U S centric policy is impairing Pakistan by Nasim Zehra aljazeerah.info

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U S centric policy is impairing Pakistan

By Nasim Zehra, Gulf News

Islamabad | | 06-04-2003

Over the last week the Bush administration took steps on two issues directly related to Pakistan. First, the U.S. President, George Bush, and British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, issued a joint statement condemning the tragic massacre of Kashmiri Pandits, called for a Pakistan-India dialogue to reduce tensions and observed that Pakistan was not doing enough to stop "cross-border terrorism".

In Islamabad the statement was read as an indictment of Islama-bad on the "cross-border terrorism" issue and also for the massacre in Nadimarg.

Yet no evidence pointing towards any Pakistani institution's involvement in the massacre has been made public. And Amnesty International has called for "an exhaustive and transparent" inquiry to identify the culprits.

The second step involved the Bush administration's decision to impose two-year sanctions on Khan Research Laboratories (KRL). This punitive measure was taken in response to Washington's own accusation that Pakistan exported its nuclear technology to North Korea.

Like in the case of the earlier U.S.-UK statement where allegations were made against Pakistan over involvement in the Nadimarg slaughter, this step to impose sanctions was taken without any evidence. What do these sanctions on Kahuta then convey? There are three views on this.

First, that these sanctions are inconsequential since no U.S. commercial entity had ever cooperated with KRL. Second, the sanctions are unjustified since no evidence of Pakistan exporting technology to North Korea was provided.

And third, that Washington must be questioned about the justification for imposing these sanctions. Reportedly, Pakistan President, Parvez Musharraf, has raised this during his April 1 telephone conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Washington's sanctions on KRL amount to the Bush administrations first ever accusation that Pakistan is exporting nuclear technology. These sanctions would actually establish in Washington a "paper trail" against Pakistan's nuclear programme which can be invoked against Pakistan when the Pak-U.S. "going gets bad".

Today, when there is absence of confrontation between the Bush and Musharraf governments, this step (of imposing sanctions) may appear harmless. It also may be tangibly inconsequential.
Yet politically it points towards continued U.S. attempts to keep each Pakistani government under pressure on the nuclear issue. This pressure persists against the backdrop of continued benign American neglect towards Israel's growing nuclear arsenal.

Whatever the merits or demerits of these two moves, neither is surprising. They logically flow from what has been Washington's operational policy towards Pakistan on the nuclear issue. Significantly, aspects of the timing of these moves are also noteworthy: they come at the height of Pakistan's support to Washington's anti-terrorism operations, at a time when Washington has opted for aggression and invasion to clean Iraq of weapons of mass destruction.

Specifically, the U.S. Secretary of State last week clearly stated, in the presence of the powerful Zionist body the AIPAC, that the U.S. will remove the dark shadow of weapons of mass destruction from above Israel.

The Israeli leadership has repeatedly identified Pakistan as a country falling within its security perimeter. Hence Israel is unlikely to ignore what developments take place within Pakistan's security realm. Israel's growing strategic cooperation with India and the fact that a strong pro-Zionist lobby within Bush's administration largely authored Washington's invasion of Iraq, both have security implications for Pakistan.

There is, therefore, no secret about the U.S. security worldview. How and when it will change will depend on a host of factors. However, for now this worldview is important for Pakis-tanis, as are misconceptions about this relationship.

Five are important.

One, that personal rapport through meetings and telephone chats among senior office holders cannot translate into our ability to effect change in U.S. policy. Personal rapport often works for the U.S. government which moves more systematically and institutionally on policy level.

Two, the failure of Pakistan to bargain at crucial junctures with the U.S., whether while helping with the opening with China or supporting the U.S. anti-terrorism operations.

Three, banking on encashing goodwill generated at a specific juncture over a specific issue at a later time. To encash later a framework of a sincere and lasting relationship based on mutuality of interests is important, as between China and Pakistan.

Four, cooperation with the U.S. in one area, will help to deflect U.S. pressure in another area. The transferability of goodwill is non-existent. Cooperation in terrorism has not translated into a more "fair" and supportive policy on the nuclear issue.

Five, that establishing our "utility" to the U.S. can best serve our national security interests. This flows from only a partial appreciation of the notion of power and influence in international affairs.

A U.S.-centric policy has impaired our ability to clearly appreciate our own inherent strengths, and, hence, opportunities available to us.

Equally, U.S.-centricity has often distorted our policy and conduct within our own home-zone, i.e. South, Central and South West Asia. Our relations with China have been the only exception.

There have been broad issues like in the 1950s when there was a period of convergence of need yet divergence of threat perceptions. A newly established and greatly threatened Pakistan needed weapons and economic support which was soon given by the U.S., but this does not guarantee genuine security. Pakistan's internal shortcomings notwithstanding, the "external" security guarantor did not deliver.

This is not because U.S. "abandoned" Pakistan, but because in Pakistan powerful groups, military or civilian, did not opt for a holistic and institutionalised approach to discussing, understanding and deciding matters of national importance.

Instead, small, powerful, often unaccountable groups became self-appointed policy makers. Their limited wisdom delivered weapons and dollars but security never came and neither did a broader "winning way" of tackling India.

We got weapons to face India but could we have done differently and better to defend ourselves from India politically and diplomatically?

Some defence vis a vis India was accrued to us. But trust and genuine cooperation has largely been missing from this relationship. Some incidents are worth recalling.

The U.S.'s refusal to sell us AWACs in the late eighties and the agreed upon and paid for F-16s; our own decision to surrender Ayaz Baluch and hand over Aimal Kansi without regard to national legal requirements.

If we have, for tactical reasons, compromised on rule of law in our relations with the U.S. we have indeed been at the losing end strategically. Compromising on key issues for temporary benefits weakens your own bargaining position as well as your own psychological strength.

This U.S.-centricity has not led to Pakistan's compromise on key security issues. Our nuclear policy stayed on course meeting a fundamental national security requirement.

Similarly, the survival and improvement of our relations with a strategically significant China. And now an opening with the Russians is also significant. Yet, this U.S. centric policy has cost us in terms of our will power, our ability to think clearly and be more bold and independent, when that has been the requirement of the times.

An essential requirement for a truly beneficial Pakistan-U.S. relation is a strict business-like interaction: calculating the cents and dollars of trust, of threat perceptions, of alliance making and of strategic partnerships. This alone will help to evolve holistically advantageous relations with the U.S.

We require, too, that all institutions involved in policy-making subscribe to the same cost-benefit calculus of Pakistan-U.S. relations.

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