An Undisciplined Defense: Understanding the $2 Trillion
Surge in US Defense Spending
PDA
Al-Jazeerah, ccun.org, April 12, 2010
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Contours of the surge
The rise in US defense spending since 1998 has no precedent in all the
years since the Korean war. It most readily compares with two earlier,
but lesser spending surges: the 1958-1968 surge of 43% and the 1975-1985
surge of 57%. The post-Cold War retrenchment of the US military reached its
limit in 1998 with DoD’s budget settling at an ebb point of $361.5 billion
(2010 USD). If we treat the 1998 budget level as a “baseline” and project it
forward to 2010 (adjusting for inflation), we find that the total amount of
funds that have been given to DoD above this level during the years
1999-2010 is $2.15 trillion (in 2010 dollars). This figure constitutes what
we call the post-1998 spending surge. (All told, DoD budget authority for
the period was $6.5 trillion in 2010 dollars).
The rebound in annual defense spending reached its recent peak in 2008:
$696.5 billion (2010 USD) – which is 92.7% above the 1998 level. The
portion unrelated to contingency operations (the so-called “base” budget)
was $503 billion that year – which is 41% higher in real terms than in
1998. Total DoD budget authority receded slightly in 2009 and 2010. But
it now seems likely that 2011 will set a new high – somewhat over $700
billion in DoD’s authority to spend.
Looking forward, the Obama administration’s 2010 budget plan allocates an
average of $545 billion (2010 USD) per year to the DoD base budget for
2011-2017. In addition, it set aside a “place keeper” sum of $50 billion per
year for military operations, recognizing that actual war costs will vary.
(And , indeed, the Pentagon already is expected to request at least $163
billion for contingency operations in 2011.)
Whether one looks at the total DoD budget, or just that portion not
attributable to today’s wars, US defense spending is now stabilizing at
levels significantly above Cold War peaks (adjusted for inflation) and far
above the Cold War average, in real terms.
Measured in 2010 dollars, average DoD budget authority was:
2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
# $423 billion for the period 1954-2001; # $517 billion for the Reagan
years; and, # $495 billion for the Vietnam War “high tide” years
1966-1970.
All told, the Obama administration plans to spend at least $5 trillion
(2010 USD) on defense during 2010-2017, which is 5% more in real terms
than the Bush administration authorized for 2002-2009. As this is
occurring, the United States is also entering a period of economic
uncertainty marked by increasing demands and constraints on federal
resources. By 2011, gross federal debt will surpass 100% of GDP. And it will
remain above that threshold for the foreseeable future.
The most ready explanation for the post-1998 spending surge is that it is
due largely to post-9/11 military operations. In fact, however, these
operations account for just 52% of the surge (and only 17% of total
spending during this period). Moreover, the wars have themselves been
exceptionally expensive by historical standards. Measured in 2010
dollars, the Korean conflict cost $393,000 per person/year invested; the
Vietnam conflict cost $256,000; and the Iraq and Afghanistan commitments,
$792,000 so far. Rather than adequately explain the post-1998 spending
surge, the high cost of recent military operations only adds to the
explanatory burden.
2. The reallocation of DoD funds Related to the rise in spending, the
allocation of DoD funds among appropriation categories also has changed,
and this provides some important clues about cost drivers. The four major
appropriation categories are Personnel, Procurement, Research and
Development (R&D), and Operations and Maintenance (O&M). Looking at spending
patterns in the 1990s and during the first decade of the new century we
find: Overall spending When divided by the number of full-time
military personnel, DoD budget authority appears remarkably stable
throughout the 25-year period 1983-1998. It begins to rise in 1998,
accelerating sharply with the onset of the Iraq War. For 2007-2010, it
averaged $459,000 per full-time person in uniform. This is 78% higher than
the Reagan peak, 95% higher than in 1989, and nearly three times the
inflation-adjusted peak during the Vietnam era.
O&M spending
The proportion of defense spending allotted to Operations & Maintenance
has risen from 31% in 1989 to 41% today. Calculated on a per person
basis, O&M spending began to climb in the early 1990s. It further
accelerated in two bursts beginning 1999
AN UNDISCIPLINED DEFENSE 3
and 2003. In real terms, it is today 2.5 times as much per person as it
was at the peak of the Reagan surge. About 85% of DoD’s civilian
payroll is counted as an O&M expense. Over the years, the civilian
payroll portion of O&M spending has mostly varied between 30% and 50%.
