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The 'Great War' of Sinai: How to Lose a 'War
on Terror'
By Ramzy Baroud
Al-Jazeerah, CCUN,
February 9 2015
The Sinai Peninsula has moved from the margins of Egyptian
body politic to the uncontested center, as Egypt’s strong man - President
Abdul Fatah al-Sisi - finds himself greatly undercut by the rise of an
insurgency that seems to be growing stronger with time.
Another series of deadly and coordinated attacks, on January 29,
shattered the Egyptian army’s confidence, pushing it further into a deadly
course of a war that can only be won by political sagacity, not bigger
guns. The
latest attack was a blow to a short-lived sense of gratification felt
by the regime that militancy in Sinai had been waning, thanks to a
decisive military response that lasted for months. When militants carried
out a multistage attack on an Egyptian military checkpoint in Sinai, on
October 24, killing 31 and wounding many, the Egyptian government and
media lines were most predictable. They blamed ‘foreigners’ for what was
essentially a homegrown security and political crisis. Instead of
reexamining Egypt’s entire approach to the poor region of North Sinai, the
army moved to further isolate Gaza, which has been under a very strict
Israeli-Egyptian siege since 2007. What has taken place in Sinai
since last October was predictably shattering. It was seen by some as
ethnic cleansing in the name of fighting terror. Thousands of families
were being forced to evacuate their homes to watch them being detonated in
the middle of the night, and resentment grew as a consequence. And
with resentment comes defiance. A Sinai resident,
Abu Musallam summed up his people’s attitude towards government
violence: “They bomb the house; we build a hut. They burn the hut; we
build another hut. They kill; we give birth.” Yet, despite a media
blackout in Sinai, the scene of devastation created by the military
campaign was becoming palpable. “Using bulldozers and dynamite” the army
has demolished as many as 800 houses and displaced up to 10,000, the
New York Times reported. Sisi spokesman referred to the demolished
neighborhoods as terrorist “hotbeds”. The long-discussed plan for a
“buffer zone” between Egypt and Gaza was carried out, and to a more
devastating degree than expected. The Jerusalem Post quoted the
Egyptian publication, Al-Yom a-Sab’a reporting that “the security forces
will work to clear the area of underground tunnels leading to Gaza and it
will also level any buildings and structures that could be used to conceal
smuggling activity.” But no Gaza connection was ever found. The
logic of a Gaza connection was bewildering to begin with. Attacks of this
nature are more likely to worsen Gaza’s plight and tighten the siege,
since the tunnels serve as a major lifeline for the besieged Palestinians.
If the attacks carry a political message, it would be one that serves the
interest of Gaza’s enemies, Israel and rival Palestinian factions, for
example, not Hamas. But no matter, Sisi, who rarely paused to
consider Sinai’s
extreme poverty and near-total negligence by Cairo, was quick to point
the finger. Then, he called on Egyptians to “be aware of what is being
hatched against us. All that is happening to us is known to us and we
expected it and talked about it before July 3,” he said, referring to the
day the military overthrew
Mohammed Morsi. In a televised speech, he blamed “foreign
hands” that are “trying to break Egypt’s back,” vowing to fight extremism
in a long-term campaign. Considering the simmering anger and sorrow felt
by Egyptians, the attacks were an opportunity to acquire a political
mandate that would allow him to carry whatever military policy that suited
his interests in Sinai, starting with a buffer zone with Gaza.
While awaiting the bodies of the dead soldiers in Almaza military airport
in Cairo,
Sisi spoke of a ‘great war’ that his army is fighting in the Sinai.
“These violent incidents are a reaction to our efforts to combat
terrorism. The toll during the last few months has been very high and
every day there are scores of terrorists who are killed and hundreds of
them have already been liquidated." Without much monitoring in
Sinai, and with occasional horror stories leaking out of the hermetically
sealed desert of 60,000 square kilometers, and the admission of ‘scores’
killed ‘everyday,’ Sinai is reeling in a vicious cycle.
Resentment of the government in Sinai goes back many years, but it has
peaked since the ousting of President Morsi. True, his one year in power
also witnessed much violence, but not at the same level as today’s.
Since the January 2011 revolution, Egypt was ruled by four different
regimes: The supreme military council, the administration of Mohammed
Morsi, a transitional government led by Adli Mansour, and finally the
return of the military to civilian clothes under Abdul Fatah al-Sisi.
None have managed to control the violence in Sinai. Sisi,
however, insists on using the violence, including the most recent attacks
that struck three different cities at once – Arish, Sheikh Zuwaid and
Rafah – for limited political gain.
He blamed the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) once more without providing much
evidence. The MB, in turn, released
a short
statement blaming government neglect and brutality in Sinai for the
violence, which promises to increase. Following the October
killings, I wrote: “If the intentions are to truly curb attacks in Sinai,
knee-jerk military solutions will backfire.” Others too sounded the alarm
that the security solution will not work. What should have been
common sense – Sinai’s problems are, after all complex and protracted –
was brushed aside in the rush for war. The folly of the military action in
the last few months may be registering internationally, at last, but
certainly not locally. That denial is felt through much of the
Egyptian media. A top military expert, Salamah Jawhari
declared on television that the “Sinai terrorists are clinically dead”
and the proof is the well-coordinated attacks of January 29. Per his
logic, the attacks, which targeted three main cities all at once were
'scattered', thus the ‘clinical death’ of the militants. He blamed Qatar
and Turkey for supporting the militants of Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, which, as
of November vowed allegiance to the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (IS),
announcing their new name: ‘The Sinai Province’. The massive
comeback of Sinai’s militants and the change of tactics indicate that the
war in Sinai is heading to a stage unseen since the revolution, in fact
since the rise of militancy in Sinai starting with the
deadly bombings
of October 2004, followed by the attack on tourists in April 2005, at the
Sharm el-Sheikh resort in the same year, and on Dahab in 2006. The
militants are much more emboldened, angry and organized. The
audacity of the militants seems consistent with the sense of despair felt
by the tribes of Sinai, who are caught in a devastating
politically-motivated ‘war on terror’. The question remains: how long
will it be before Cairo understands that violence cannot resolve what are
fundamentality political and socio-economic problems? This is as true in
Cairo, as it is in Arish.
- Ramzy Baroud – www.ramzybaroud.net -
is an internationally-syndicated columnist, a media consultant, an author of
several books and the founder of PalestineChronicle.com. He is currently
completing his PhD studies at the University of Exeter. His latest book is
My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story (Pluto Press, London).
***
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