The Gulf War:
Overreaction & Excessiveness
By Hassan A El-Najjar
Amazone Press, 2001
The Root of Subsequent US Invasion of the Middle East
America was dragged into conflict
with the Arab and Muslim worlds
REAL STORY OF THE GULF WAR
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait as a culmination of
developments that spanned a century. In response, the United States
led a coalition of 31 countries that forced Iraq out of Kuwait. The
1991 Gulf War that reversed the Iraqi invasion resulted in killing
hundreds of thousands of Iraqi soldiers in addition to thousands of
Palestinian and Arab civilians after the War. Throughout the decade
that followed the war, Iraq has been kept under an embargo and a
strict regime of economic sanctions that have resulted in the death of
hundreds of thousands of children. So, why did Iraq invade Kuwait, in
the first place? What happened to warrant all these deaths? Why was
Iraq destroyed, instead of just being forced to reverse its invasion?
And why did the Bush administration insist on the use of force instead
of sanctions, despite major Congressional opposition?
Many books have been published about different aspects of the
1991 Gulf War. However, most of them were biased, viewing the issue
from an anti-Iraqi perspective. This book is different in that it is
more objective, particularly in uncovering the way the crisis was
handled and the war was executed. In addition, it explains the crisis
as a historical development instead of just dealing with it as if it
is an accidental event or a chaotic eruption that disturbed the world
order. It also addresses the basic aspects of the crisis and the war
that were not addressed by most of the previous books. The end outcome
is that the real story of the Gulf War is revealed in a way that
respects readers' intelligence. Furthermore, the conflict is explained
in relation to inter-Arab politics as well as Arab-Western relations.
A special emphasis throughout the book is on how and why America
became involved in the conflict. Finally, this book is unique in three
main ways. First, it is critical of the way the Bush administration
handled the crisis and the War. Second, it points to the special
relationship between the American power elite and the Gulf absolute
monarchies. Third, the author is an Arab-American who lived in the
Gulf region as well as in the United States. This has enabled him to
provide readers with insights from the Arab and American dimensions,
which is missing from the experiences of most authors.
Proponents of the 1991 Gulf War claimed that it was fought to
reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and to put an end to the
ambitions of the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussain, who was described as
These claims will be investigated in relation to the other more
important goals of the war. More specifically, the following main
questions will be investigated. First, was the War really fought to
reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or to reassert the hegemonic
position of the three major Western powers: the U.S., Britain, and
France, in the region? Second, who were the War constituents? Was not
the destruction of Iraq a goal in itself? Was not the War an
opportunity to justify continuous militarism, particularly in the
U.S.? Finally, was not the War an opportunity to strengthen the
position of the ruling families in the Gulf and provide them with
direct Western protection from their rivals, Arab nationalists?
Most authors did not analyze the process through which America
went to the War. In particular, the role of bureaucrats in the
administration, known as Middle East experts, was not explored in the
vast majority of the works written about the War. An important part of
the investigation in this book is about these experts. Who are they?
How did they influence President George Bush, his Secretary of State,
James Baker, and the National Security Council in making the major
decisions before and during the crisis and the War? In particular, the
role of these experts in branding Iraq as an adversary well before the
invasion will be investigated.
Then how did they influence decision- making during the second meeting
of the National Security Council, after the Iraqi invasion? By
investigating influence of these experts on the President, the
discussion will extend to several related areas, such as national
interests, the presidency, and democracy in America.
Concerning the War itself, the book investigates and analyzes
basic questions that were rarely addressed by other authors. In
particular, was the administration reluctant to go to war or was it
determined to launch it? Was the administration willing to accept a
peaceful solution or was it insistent on denying Iraq any chance to
withdraw without fighting? Finally, did the War stop when the Iraqis
were forced out of Kuwait, or did it continue unnecessarily?
What Is This Book All About?
