Richard Lightbown explains what controls the opening of the Rafah
Crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip and briefly considers if this
might change in the future.
Hopes that the popular uprising in
Egypt will lead to the permanent opening of the Rafah Crossing into the Gaza
Strip suffered a setback on 13 March when an Anglo-French medical team of
three surgeons was denied entry into the Strip by Egyptian officials. No
reason was given for refusing a visit that had been arranged in conjunction
with the French embassy two months previously. According to a report by
Gisha, an Israeli
organization that challenges restrictions on Palestinian movement, entitled
“Rafah Crossing Who Holds the Keys?” Israel, not the Egyptian government
largely controls the Rafah Crossing. The other key players are the Hamas
government, the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Ramallah, the European Union
and the United States. It is no surprise then that the situation remains
much as it did before the Egyptian revolt.
The 2005 agreement on movement and access
The operation of the Rafah Crossing is run according to the Agreement on
Movement and Access (AMA) between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel
which was brokered by Condoleezza Rice in November 2005. This was a
comprehensive plan for the normalization of movement for people and goods
within the Palestinian territories and across Palestinian borders. All
crossings were to be open by the end of 2005 and were to operate
continuously, while the refurbished crossing at Karni was intended to allow
400 trucks a day to pass between Israel and Gaza by the end of 2006. (In
January and February this year, just before it was permanently closed, the
crossing handled an average of 136 trucks per day, despite Israel’s
well-publicized “easing” of the closure.)
Under the AMA the Rafah
Crossing opened on 26 November 2005 for Palestinian identity card holders
and other designated persons. It was also intended to cater for the export
of goods, and for cars once sophisticated search equipment had been
inaugurated. The EU had agreed to supply officials to ensure proper
procedures were followed. Cargo imports from Egypt were to enter Gaza
through Kerem Shalom in the southwest corner of the Strip where they would
be cleared by PA officials under Israeli supervision. A further part of the
agreement was that Israel would not close any of the crossings as the result
of a security incident that was unconnected with the crossing itself.
The Israeli military presence which had controlled the Gaza facilities
at Rafah since January 2001 was withdrawn under the agreement, but Israel
did not relinquish control. Despite claims to have lifted the occupation of
Gaza, Israel still retains total control of the Palestinian population
registry. This determines who is officially resident and therefore eligible
to use the crossing. (Palestinians who are designated non-resident must
enter and leave Gaza by the Erez Crossing from Israel.) Israel also has the
right to veto the use of the facility to foreigners, and it can close the
crossing simply by ensuring that the conditions for its opening are not met.
The AMA requires that Israel supervises passengers from its control room at
Kerem Shalom, while the EU observers who are billeted at Ashkelon need to
enter Gaza through Kerem Shalom. Both conditions have been denied on the
whim of Israeli authorities. (It is not clear why EU personnel are not
accommodated in the Egyptian resort of Al-Arish, which is nearer to Rafah
than Ashkelon and has a number of hotels including one five-star facility.)
Closures of the crossing
Following the signing of the Oslo accords in 1994 hundreds of trucks
crossed through Rafah, but the crossing was closed (in breach of the
agreement) for more than 70 per cent of the time during the year following
the second intifada in 2000. Traffic increased again during 2004
but imports through Rafah ceased under the Israeli disengagement plan in
September 2005. The passage of exports was also denied, contrary to the AMA,
However around 1,300 people passed each way during the nine-and-a-half hours
the crossing was open each day.
The agreement was breached again when
the crossing was closed following the capture of Gilad Shalit on 25 June
2006 and for the next year it remained closed for 86 per cent of the time.
The occasional openings were at random and at only two days’ notice,
rendering forward travel plans impossible. It also left Gaza residents
stranded in Egypt for days or sometimes weeks.
After Hamas took
control of the Gaza Strip Israel implemented its policy of closure of the
territory. Rafah Crossing was closed to all traffic after 9 June 2007 when
Hamas evicted the Presidential Guard and prevented the PA from fulfilling
its designated duties. Because of EU policy not to deal with Hamas the
observer force was also suspended. (Apparently political principles override
humanitarian considerations.) In consequence thousands were again stranded
on the Egyptian side of the border, surviving in rented rooms and tent camps
while descending into penury. More than one thousand of them were patients
returning after treatment in Egypt, 14 of whom died during July 2007. An
Israeli proposal for them to return by Kerem Shalom was scuppered when Hamas
shelled the crossing. An arrangement was finally agreed between Egypt,
Israel and the PA at the end of July 2007 whereby 6,374 people entered
Israel by the Nitzana Crossing and were then bussed to the Erez Crossing to
enter Gaza.
