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What Did Doha Conference Do for Efforts to
Combat Climate Change?
By Curtis FJ Doebbler
Al-Jazeerah, CCUN, December 17, 2012
The latest round of global climate talks known as COP18 finally
came to an acrimonious end on Saturday night, almost a day later than had
been planned. It was a messy end and to many it was a very unsatisfactory
one. States appeared more interested in not pleasing their gracious
Qatari hosts than in making progress towards addressing the adverse effects
of climate change that have been increasingly dangerous to human beings.
States seemed to be oblivious to the typhoon that took hundreds of lives in
the Philippines during COP18 and Hurricane Sandy caused 60 billion US
dollars of damage in the United States just days before the meeting started.
The Doha meeting was taking place at a crucial time as the first
commitment period Kyoto Protocol—the main treaty containing obligation for
States to control the emission of greenhouse gases that cause climate
change—was coming to an end. This meant that, if a new commitment period was
not agreed, States would not have meaningful legal obligations to limit
greenhouse gas emissions. This new commitment should have
been agreed years ago. In 2007 at COP3 in Bali, States agreed to work in two
tracks. An Ad-Hoc Working Group on Longterm Comprehensive Action (AWG-LCA)
and an Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP). It was expected
that negotiations in the AWG-KP would result in a second commitment period
to be adopted at COP15 in Copenhagen, Denmark. Indeed, this meeting received
tremendous fanfare and was attended by about a hundred heads of States and
government and almost 50,000 State representatives and civil society
observers. The latter particular hoped for a more ambitious second
commitment period as required by the evolved warnings of science.
The Copenhagen meeting did not deliver the anticipated result. Instead,
States led by the United States with its President Barak Obama attending,
forced a result that called only for voluntary pledges on emissions. This
undermined the legal regime that had been put in place by the Kyoto
Protocol. The spectra of voluntary pledges for the historically largest
polluters even appeared to undermine the most basic principles, such as that
of common but differentiated responsibilities, in the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change which virtual every had ratified.
Doha continued the lack of ambition and lack of responsible action.
An ambitious limit on greenhouse gas emissions was not among the final
decisions despite the fact that these outcomes were the priorities for
almost every one of the almost two hundred countries present and the
hundreds of environmental activists. For developing countries, the much
needed sharing of the financial burden of combating climate change was also
denied by rich developed countries who were too worried about their own
economies at home to live up to obligations they undertook more than two
decades ago. A Lack of Ambition Thus the two main hopes for
the conference—ambitious emission cuts and adequate funding—were not
achieved. All that was agreed were the most meagre promises to keep working
on it for another year to implement the UNFCCC and a few very small steps in
the direction of responsible action. States did agree to a second
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, but with such a low level of
emissions cuts that it hardly seemed worth the effort. Nevetheless,
Executive Director of the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Christina Figueres (@CFigueres), made
the most of this meagre accomplishment tweeting “[a]ll #COP18 decisions
adopted by acclamation. We have a Second Commitment Period of the Kyoto
Protocol!!!” But if the UNFCC was upbeat, most States and observers found
even the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol's second commitment period an
anti-climax because of the low ambition it reflected. With emission cuts in
excess of 45% are needed, the new Kyoto commitment period calls for
emissions cuts that are less than 20%. Moreover, it does include the States
responsible for almost 85% of total global greenhouse gas emissions.