These questions are going to be answered in the relevant
chapters of the book. Readers are going to see how the Bush
administration handled the crisis and the war in the Gulf. By
investigating and analyzing these questions and the related issues,
the real story of the Gulf War is revealed. So, this book is about
providing readers with information and analyses that have not been
provided by other works about the Gulf War.
In Chapter I, the Iraqi claims of Kuwait will be investigated,
shedding some light on the special relationship between the two
states, which is usually underestimated as a main factor that
contributed to the crisis. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was described
as caused by border disputes and disagreement over oil prices.
While this was true, it would not warrant an invasion. There was a
special relationship between Iraq and Kuwait that led Iraqis to take
such action. Throughout the 20th century, Iraq has claimed Kuwait as
an Iraqi territory. In fact, the 1990 invasion was the fourth Iraqi
attempt to restore Kuwait.
Iraqis have always felt that it is the duty of Kuwaitis to support
Iraq. They expected Kuwaiti support during and after the Iran-Iraq
war. The crisis started when the Kuwaiti government began asking Iraq
to pay back the war debt. Then, the crisis was more deepened when
Kuwaitis did not concede to the Iraqi border demands and did not
respond to the Iraqi appeals to stop their overproduction of oil.
Thus, Chapter I focuses on the special relationship between Iraq and
Kuwait, as a necessary background to understand the crisis and the
Chapter II focuses on the relationship between Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait in order to clarify the indispensable role that Saudis played
during the crisis and the War. During the first few hours of the Iraqi
invasion, the Kuwaiti government and the royal family took refuge in
Saudi Arabia. Saudis also supported Kuwaitis by their decision to
receive and finance the coalition troops. But why did Saudi Arabia
take the Kuwaiti side? It is true that the Bush administration
persuaded the Saudis to take that stance.
But there was another important factor. The Kuwaiti and Saudi royal
families have been allies throughout the 20th century. In 1901, the
ruler of Kuwait, Mubarak Al-Sabah, supported Abdul Aziz Al-Saud to
restore the rule of his family over Nejd. Saudis paid back this debt
first in 1961 when they supported Kuwait during the third Iraqi
attempt to restore it. Then, Saudi-Kuwaiti relations were strengthened
when both states joined the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in 1981.
Nevertheless, relations between them have not always been friendly.
There have been border disputes and even fighting in some occasions.
In Chapter III, the relationship between Kuwaitis and
immigrants in Kuwait is investigated. In particular, mistreatment of
immigrants is analyzed in order to help readers understand how
Kuwaitis are perceived in the region. The Kuwaiti insensitivities
concerning Iraqi grievances, particularly insisting on debt repayment
and overproduction of oil, were not isolated from an overall Kuwaiti
way of thinking and treatment of others. Immigrants in Kuwait were
systematically discriminated against socially, economically, and
politically through denying them permanent-resident status and
Although Kuwait is not the only Arab state that followed this policy
toward immigrants, it was unique in doing so for three major reasons.
First, Kuwait had a large population group of non-citizens who had no
citizenship of any other country, known as Bedoons. These were
exploited by the Kuwaiti government, which hired them in the
lowest-paying jobs in the police and the armed forces without giving
them a legal status in the country.
Second, Kuwait had the largest Palestinian immigrant community outside
Palestine and Jordan. Despite the fact that Palestinians started to
come to Kuwait in the 1930s and participated in building the country,
they were also discriminated against. Like the Bedoons and other
immigrants, they were denied permanent-resident status and
Third, the Kuwaiti discriminatory policies led to the material and
psychological separation between immigrants and citizens. This led to
a mutual distrust and suspicion that escalated to persecution of the
Palestinians and the Bedoons, after the war.
The irony was that despite mistreatment of these two population groups
before the war, the Kuwaiti government expected them to be more loyal
than Kuwaitis themselves. They were blamed for staying and working in
the country during the period of the Iraqi rule. Unlike Kuwaitis, they
could neither leave nor stop working. As a result, they were made
scapegoats after the war by accusing them of collaboration with the
While Kuwaiti discriminatory policies and their consequences are
discussed in Chapter III, the terror campaign against Palestinians
after the war is the subject of Chapter X.