Much of the remainder of O&M costs involve DoD purchases of goods and
services. Since 1989, the “goods and services” portion has grown
significantly, however. Today, it claims around 80% of the O&M budget.
And, within this trend, the portion that is contractor services has
grown.
Military personnel spending
During the 20-year period 1981-2000, budget authority for personnel
varied by only a few percent around an average of $73,200 (2010 USD) per
person. It then rose by 46% between 2000 and 2010. The increase was
enough to bring total personnel expenditures back up to Cold War levels –
for a military only 69% as large. Modernization spending This category
combines R&D and procurement spending. Over the thirty-year period
1980-2010, modernization spending has moved in a boom-bust cycle, which is
historically typical for this category. Of course, what is atypical about
the 1980-2010 period is that it straddles the end of the Cold War.
Reviewing the pattern in modernization spending, however, this event
seems to register as little more than a routine dip.
Total modernization spending was 32% lower in the 1990s than in the
1980s. After 1998, however, it began to rebound. For the 2000-2009
period, it was near the 1980s level in real terms. In per person terms,
however, modernization spending for 2000- 2009 surpassed the 1980s level
by 47%.
Comparing just the past four years (2007-2010) with the four peak Reagan
years (1983-1986) shows current procurement spending to be 40% higher in
real per person terms. In similar terms, R&D spending is 135% higher.
Shifts in spending priorities Looking at how the four main “accounts”
have fared relative to each other shows O&M spending to have advanced
most significantly. Its relative importance began to increase in the
early 1990s. Research & Development funding followed a similar
trajectory. Procurement, by contrast, has become more important relative
only to military personnel spending, which has slipped in importance.
4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The greater emphasis on modernization spending relative to personnel
spending does not mean that US military power has become much more
capital intensive than it was in 1989, however. This is because the
principle budget shift, which has been toward a greater emphasis on O&M
spending, actually involves a significant expansion of DoD’s workforce –
by means of contract labor.
3. Explaining the spending surge
Three distinct, but related processes contributed to the exceptional rise
in defense spending after 1998 and to its present stabilization above
Cold War levels. These processes also shaped the reallocation of funding
among appropriation categories.
3.1 Peace versus power dividend
First, in the wake of Soviet collapse, both Republican and Democratic
administrations sought to realize a “dividend” in the currencies of both
peace and power. The first entailed military force reductions and DoD
budget cuts. The second involved adopting more ambitious security goals
and requiring America’s armed forces to sustain a substantial continuous
global presence, increase peacetime engagement activities, and prepare to
conduct more types of missions, faster, across a broader swath of the earth.
While smaller, the US military was to be better supported and more ready,
more deployable, and more active. In addition, all the facets of US
military power – the many different types of capabilities and the
multiple regional commands – were to be retained, if not enhanced.
The efforts to achieve a peace dividend and a power dividend pulled the
budget in opposite directions. But the two imperatives were supposed to
be reconciled by DoD reform and transformation initiatives that would
putatively allow the armed forces to do more for less. An additional
challenge was that, in becoming smaller, the US military lost some
economy of scale in both support and acquisition functions. So the challenge
for reformers was considerable.
Reform efforts were to focus principally on trimming infrastructure,
streamlining support, renovating business practices, and privatizing
various activities. A prospective “revolution in military affairs,”
driven by new information technology, also was supposed to help the armed
forces achieve “new efficiencies”. In implementation, however, both the
reform and the transformation agendas fell well short of their promise.
In both cases, institutional resistance and bureaucratic inertia proved
stronger than the impetus for change. Squeezed between this shortfall and
the ambitions of post-Cold War military strategy, the peace dividend soon
vanished.
AN UNDISCIPLINED DEFENSE 5
Effects on the DoD budget and workforce Increased operational tempo,
increased support, and the loss of economies of scale were evident in the
relative rise in O&M spending beginning in the early 1990s. Among other
aims, the prospective reforms were meant to allow a transfer of funds from
O&M and infrastructure accounts to procurement. Although some reform
efforts – such as base closures – achieved some savings, these have not
amounted to more than 4% of the DoD budget. This has not been sufficient
to cover the costs of increased operational tempo, much less a rebound in
procurement.
