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A Post 'Arab Spring' Palestine
By Ramzy Baroud
Al-Jazeerah, CCUN, July 9, 2012
Will the Arab Spring serve the cause of Palestine?” is a
question that has been repeatedly asked, in various ways, over the last year
and a half. Many media discussions have been formulated around this very
inquiry, although the answer is far from a simple “yes” or “no.” Why
should the question be asked in the first place? Hasn’t the Arab link to the
Palestinian struggle been consistently strong, regardless of the prevalent
form of government in any single Arab country? Rhetorically, at least, the
Arab bond to Palestine remained incessantly strong at every significant
historical turn. True, disparity between rhetoric and reality are as
old as the Arab-Israeli conflict. But the relatively small divide between
words and actions widened enormously following the Arab defeat in the 1967
war, which cemented US-Israeli ties like never before. The war
brought an end to the dilemma of independent Palestinian action. It shifted
the focus to the West Bank and Gaza, and allowed the still dominant Fatah
party to fortify its position in light of Arab defeat and subsequent
division. The division was highlighted most starkly in the August
1967 Khartoum summit in Sudan, where Arab leaders clashed over priorities
and definitions. Should Israel’s territorial gains redefine the status quo?
Should Arabs focus on returning to a pre-1948 or pre-1967 situation?
The PLO insisted that the 1967 defeat should not compromise the integrity of
the struggle. It also stressed that Palestine – all of Palestine – was still
the pressing issue. Then-Egyptian President Jamal Abdel Nasser’s messages
seemed, for once, befuddled, although he continued to advocate conventional
military confrontation with Israel. Syria, on the other hand, didn’t attend
the summit. International response to the war was not promising
either. The United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 242 on Nov.
22, 1967, reflecting the US’ wish to capitalize on the new status quo
(Israeli withdrawal “from occupied territories” in exchange for
normalization with Israel). The new language of the immediate post-1967
period alarmed Palestinians, who realized that any future political
settlement was likely to ignore the situation that had existed prior to the
war, and would only attempt to remedy current grievances. Then, the
boundaries of the conflict permanently changed. For some, Palestine and its
conflict became more of a burden than a shared responsibility. Official Arab
solidarity with Palestinians become a form of everyday politics – essential
to claim relevance to greater Arab causes, but extraneous in terms of
substance and application. Present-day Palestinian leaderships –
since there are several bodies that claim to represent Palestinians
“everywhere” – also learned how to stage-manage official Arab manipulation
of Palestine. They often did so out of desperation, as they urgently needed
a physical base and sources of financial support. Over time, it
became clear that official Arab solidarity with Palestine was mostly –
although not entirely – a farce. The solidarity they speak of is either
entirely nonexistent, or grossly misrepresented. Palestinian communities in
various Arab countries are treated with suspicion at best. Those who never
tired of publicly calling for freedom for Jerusalem failed to treat
Palestinian refugees with respect. They refused entry to stateless
Palestinians and denied Palestinians work and permanent residence. Many
Palestinians surely concluded that one must learn to differentiate between
Arab peoples and Arab governments. Since the latter mostly dominate the
former without legitimate mandate, it was foolish to expect official Arab
institutions to lead any substantive action to end the subjugation of
Palestinians. That is, until several Arab nations revolted. The more
genuine and inclusive the revolt, the more representative the outcome has
been. A sudden surge in popular solidarity with Palestine in Tunisia
replaced bashful but real attempts by the former Tunisian regime to
normalize relations with Israel. Per Israeli calculations, Arab
peoples are dismissible. They are a non-entity. But now Israel is forced to
revisit that old calculation. Its fears that Egypt’s new president, Muhammad
Mursi will shun, or at least revisit the Camp David peace treaty – signed
between Egypt and Israel in 1979, with the ultimate aim of sidelining Egypt
from a conflict that remains essentially “Arab” – are well-founded. But
Mursi is not the one that is truly feared, and nor is his Muslim
Brotherhood. The trepidation stems from the fact that a truly democratic
Egypt is unlikely to work in tandem with US-Israel to further pressure and
isolate Palestinians – or sideline Egypt from its Arab context. Israel and
its allies fear genuine Egyptian democracy. With the notable shifts
that may redefine Palestine’s position within Arab priorities, one cannot
ignore the fact that several Arab countries continue to normalize with
Israel, oblivious to any seasonable political changes in the region. They do
so as if there are hidden hands that wish to balance the possible losses in
Tunisia and Egypt, with gains elsewhere. Palestinians in Gaza, as elsewhere,
still speak of Arab solidarity with passion, but also with obvious
bitterness. They still pray for their brethren to come to the rescue. The
older generation speaks of the bravery and sacrifices of many Arabs who
fought alongside Palestinians. But the generational expectations have also
been altered. Palestinians simply want real solidarity. They want to see
Palestinian communities treated with respect and a complete end to Arab
normalization with Israel. - Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net)
is an internationally-syndicated columnist and the editor of
PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is My Father Was a Freedom Fighter:
Gaza's Untold Story (Pluto Press, London.)
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