In Chapter IV, the conflict is analyzed within an inter-Arab
context. The Kuwaiti-Iraqi crisis developed as a result of the fact
that the ruling elites in the two Arab states represented two
conflicting ideologies. In this inter-Arab conflict, the Iraqi Ba'ath
Party represented an ideology close to socialist ideologies in Western
societies. The ruling class in Kuwait represented a quasi-feudal
ideology according to which members of the royal family control the
country=s major resources, allow their loyal subjects to have access
to them, and deny them to others. While followers of different
ideologies, such as liberalism and conservatism in the United States
and other industrial societies, alternate the exercise of power
peacefully by accepting results of elections, this has not happened
yet in the Arab Middle East. Some Arab states do not have multi-party
elections, others do not have elections at all. In addition to that,
rivalry between Arab states intensifies these ideological differences.
Consequently, the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait can be better
understood if it is analyzed as a result of a conflict between two
different ideologies in the absence of a unified and democratic Arab
Chapter V analyzes the role of Western interests in the
development of the crisis and the War. The Gulf War has demonstrated
that the power elites in the West are willing to go to a major war in
order to secure their interests in the Gulf. They considered the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait as a threat to their oil interests. However, Iraq
was targeted by hostility from the West for a long time. In order for
Western interests to be protected, successive Iraqi governments have
been kept busy fighting with their Kurdish minority, throughout the
twentieth century. Between 1922 and 1975, Iraqi Kurds revolted several
times against the Iraqi central government receiving assistance first
from the British then from the United States and Israel.
Peace in Iraq lasted only about five years, between 1975 and 1980,
then the Iran-Iraq war started and continued until 1988. That war was
closely related to the Kurdish problem because it started as a result
of canceling the 1975 Iraqi-Iranian treaty, which ended the Kurdish
By the time the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988, Iraq was about $90
billion in debt and in need for money to rebuild its economy.
The decline in oil prices did not help the Iraqi plans for
reconstruction. Thus, the 1990 economic distress, that Iraq found
itself in, was caused originally by the eight-year war with Iran and
the longer war with the Kurds.
In addition to oil interests, the Western power elites have an
interest in keeping militarism alive and well. For a few months, in
1989 and 1990, the downfall of the Soviet Union deprived the military
industries in the West from the major justification of keeping the
military spending as high as possible. In the United States, people
even started talking about peace dividends. The Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait was a golden opportunity for the military industries and their
constituents among the power elites to argue for the continuation of
the high military spending. Thus, as one Cold War was over, another
was aggressively argued for. After all, the Cold War was a big
business. In the United States alone, the cost of the Cold War reached
about $12.8 trillion between 1945 and 1990.
Chapter VI deals with the 1990 crisis that led to the invasion.
Relations between Iraq and Kuwait have been tense throughout the
twentieth century. However, tensions increased during the five main
crises of 1901, 1902, 1938, 1961, and 1990. Only the last crisis
escalated to an Iraqi invasion. When the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988,
Kuwaitis felt the need to avoid future problems with Iraq. To achieve
that, they demanded an Iraqi recognition of the borders between the
When Iraq did not agree, they retaliated by exerting economic
pressures. They demanded repayment of the $12 billion war debt. Then,
they increased their oil production, thus violating the OPEC quota,
and contributing to a 30 percent decline in the oil prices.
Feeling these economic pressures, the Iraqis responded by sending
troops to the border. When the Jeddah talks failed to resolve the
disputes, the stage was set for the Iraqi invasion.
The Arab initial reaction to the invasion was a mixture of
shock and disbelief. Therefore, it took the form of diplomatic
initiatives demanding the Iraqi withdrawal. However, the tough
positions of the U.S. and the U.K. in the United Nations and their
pressures on some Arab states led the Arab League to condemn the
invasion and demand an instant Iraqi withdrawal. The turning point was
when King Fahd agreed to receive American troops in his country.