These developments also have reshaped the DoD workforce. As noted above,
the increase in O&M spending correlated with an increased reliance on
contract labor, which is generally less expensive than either military or
civilian DoD labor. (In 2004, the life-cycle cost of a US military
officer amortized over a 20-year career was approximately $88,000 per year;
for enlisted personnel, $43,400 per year.)
Despite increased operational tempo, DoD has been reluctant to
permanently increase military end strength because of all the follow-on
costs involved. Thus, most of the recent additions to the Army and Marine
Corp have been either temporary positions or have been matched by
reductions in the Navy and Air Force. The total number of full-time US
military personnel by the end of 2010 will be barely 50,000 more than the
post-Cold War low point – and 22,000 of these will be temporaries.
Rather than add end strength, DoD has focused on squeezing more effort
out of the existing pool of military personnel and migrating more of
these personnel from the non- deployable to the deployable portion of the
force, and from non-combat to combat positions. Civilian DoD and
(especially) contract labor have filled the support gaps left behind.
Beyond this, the increased support required by increased operational tempo
has been increasingly provided by contract labor. Indeed, the role of
contractors now extends to some basic security and intelligence
functions.
The result is that DoD’s total workforce is probably as large today as it
was in 1989 (or even larger), but less of the total is in uniform. This
accords with the rise in O&M spending and also with studies by Paul C.
Light of the Brookings Institution, which suggest that the contractor
workforce may have grown by as much as 40% since 1989. By comparison, the
full-time military and DoD civilian workforces are both about 32% smaller
today than in 1989.
3.2 Discordant modernization
The second process contributing to the exceptional surge in defense
spending concerns post-Cold War force modernization efforts. The DoD
acquisition process has been the subject of frequent criticism by
congressional research agencies, the Defense Science
6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Board, and others for routinely delivering products late, over cost, and
not as capable as promised. But these problems cannot fully explain the
exceptional circumstance that DoD is facing today. Since reaching a
low-point in the late-1990s, procurement spending has rebounded
substantially, rising by more than 160% in real terms. Not since the nation
undertook crash rearmament for the Korean war has as much been spent in a
single year as in 2008, when the procurement account was allotted $170
billion (2010 USD). As noted above, recent modernization spending is
comparable to Reagan levels. And, in real per person terms, it surpasses
them substantially.
And yet, while the earlier period is remembered as one of robust
modernization, today’s efforts are viewed as “troubled” from all sides.
What distinguishes recent practice is a dysfunction that we call
“discordant modernization”. Beginning in the early 1990s, acquisition
practice has been riven by several, contending trends or visions. More
important, DoD has failed to adequately prioritize among them or to
compel integration. So these have all lurched forward together, layered
one atop the other.
Looking at recent practice, we can distinguish three modernization
trends: Legacy, Transformational, and Adaptive.
# Legacy efforts carry forward and seek to enhance the pivotal platforms
and capabilities of the recent past;
# Transformational efforts seek to achieve dramatic increases in
effectiveness or efficiency by employing new technology, techniques, and
forms of organization;
# Adaptive efforts correspond to the perceived requirements of new
security missions and circumstances – such as stability operations,
counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism.
Given strong strategic guidance and prioritization from the center, these
efforts can be fully integrated. Otherwise, they will proceed in a
discordant way, competing for funds – a circumstance that, like
inter-service rivalry, exerts unrelenting upward pressure on the budget.
The Army’s recent modernization agenda provides a particularly acute
example. But the problem is evident as well in, for instance, the Navy’s
program which, apart from the decision to retire battleships, has sought
to modernize virtually every type of surface, subsurface, and aircraft
capability, while adding cruise-missile subs, littoral combatants,
remotely piloted vehicles, and tilt-rotor aircraft. And, of course, like
every service, the Navy is attempting to build its own encompassing C4I
network.
When strategic discipline is lax, legacy modernization tends to
predominate, due to its institutional momentum. Eventually, external
circumstances may compel a rush of ad hoc
AN UNDISCIPLINED DEFENSE 7
adaptive measures – as is the case today with regard to procurement to
meet counter- insurgency needs. These may then come to predominate,
prematurely. The only remedy is to strongly discipline force
modernization in accord with a sustainable, adaptive, and cost-effective
national security strategy. The various scenarios and missions that define
military requirements must be strongly prioritized, and these priorities
must be enforced from the center.
