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Political Football Over Disaster Relief: Another Argument for Public Banking
By Ellen Brown
Al-Jazeerah, CCUN, January 16, 2013
In a shameless display of putting politics before human needs, Congress
began 2013 still scrapping over a $60 billion Hurricane Sandy relief bill
fully nine weeks after the disaster hit. And if the Katrina experience is
any indication, the bill may not bring adequate relief to struggling and
displaced homeowners even when it is finally passed.
The damage wrought by Sandy to New York and New Jersey coastal areas was
similar in scale to that to New
Orleans from Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Just two weeks after Katrina hit,
Congress approved $62.3 billion in emergency appropriations, along with
numerous subsequent emergency funding requests to cover the damages, which
topped $100 billion. Yet as noted on the Occupy Sandy Facebook page, federal
relief funds post-Katrina were gutted in favor of “privatizing and
outsourcing relief, making room for predatory lenders, disaster capitalists,
and gentrification developers.”
Most people believe they are protected from disaster by their insurance
policies or by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
But many Sandy victims have found that their insurance policies
included obscure provisions that excluded coverage, depending on such things
as whether the disaster was officially classified as a “hurricane” or a
“tropical storm,” and whether the damage was from “wind” or “flood.”
And the only aid they have been offered by FEMA, working in
partnership with Small Business Administrative Disaster Assistance, is the
opportunity to take on more debt.
According to a report by Strike Debt:
[T]he vast majority of FEMA’s resources and efforts are spent on public
assistance grant programs that provide infrastructure restoration.
Individual victims of disaster are mostly offered personal loans to help
them “get back on their feet.” Although these loans might seem good on the
surface, they have many features of predatory subprime lending techniques
and ultimately make long-term financial burden the precondition for
“recovery.”
Disaster victims are now being expected to shoulder relief expenses that
used to be shared publicly. It is a failing of our austerity-strapped
federal disaster relief system that it offers little real help to
individuals; and it is a failing of our private, for-profit insurance system
that the legal duty of management is to extort as much money as possible
from customers while returning as little as possible to them, in order to
maximize shareholder profits.
Most Sandy Victims Are Left Stranded
The report by Strike Debt was based on observations made at a community
meeting in Midland Beach, Staten Island, on November 18, 2012, as well as on
interviews with FEMA and Small Business Association (SBA) representatives,
volunteer workers, local business owners, and residents throughout New York
City. According to the report, there are three main sources of financial
support being offered to Sandy victims: insurance, grants, and loans.
Federal support is available only once private insurance has been exhausted.
For federal aid programs, according to the report:
* Victims are required to first apply for SBA loans before qualifying to
apply for FEMA aid, placing the economic cost of the disaster on the
individual victim.
* Aid programs favor those who
can take on debt, further exacerbating pre-existing inequalities among
residents.
* Federal programs are
inflexible and fail to meet even basic individual and community needs.
* Relief options are not
clearly communicated or well understood. Policies are so complex that even
lawyers are confused.
Except for temporary living costs, FEMA grants are accessible only after the
homeowner, renter or business applies for an SBA loan.
If the applicant qualifies for a loan, he or she is not likely to be
offered further FEMA aid. Disaster loans are made on the basis of credit
history, and favorable interest rates are available only if the applicant
does not have “credit available elsewhere.” That means favorable interest
rates are offered only if an applicant cannot qualify for credit through a
commercial bank.
There is no FEMA money for small businesses other than SBA loans, and
businesses have difficulty taking on debt when they don’t know when they
will be able to reopen. The SBA application is reported to be at least 30
pages long, and is often difficult to complete because flooding has
destroyed much of the required paperwork.
Many homeowners were strained by mortgages that were underwater prior to the
storm, and their properties have now depreciated to the point of having no
market value at all. They have
no choice but to try to rebuild, but how can they take on more debt?
The focus on lending, says the Strike Debt report, moves money from
the victims of disaster into the hands of loan servicers, who make enormous
profits off these loans.