That was the first step toward the eviction of the Iraqi troops from
Kuwait and the destruction of Iraq during the war.
The Bush administration contributed to the crisis by leading
the Iraqis to believe that it would not interfere in the dispute. On
July 23, 1990, the U.S. State Department spokeswoman, Margaret
Tutwiler, said that the U.S. “had no defense treaties with Kuwait;
no special defense or security commitment to Kuwait.”
Two days later, on July 25, Ambassador April Glaspie assured the Iraqi
President that the U.S. was not going to interfere in “inter-Arab
Europeans and Israelis also contributed to the escalation of
the crisis by making the Iraqis nervous. First, the Iraqis began to
fear an imminent Israeli attack on their nuclear installations.
Second, an anti-Iraq media campaign spread all over Europe and North
America because of the Iraqi counter-threats against Israel.
Then, European countries started intercepting industrial shipments
purchased by Iraq for fear that these shipments may be used in making
the Babylon Super-Gun, which may threaten the Israeli military
superiority in the Middle East. Third, Israeli agents assassinated the
Canadian designer and builder of the Super-Gun, Gerald Bull.
One of the most important aspects of the Gulf War was how the
war decision was made. It took President Bush less than two days to
conclude that Iraq was wrong. Neither the Congress nor the media
contemplated seriously on the possibility that Kuwaitis were as
responsible for the escalation of the crisis as Iraqis were. The Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait was considered as a disruption of the world order.
However, the Kuwaiti disruption of the oil markets, which led to the
sharp decline in oil prices, was ignored. The unique relationship
between Kuwait and Iraq was also ignored despite the fact that the
relationship between them is very similar to the relationship between
Syria and Lebanon. Such relationship allowed Syria to send its troops
to Lebanon and stay there without serious regional or international
objections. Finally, in concluding that Iraq was wrong, the Bush
administration ignored the historical background of the inter-Arab
President Bush found himself between the Thatcher anvil and
hammers of the hawks in his administration. All of them demanded a
tough stand against Iraq. Margaret Thatcher gave him a lecture in
colonial history and how she defeated Argentina in the Falkland War, a
few years earlier.
Brent Scowcroft, James Baker, Dick Cheney, and their assistants,
particularly Richard Haass, Larry Eagleburger, and Dennis Ross,
hammered him to take a strong stance against the invasion.
As Chapter VI reveals, these pressures led President Bush to choose
war over sanctions.
Once the war decision was made in the first few days after the
invasion, the Bush administration started preparation for war. Troops
were sent to Saudi Arabia after convincing Saudis that they were in
The coalition was built and the necessary U.N. resolutions were passed
using the Bakerian diplomacy of cajoling, extracting, threatening, and
This is the emphasis of Chapter VII, which documents the Bush
administration’s rejection of all peace initiatives, dismissing them
as a “linkage”.
It also analyzes the role of Congress, particularly the attempt of
Democrats to avoid the War.
While all this was being done, the basic right of the American
people to know the truth concerning the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis was not
observed by the Bush administration and its supporters in Congress.
When they held Congressional hearings, they did not give a fair chance
to sociologists, historians, and history-oriented political scientists
who are experts on the Middle East. This deprived Congress and the
American people of understanding the social and historical backgrounds
that contributed to the development of the crisis. Hearings conducted
by supporters of the administration were biased and aimed at charging
the American people emotionally against Iraq. In one hearing, Iraqis
were accused of throwing Kuwaiti infants out of their incubators in a
hospital and taking the medical equipment to Iraq. Several media
investigative reports after the war demonstrated that this never
happened. Interviews were conducted with the director and doctors of
the Kuwaiti hospital who said that they hid the medical equipment in
the basement of the building during the crisis and the war.