In a broader perspective, discordant modernization risks detaching the
nation’s finite defense resources from its actual security needs. In the
decade before the 9/11 attacks, the United States spent over $1 trillion
on military modernization. But most of this expenditure proved irrelevant
to defending against the most serious attack on America in 60 years.
Subsequently, three more years of funding added another $450 billion dollars
to modernization accounts, but still the nation found itself ill-equipped to
execute the new tasks it had undertaken: counter-insurgency in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
3.3 Going to war (with the military you have)
The third process contributing to the post-1998 spending surge was
America’s protracted commitment to two wars of a type for which its armed
forces were ill-prepared. As noted above, fully 52% of the spending surge
(and 17% of total spending since 1998) can be attributed to contingency
operations – principally to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Although war
costs explain a significant portion of the surge, they also beg the
question: Why have these wars proved so much more expensive in real terms
than their predecessors?
Part of the reason is that the United States found itself inadvertently
fighting “Mr. Johnson’s war” using a reduced version of “Mr. Reagan’s
military.” Unlike during the Vietnam War era, the United States today
employs an all-volunteer (that is, professional) force. The logic of this
policy ensures that long, exhausting, labor-intensive wars will drive
personnel costs sharply higher, as DoD must bid higher to recruit and retain
personnel. And they have: after remaining virtually flat in real terms for
22 years, military personnel spending measured on a per person basis rose
46% between 2000 and 2010. Slightly more than half of this was
war-related.
In one obvious respect – size – today’s uniformed military is not Mr.
Reagan’s or Mr. Johnson’s. In this respect, too, America’s military was
ill-suited to undertake occupation and counter-insurgency tasks in two
challenging locales with a combined population of approximately 50
million. Principally, DoD sought to compensate by employing a uniquely
high proportion of contractors. The Congressional Research Services
estimates that 240,000 are employed in the CENTCOM area today – and more
are on the way. In budgetary terms, this registers as above-average O&M
costs – and the wars are responsible for 73% of the surge in O&M
spending.
8 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The wars are also responsible for nearly 43% of the post-1998 surge in
modernization spending. The challenge has been not simply to replace the
equipment consumed in war, but also to purchase entirely new fleets of
equipment suited to these wars (such as Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
vehicles) and to significantly adapt existing fleets. As noted above,
despite nearly $1.45 trillion in modernization spending during 1991-2004 –
including much invested in ground combat vehicles – the United States found
itself ill- equipped for the major types of operations it chose to
conduct. More than three years of fighting passed before DoD began to
seriously re-orient its procurement programs.
4. Trillions to burn
The three policy paths outlined above have converged to give America a
historically unique global edge in military spending. This has not
purchased clear and sure progress toward a more secure and stable world,
however. Nor has it produced an especially efficient military, closely
adapted to the current security environment.
The road not taken – at a cost of some trillions of dollars – would have
involved some combination of (i) a more forceful and thorough-going
approach to Pentagon reform, (ii) an integrated or “joint” approach to
force modernization and transformation, tailoring these closely to new
era conditions, and (iii) greater restraint in setting post-Cold War
military goals and missions. That this has not occurred suggests a lapse in
attention to the strategic costs and benefits associated with our chosen
defense posture. It is as though the nation has trillions to burn.
A permissive spending environment is the precondition for the types of
problems identified in this report. It is easy enough to point to the 11
September 2001 attacks as the progenitor of this condition. However, as
we note, the surge in spending began before 2001. Moreover, Gallup polls
show that public support for increased spending was higher in the two
years prior to the attacks than in the two years after. And it has receded
significantly since then. This points to a more fundamental enabling
condition: presently there seems to be little political gain (and much
risk) in pressing for the type of tight DoD budget constraints that might
prompt through-going reform and transformation.
Nonetheless, emerging fiscal realities may soon compel increased
attention to how the nation allocates scarce resources among competing
national goals -- foreign and domestic, military and non-military. And this
might put the nation on the road to a disciplined defense.
PROJECT ON DEFENSE ALTERNATIVES n COMMONWEALTH INSTITUTE
CAMBRIDGE MA: 617-547-4474 n WASHINGTON DC: 301-493-8769
www.comw.org/pda
pda@comw.org
http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1001PDABR20exsum.pdf
http://www.comw.org/pda/
Full report:
http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1001PDABR20.pdf
|