For environmental activists this was much too little and for environmental
scientists it was, they said, probably too late. Although they said that the
ambition of States and observers had been very low from the start, for many
the outcome was still disappointing. Mr. Alden Meyer of the Union
of Concerned Scientists, for example, warned that the real winners in Doha
were the coal industry and oil industry. The NGO International-Lawyers.Org
lamented that action was not taken that was consistent with what was
required by the science and the existing international law. Article 2 of the
UNFCCC calls upon States to act to ensure that greenhouse gases do not reach
a dangerous level in the atmosphere. The 2007 Assessment Report from the
reputable International Panel on Climate Change indicated that significantly
more ambitious action was needed to achieve this goal. The Doha outcome
makes little if any progress towards meeting this obligation. A
Climate Summit Beset by Organizational Problems The conference was
rife with organizational problems from the start. It was clear the Qatari
government lacked the expertise to host the conference both logistically as
well as substantively. The Qatari President of the COP18, Abdulla Bin Hamad
Al-Attiyah , the Deputy Premier of the small Gulf hereditary monarchical
State, had to enlist ask oil companies to second staff to advise him,
according to one of his advisers who sought to remain anonymous. The dozens
of oil company lawyers and policy adviser that Qatar's riches bought,
however, knew little or nothing about about climate change. Despite his
constantly amiable manner both the Qatari President and his team seemed
overwhelmed. Delegates were also frustrated by the Karwa buses that
didn't run as scheduled, frequently failing internet connections in some
areas of the huge conference venue, a lack of information about here and
when meetings were taking place, and hiked up prices at hotels and taxis
that regularly charged double usual rates. The frustration reach such point
that a Chinese delegate in a statement to COP18 compared the unhappy
compromise reflected in the decisions the conference was considering to the
poor food being served trough out the conference center. Qatar did
not help its image by arresting and deporting youth who had protested
Qatar's own lack of ambitious contributions to cutting their greenhouse gas
emissions. This drew further attention to the fact that Qatar is the biggest
per capita emitter of greenhouse gas emissions in the world and would rather
talk about it than do something about it. And as if to deflect
attention from the deadlocked negotiations, during its first week a Qatari
court handed a life sentence to the poet who had become famous for his
inspirational support for the Tunisian popular uprising, Mohammad ibn al-Dheeb
al-Ajami, for criticizing Qatar's hereditary ruling class for failing to
relinquish political power to elected officials. A Very
Unsatisfactory Process But If COP18 was a public relations fiasco
for Qatar, it may turn out to be an even greater disaster for the future of
our planet. In recent years a lack of ambition and vaguely worded promises
to keep trying have delivered very little on either emissions limitations or
financing. Yet, once again this is how another COP ended. Friends of
the Earth climate campaigner Mr. Asad Rehman called the compromise that was
reached unacceptable and called on States to reject it. The Stockholm
Environment Institute's climate & policy research team tweeted that the
“climate talks fail to deliver on urgent issues, hit developing countries
hard.” Indeed as Ministers of Environment began to arrive mid-way through
the second and last week, the possibility of no outcome at all loomed over
the conference. Some activists argued this was the most honest outcome at
which the Parties could arrive. A handful of countries discussed this
possibility as well. The President responded to the impasse by
reminding States that he was at home and that he was willing to take as long
as necessary to get a result. Still no sign of a willingness to make needed
cuts in greenhouse gas emissions or on the provision of finance by developed
countries was emerging. On these two crucial issues both sides were digging
in their heels. It was only as negotiations ran through the night on
Thursday and at the daily stocktaking held on Friday that it appeared that
an agreement could be reached. At the same time it became clear that if this
was to be the case it would be at a low common denominator, but one that
gave enough to everyone that it could not be refused. By this time
the Qatari chair had asked the assistance of Mr. Luiz Alberto Figueiredo
Machado , the Under-Secretary-General for Environment, Energy, Science and
Technology at Brazil's Foreign Ministry. Machado had been one of the driving
forces behind the outcome of the Rio+20 Conference in June 2012. His
imposition of discipline on States negotiating the Rio+20 outcome had
overrode dissent and virtually imposed an agreement. In Doha, however, he
was in less familiar territory and had to work with the much less
experienced Qatari hosts than in Rio+20. Nevertheless, with the
help of other experienced negotiators, like South Africa's Foreign Minister
Ms. Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, and buoyed by a constant stream of bi-lateral
and multilateral meetings, by the time COP18 was into extra-time on Friday
night it was apparent that an agreement was on the way. It also became
evident that it was being driven less by the already agreed legal
obligations of States or the science, but more by political expediency and
the need not to insult the host country by walking away without anything at
all. When the stocktaking, planned for early Saturday morning
finally convened in mid-afternoon, most observers began to suspect that a
text would emerge that no State could reject. Hours later when the text
appeared that expectation was bourne out. It also became clear that the
compromise text would have to be drawn up by the Presidency and his
advisers. For example, after all night negotiations on loss and
damage provisions—a broad term for compensation to countries effected by
climate change or having to make a special effort to mitigate their
emissions—States had arrived at four or five alternatives that the
facilitator agreed to pass to the President. Nevertheless, only one slightly
tweaked proposal for action appear in the final text on loss and damage.
By Saturday a sense of urgency and fatalism had set in. Many developed
countries had been depleted of their best people who had to depart on
pre-booked flights that they could not change. And at the same time, some of
the larger countries increased their competitive advantage to the point that
developing States feared an agreement would be based on the influence of
only developed countries interest. The final compromise was slightly more
balanced, but still denied developing countries, the overwhelming majority
of States their key demands. A Very Unsatisfactory Process Outcome
The decision on the Kyoto Protocol brought the Ad-Hoc Working Group on
this treaty to a close by establishing a second commitment period. The
commitments, however, make it probably that temperatures will rise globally
as much as an average of 4 degrees Celsius. There are only vague future
half-promises to consider a high ambition in the future. If past promises
are an indication, such promises count for little. Some countries
point to a victory limiting carbon trading and the fact that the decisions
related to the Kyoto Protocol generally prevent States from carrying unused
rights to pollute into the second period of the commitment to cut emissions.