The “war or peace” debate was ruled out in the first few
days of the crisis. Few opportunities were given in Congress to
experts who would argue for resolving the crisis peacefully, through
negotiations, or by the use of economic sanctions. In fact, there was
a real need for other experts who would educate the American people
and their representatives about the history of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti
relations. However, those who tried to give experts a chance to argue
for economic sanctions instead of war, like Senator Sam Nunn, were
criticized, as documented in Chapter VIII.
In spite of that, Sam Nunn continued his efforts to educate the
administration, the Congress, and the public about the origins and
consequences of the Gulf crisis. He started a series of televised
Senate hearings on September 11 and 13, November 27-30, and December
3, on the U.S. Gulf policy, posing questions on the use of sanctions.
He argued that the U.S. should stick to sanctions for up to two years,
if necessary. His position attracted the support of many Democrats.
During the hearings, he called seventeen government officials, retired
senior military officers, and experts to testify.
The vast majority of the witnesses spoke out against the use of force
because sanctions would do the job if they were given the chance to
However, the Bush administration succeeded in containing
opposition in Congress in preparation for war against Iraq. Expecting
that the war would be horrendous in its consequences, the Iraqi
President called it "the Mother of All Battles" (Chapter
IX). Although Iraq was defeated, the war still deserves that
description, at least within an Arab context. It was the largest
attack on Arab forces in history. The number of Arab casualties was
unprecedented given the short time of the war. Hundreds of thousands
of Iraqis lost their lives in forty-four days.
The "Mother of All Battles," or the Gulf war over
controlling Kuwait, started on January 17 and ended on February 28,
1991. It resulted in the destruction of the major Iraqi military and
civilian infrastructure, industry, and centers of gravity.
It also resulted in a huge number
military and civilian casualties. General Schwarzkopf estimated that
the number of the Iraqi soldiers who were killed reached one hundred
thousand at the end of the air campaign and fifty thousand more at the
end of the ground war.
Other estimates ranged between 50,000 and 220,000 (Chapter IX).
Actually, the “Mother of All Battles” could have developed
into a nuclear holocaust had the Iraqis used chemical weapons. General
Powell and Secretary Cheney contemplated the use of tactical nuclear
weapons in that occasion. The Israelis also were ready to retaliate
with nuclear weapons if they were attacked by chemical weapons.
It was the Iraqi decision not to use unconventional weapons that saved
Iraq and the region from total destruction.
The war was an excessive “slaughter,” as described by
Even America=s allies, the British and the French, described it as
It was also “un-American” in the sense that thousands of Iraqi
soldiers were killed while in retreat.
This was contrary to the assurances given by Baker to Aziz in Geneva
that “Americans don=t shoot their adversaries in the back,”
and to President Bush=s announcement on February 24, 1991 that “the
coalition forces would not attack unarmed soldiers in retreat.”
Despite the destruction and the huge loss in human life, many
critics of the war wanted more killing, destruction,
and even the occupation of Iraq and the overthrow of its government.
Some of them criticized the President for declaring the cease-fire
Others criticized him for not going far enough.
Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf were criticized for that “incomplete
success.” Their critics claimed that in order for them to protect
the image of the American military, they allowed half of the
Republican Guard forces to withdraw without being destroyed.
Reactions of these critics lead to several serious questions
that most authors avoided. Was the destruction of Iraq and the huge
number of Iraqi casualties inevitable, or intentional? Why weren't the
Iraqi troops allowed to withdraw in order to avoid such destruction
and casualties? In other words: Was the war really executed to force
Iraq out of Kuwait, or to inflict maximum destruction on Iraq itself?
And, why were leaders of the coalition determined to destroy Iraq?
Chapter IX attempts to answer these and other related questions.
In Chapter X, the focus is on the terror campaign against
Palestinians in Kuwait, after the War. This topic is missing from all
the books that have been published in the West about the Gulf War.
During the war, Americans as well as citizens in the other coalition
countries were allowed to read, hear, and watch what the coalition
military commanders wanted them to know. This happened as a result of
a carefully controlled media coverage of the war.
The "smart" weapons were shown destroying Iraqi weapons and
installations neatly. The coalition casualties were unbelievably low
and some of them were even caused by friendly fire.