Egyptian unilateral Openings
In December 2007 Egypt allowed 2,200 pilgrims through the crossing to go
to the Hajj in Mecca, without coordinating this with either the PA or
Israel. (Israel had allowed a further 700 to pass through Erez in order to
travel via Jordan.) Upon their return Israel had requested that the pilgrims
be allowed back through an Israeli-controlled crossing, which the Egyptian
authorities originally agreed to. Fearing investigation and detention in
Israel the pilgrims refused to comply and they were allowed to return via
Rafah after violent protests. Israel protested that this contradicted
agreements.
After a large section of the border wall was blown up by
Hamas militants in January 2008 Egypt unilaterally allowed a small number of
students to pass on to Cairo airport. While Gazans stormed the border to buy
goods Israel and the US applied pressure on Egypt to “solve the problem”.
The border was again closed on 3 February by arrangement with Hamas. However
the crossing was reopened early in March after the Ministry of Health in
Gaza had declared a medical emergency following clashes between Gaza forces
and the Israeli army. One hundred and seven Palestinians had been killed and
250 injured. The crossing opened again between 31 December and 5 February
2009 in similar circumstances during Operation Cast Lead. After the war
openings returned to an irregular format forcing students with overseas
placements and patients requiring medical aid to cross the border through
the tunnels. Only state terrorism on the high seas against the Gaza flotilla
finally shamed the Egyptian government to go it alone and open the crossing
on a regular basis. Representatives from
Physicians for
Human Rights – Israel told the
Turkel Commission in October that this had allowed supplies of medical
equipment and medications that had not been available before the flotilla
raid. (Turkel completely ignored this testimony when writing their report.)
Policy influences past and future
Pro-Israel lobbying of members of the US Congress resulted in a proposal
in the House of Representatives to withhold 200 million dollars of Egypt’s
1.3 billion dollars military aid budget against certain requirements. This
included stopping arms smuggling into Gaza (while inevitably restricting
other traffic). This was later substituted for an allocation of 23 million
dollars from the budget to pay the cost of sending engineering teams to
Rafah to detect tunnels. Egypt also increased its activities against the
tunnels during the summer of 2008.
The official Egyptian position
under President Hosni Mubarak was that the crossing remained shut because it
was not possible to implement the AMA. Unofficially it was acknowledged that
there were objections from the US, Israel and Europe, while Hamas
affiliation with Mubarak’s political opponents, the Muslim Brotherhood,
influenced the decision. Israeli intentions to seal its borders with Gaza
(while presumably maintaining its illegal naval blockade) have long been
suspected and were voiced publicly by Foreign Minister
Avigdor Lieberman in 2010. The previous Egyptian leadership was
unwilling to have the political and economic responsibility of Gaza dumped
upon it in this way.
Israel does not want an independent state in the
Gaza Strip with free access to the Western and Arab worlds which could
become the centre of the Palestinian struggle for liberation. This might
impinge on its policy of stealing portions of the West Bank. Much could
depend on how the popular revolt evolves in Egypt. Despite the initial
empowerment of a population sympathetic to the plight of Gaza the end result
is still uncertain and the cost to the economy has been extreme. (Income
from tourism had exceeded 10 billion dollars in 2010. In February 2011 a
Press TV film crew found a solitary Japanese tourist trying to blag her way
into the pyramids.) At the moment remnants of the old guard remain in
positions of power where they will be susceptible to economic pressure from
the US, aimed to a large extent at looking after Israel’s interests. From
within these competing groupings the future operation of the Rafah Crossing
will be decided in the short term. In the medium term it remains to be seen
how serious Mahmoud Abbas is in seeking a Palestinian reconciliation, which
would allow for a normal resumption of the AMA. For the moment the
status quo appears to prevail and Israel’s unremitting stranglehold on
everyday life in Gaza remains largely intact.
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