which will, over time, open up for a de facto expanded role for the UN beyond its current tasks and advisory function, into an active role in the economic and political reconstruction of Iraq. Otherwise, the human and other costs of occupation would escalate and possibly force a disorganised withdrawal.

The writer is deputy chairman, Jordan Securities Commission, former minister, UN under-secretary general and executive secretary of ESCWA. He contributed this article to The Jordan Times.