However, the media generally avoided covering the Iraqi casualties or
the degree of destruction inflicted on Iraq. The exception was when
Peter Arnett, the CNN correspondent, reported on the civilian shelter
in downtown Baghdad, which was hit by two "smart" bombs
killing hundreds of civilians. President Bush was still bitter about
that report years after the war, as he mentioned it in his PBS
interview in January 1996 and in his 1998 book.
The media also rarely reported on the terror campaign against
Palestinians, Bedoons, and other Arab immigrants in Kuwait, which was
conducted directly after the war. In fact, the Kuwaiti terror campaign
was may be attributed to pre-war conditions than to the formal
Palestinian support for Iraq. During the two decades that preceded the
1990 invasion, Kuwaitis demonstrated their will to get rid of the
Palestinians but they were waiting for a pretext to do so.
When the Palestinian leadership expressed its support for the Iraqi
“linkage” initiative, the Kuwaiti government found the excuse it
was looking for to force Palestinians out of the country. The campaign
started as threats by Kuwaiti officials in-exile,
then was carried out by Kuwaiti police and armed forces after the war.
Thus, when Americans were euphoric, celebrating victory over
the Third World country of Iraq, Kuwaitis were heavily involved in
persecuting Palestinians in the country. Thousands of innocent
Palestinian civilians were taken from their homes and from the streets
to police stations and detention centers. There, they were tortured,
raped, and killed for no reason other than being Palestinians.
The killing and torture of Palestinians in Kuwait was happening
with full knowledge of the coalition governments. The Kuwaiti terror
campaign was rarely reported by the media or in government briefings.
Even when they published their books about the war, neither President
Bush nor any other officials in his administration mentioned anything
concerning the Kuwaiti atrocities.
Chapter X addresses these atrocities against Palestinians, showing
that Kuwaitis were not the victims that they were portrayed to be.
In Chapter XI, the Gulf War is assessed in terms of its
consequences on the Middle East and the United States. In particular,
the War influences on democracy, Cold War, militarism, and the Middle
East peace are analyzed. The first part of the Chapter deals with the
way war decisions are made in America. An emphasis is on the role
played by non-elected officials, which poses serious questions about
democracy in America. Another part of the Chapter focuses on how
proponents of war in the United States have been pushing for a new
Cold War to replace Cold War I against communism. This time, Muslims
are suggested to be the new enemies. Then, an analysis of the main
negative consequences of the war follows, particularly how the War
victims have continued to suffer inside Iraq, even a decade after the
War. The Chapter includes an assessment of human rights conditions,
democracy, and militarism in Arabia.
Bush and Scowcroft (1998: 340, 371, 388, 467).
Baker (1995: 267-269); Bush and Scowcroft (1998: 305-307).
Graz (1990); Daneshku (1990); Salinger and Laurent (1991: 31).
The first was in 1901, the second in 1902, and the third in
1961 (Al-Rashid, 1960: 127-27; Dickson, 1956: 136-41;
Joudhah, 1964: 61-67; Asiri, 1990: 7).
Bin Sultan (1995: 183-84); Pimlott (1992: 41-46); Salinger and
Laurent (1991: 90-113).
Al-Iktissad Al-Arabi (61), July 1981: 23-27.
Fighting in Al-Jahra, in 1920 and disputes following Al-
Uqair Conference in 1922 (Dickson, 1956: 148-155, 250-257;
Joudah, 1964: 116-147).
Alessa (1981: 16-18); Brand (1988); Russell (1989); Shah and
Al-Qudsi (1989); Farah et al. (1980); Human Rights Watch
Middle East Watch (1991: 51-53); Human Rights Watch (1995: 66-
Al-Shahi (1993: 10-11); Ghabra (1987: 34-37, 54, 58); Alessa
(1981: 16-18, 106-111).
Al-Sabah, Su=ad (1983: 28); Al-Sabah, Youssif (1980: 138-139);
Lubbadah (1992); Russell (1989); Farah et al. (1980).
