Some former intelligence officers and historians say they are seeing a worrisome pattern of Vietnam-style politicization of intelligence, with pressure to play up the threat from Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction and to minimize the potential for Iraqi resistance and the threat the war poses to regional stability.

They cite complaints from current CIA analysts as well as glimpses of deeply flawed evidence used by the administration to make the case for war, including documents purporting to show Iraq’s attempts to buy uranium from Niger for nuclear weapons. The documents turned out to be forgeries, as CIA analysts had warned before the alleged uranium quest was used by President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell to illustrate the looming danger from Iraq. More recently, as American and British troops were targeted by Iraqi irregulars, some news organizations were tipped to a secret CIA report prepared in February that detailed the threat from Saddam’s Fedayeen and other paramilitary units. The leak was a sign that intelligence officers do not want to be blamed for underestimating the resistance US troops could face. On Thursday, a dispute broke out over intelligence analysis of Saddam’s recent television appearances to determine whether they prove he survived the missile strikes that began the war. A Defense Department official told reporters all the video appearances were recorded before the war — but the CIA immediately disputed that, saying it had reached no such conclusion, according to the Associated Press. The problem of intelligence being distorted or ignored is an old one, but it is particularly acute during crises. After Sept. 11, 2001, the intelligence agencies came under fire for failing to put together the clues in time to thwart the terrorist attacks.

Now critics say the agencies have gathered relevant information about Iraq, but it has been overwhelmed by the strong convictions of the president and his top advisers.