This might turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory because it may also lead to a
significant cut in funding to the Adaptation Fund which benefited from a tax
on carbon trading and for which no alternative form of financing was agreed.
A delegate from Japan, one of the States effected, explained that Japan will
continue to accumulate the pollution rights or credits as this is not
prohibited, but “will use the credits in [its] internal carbon market where
no tax has to be paid.” Moreover, having lost on ambitious mitigation
targets and financing it is hard to view the limits on carbon trading as
much of a victory. At the same time as carbon trading is limited,
the exploration of new market mechanisms is encouraged. Developing States
have ensured that non-market mechanisms will also be considered, but this is
more by implication than the clear one page of text that calls for the
consideration of new market mechanisms. Almost half the outcomes
that were adopted concerned financial matters. Nevertheless there was no
commitment to new and additional financing and no real consideration of how
to ensure financing. The developed countries had offered 30 billion USD in
fast-track funding and 100 billion USD by 2020. This figures was already low
as the World Bank, UNEP and the South Center have estimated that as much as
1.1 trillion will be needed every year to assist developing countries in
limiting their emissions and in adapting to the harm being caused by climate
change. Estimate also call for another trillion USD for technology transfer
that is called for in the UNFCCC. Even the insufficient amounts of 30 and
100 billion were not forthcoming. Several States did make pledges to the new
Green Climate Fund (GCF), which was launched in 2012, but not one penny has
yet been deposited. The GCF remains without funds. Furthermore, several long
existing climate funds remain underfunded with no clear plan as to where new
and additional funding will come from despite the fact developed countries
are obliged to provide such funding in the UNFCCC. The grand text on
a Longterm Cooperative Action, which had been the subject of an Ad Hoc
Working Group was being closed down, but offered mainly linguistic responses
to the demands of the developing countries and the requirements the UNFCCC.
The linguistic victories included, as Bolivian chief negotiator Mr.
René Gonzalo Orellana Halkyer pointed out that “Mother Earth, equity,
equitable access to sustainable development as part of the right to
development are incorporated.” The seminal principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities is also include in the text on Longterm
Cooperative Action. All of these are principles that developing countries
having been urging the COP to take on board. There was, however, no
reference to human rights, despite the fact that there had been in earlier
LCA texts and the fact that the UN Human Rights Council has indicated that
climate change is one of the most significant challenges to human rights in
this century. The real test, however, will be whether States will also act
in accordance with these principles. Finally, a new Durban Plan of
Action provided only aspirations for action to cutting emissions and on
adequate financial assistance to developing countries. It was a struggle to
even get the some States, again led by the United States, to even agree to
ensure the Durban Plan of Action work was consistent with the UNFCCC.
Felting Hope In the end it seemed like little progress was made
towards the urgent need to deal with the adverse consequences of climate
change despite the fact that the global climate meeting, dubbed COP18,
started just days after Hurricane Sandy ravished the United States and as
the meetings was ongoing hundreds of Filipinos were killed by a tropical
storm. Although climate skeptics were increasingly out of fashion, ambitious
action still seemed to be in short supply. The Philippines Climate
Change Commissioner and Deputy Head of Delegation, Mr. Mr. Naderev Saño,
made several impassioned pleas' for adequate action tearfully recalling the
recent natural disaster that befell his country. He cautioned delegates that
that they had to take urgent adequate action asking “[i]f not us, then who?
If not now, then when? If not here, then where?” To wake negotiating
State representatives, civil society observers, and business representatives
at the start of what was supposed to be the closing session a video song as
played with young people calling for action on climate change. The
impassioned calls of the youth and views of the majority of States just
didn't seem to be enough to overcome the indifference of the small minority
of a few rich and powerful States that just refused to take adequate action
to protect our planet's atmosphere. The future does not look
bright. Having held COP18 in the country with the highest per capita
greenhouse gas emissions, next years will be in the country that single
handedly has been holding back the European Union from making greater
emissions cuts. The Polish hosts will have their work cut out for them if
they are not to be branded a pariah in the global forum for international
climate change action. They will have to ensure the ambition that was
missing this year while at the same time ensuring that funds are put on the
table by developed countries. Neither of these aspirations look very
realistic at the end of COP18. At the end of the annual Climate Summit only
the rapidly increasing destructive effect of climate change look like a sure
thing.
Dr. Curtis FJ Doebbler, visiting adjunct professor of law at Webster
University.
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