Lubbadah (1991); USA Today (June 17, 1991); Los Angeles Times
(June 3, 1991); The Christian Science Monitor (August 2,
Ghabra (1991: 13); The Boston Globe (March 1, 1991); The
Atlanta Journal and Constitution (march 4, 1991); Roth (1991:
Ghareeb (1981);Yassin (1995: 37, 49-51); Al-Barrak (1989: 27-
37, 63-85, 98-105, 205-253); Al-Bazzaz (1989); Timmerman
(1991: 17-19); O=Ballance (1996: 93).
Ghareeb (1990: 29-32); Al-Farzali (1982: 23-43, 123-133).
Powell (1995: 459).
Center for Defense Information (1996).
Graz (1990); Daneshku (1990); Salinger and Laurent (1991: 31).
Jaber (1990); Pimlott (1992: 40); Bin Sultan (1995: 158-59);
Al-Yahya (1993: 84, 113).
Bin Sultan (1995: 183-84); Pimlott (1992: 41-46); Salinger
and Laurent (1991: 90-113).
Cipkowski (1992: 57).
The entire famous July 25, 1990 Glaspie-Saddam interview is
documented in Sciolino (1991: 271-292). The most important sentence
“But we have no opinion on inter-Arab disputes, like your dispute
with Kuwait,” is on page 280.
Timmerman (1991: 377-79, 387-88).
Baker (1995: 278-79); Powell (1995: 467).
Bush and Scowcroft (1998: 256); Baker (1995: 6, 10);
Bush and Scowcroft (1998: 319-320); Baker (1995: 279).
Baker (1995: 305).
Whitaker (1991); Bush and Scowcroft (1998: 292-293 362, 365,
Lubbadah (1991: 44-45); The Guardian (April 19, 1991).
These included, by order, Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, Terrence
O’Donnell, James Schlesinger, David Jones, William Crowe, Henry
Kissinger, James Webb, Edward Luttwak, Richard Perle, Christine
Helms, James Placke, Phebe Marr, William Odom, Gary Milhollin,
William Graham, and Leonard Spector.
"Centers of gravity" was the term used by American
military planners in referring to all the non-military Iraqi targets
they intended to destroy during the air campaign, such as the
industrial and economic institutions, highways, bridges, and
buildings (Bin Sultan, 1995).
Powell (1995: 486, 503-4, 511-12); Levrani (1997: 68).
Baker (1995: 436).
Schwarzkopf (1992: 467-69).
Powell (1995: 517); Schwarzkopf (1992: 466); Baker (1995: 409-10).
Baker (1995: 360).
Baker (1995: 410).
Yetive (1997: 44).
Gordon and Tainor (1995: 447).
Cipkowski (1992: 153).
Brown and Shukman (1991: 180).
Gordon and Trainor (1995: x, xii, xiv).
The Pentagon controlled the media coverage of the war through combat
pools, which allowed selected groups of friendly journalists to go
to particular areas to report on (Yetive, 1997: 130-131).
Among the 144 Amercans, 10 British, and two French who were killed
in the war, 16 deaths resulted from friendly fire (Cipkowski, 1992:
Shah and Al-Qudsi (1989: 22); Farah et al. (1989: 33-40);
Fisk, Robert of the Independent (February 21, 1991).
Lubbadah (1991: 113-116); Healy (1991: 47); Roth (1991: 11).
Bush and Scowcroft (1998), Baker (1995), Powell (1995), and
Schwarzkopf (1992). Even the Saudi commander Bin Sultan (1995)
followed the same policy of complete silence concerning the Kuwaiti
terror campaign against Palestinian civilians after the war.
Palestinians of Kuwait were not the only victims of that war. Iraqi
and Kuwaiti civilians suffered from the war and the invasion.
Yemenis were mass-deported from Saudi Arabia, and many Arab
immigrants suffered persecution on the hands of Kuwaitis, after the