A Better Model: Disaster Relief in North Dakota
That is the state of disaster relief in most parts of the country, but one
state has developed a different model – North Dakota. North Dakota is the
only state in the union to have its own state-owned bank. The Bank of North
Dakota (BND) has a mandate to serve the public interest, and it has no
shareholders other than the state itself.
That gives it wide-reaching flexibility in emergencies, allowing it
to act quickly to catalyze and coordinate resources.
The BND’s emergency capabilities were demonstrated in 1997, when record
flooding and fires devastated Grand Forks, North Dakota. The town and its
sister city, East Grand Forks on the Minnesota side of the river, lay in
ruins. Floodwaters covered virtually the entire city and took weeks to fully
recede. Property losses topped $3.5 billion.
The response of the state-owned bank was immediate and comprehensive,
demonstrating a financial flexibility and public generosity that no
privately-owned bank could match. Soon after the floodwaters swept through
Grand Forks, the BND was helping families and businesses recover.
Led by then-president and CEO John Hoeven (future North Dakota
governor and U.S. senator), the bank quickly established nearly $70 million
in credit lines – to the city, the state National Guard, the state Division
of Emergency Management, the University of North Dakota in Grand Forks, and
for individuals, businesses and farms. It also launched a Grand Forks
disaster relief loan program and allocated $5 million to help other areas
affected by the spring floods. Local financial institutions matched these
funds, making a total of more than $70 million available.
Besides property damage, flooding swept away many jobs, leaving families
without livelihoods. The BND coordinated with the U.S. Department of
Education to ensure forbearance on student loans; worked closely with the
Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration to gain
forbearance on federally backed home loans; established a center where
people could apply for federal/state housing assistance; and worked with the
North Dakota Community Foundation to coordinate a disaster relief fund, for
which the bank served as the deposit base. The bank also reduced interest
rates on existing Family Farm and Farm Operating programs. Families used
these low-interest loans to restructure debt and cover operating losses
caused by wet conditions in their fields.
To help finance the disaster recovery, the BND obtained funds at reduced
rates from the Federal Home Loan Bank.
These savings were then passed on to flood-affected borrowers in the
form of lower interest rates.
The city was quickly rebuilt and restored.
As a result, Grand Forks lost only 3% of its population between the
1997 floods and 2000, while East Grand Forks, right across the river in
Minnesota, lost 17% of its population.
Bringing Real Security to Communities
Just as we can rely on our local public fire department to be there for
emergencies, so a public bank can be relied on to lend a true helping hand
when private banks, insurers, and FEMA may not. Unlike private insurers that
are prone to withdrawing coverage on obscure technicalities, a
publicly-owned bank is not beholden to shareholder profit-seeking; and
unlike federal disaster relief agencies, a public bank is not dependent on a
penny-pinching Congress for funds. Like private banks, it has the ability to
create money in the form of bank credit on its books, and it has access to
very low interest rates. But private banks have a business model that
requires them to take advantage of these low rates to extract as much debt
service as the market will bear. A
public bank can pass these low rates on to disaster victims and local
governments.
When the biggest private banks needed an emergency bailout, trillions of
dollars in nearly-interest-free money came flooding their way. Why? As Sen.
Dick Durbin said of Congress in 2009, “Wall Street owns the place.” The
private banking industry also owns all twelve branches of the Federal
Reserve. If we the people want the sort of security in emergencies that is
available to Wall Street banks, we need to own some banks ourselves.
Just as Occupy Sandy has pre-empted the official rescue agencies through
community organizing, so a Public Bank of New York or New Jersey could
pre-empt the vulture Wall Street banks and finance the state’s own
rebuilding. Twenty states have now introduced bills of various sorts to
establish their own banks. For
more information on the campaign in your state, see here.
_____________
Ellen Brown is an attorney and president of the Public Banking Institute.
In Web of Debt, her latest of eleven books, she shows how a private
banking oligarchy has usurped the power to create money from the people
themselves, and how we the people can get it back. Her websites are
http://WebofDebt.com, http://EllenBrown.com, and
http://PublicBankingInstitute.org
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