September 11, 2001 and Cold War II:

Communism is Dead, Long Live Islamism

By Hassan El-Najjar

January 24, 2002

Editorial Note:

The following is academic paper was adapted from Chapter 11 of the author's book, "The Gulf War: Overreaction and Excessiveness," which was published in January 2001, then online at 


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Abstract / Introduction

     The collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist governments of Eastern Europe, in the late 1980s, marked the end of the Cold War between the East and the West. Although the end of that undeclared war may have seemed to be good news for most nations of the world, it represented a terrible development for the beneficiaries of that era. Some of these beneficiaries were represented by military industries, oppressive regimes, and a host of people who made careers out of advocating and promoting the Cold War. These included politicians, journalists, researchers, and defense professors. As a result, it was not surprising that these Cold War entrepreneurs would desperately try to promote a second Cold War. This time, some Muslim countries and Islamic groups are being installed as the new rival to the West. Thus, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria were reinvented throughout the 1990s by Western governments, particularly the United States, as states that support “terrorism”[i] (Palestinian resistance). The implication is that these are the new enemies of the West.

     While the argument to launch Cold War II using “Islamic terrorism” was not successful throughout the 1990s, it has gained tremendous support since the air attacks on New York and Washington, on September 11, 2001. Cold War II was declared instantly by the Bush administration with huge military and security appropriations ($200 billion to buy Lockheed jets and $60 billion in assistance to the airline industry and home security).

     The first part of the paper is an analysis of the efforts of some of these Cold War entrepreneurs, as represented by the reports published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), articles published in the Council on Foreign Relations journal, “Foreign Affairs,” and media interviews with so-called “terrorism experts.” In the second part of the paper, I argue that militarism in the U.S. has a vested interest in having a new Cold War, in order to maintain its benefits through arms sales nationally and internationally as well, particularly in the Middle East. The third part of the paper includes an analysis of how major portions of the Arab oil wealth is spent on armament, as a result of continuous wars and tensions in the Middle East. Finally, the paper ends with a section about how the American power elite think about and plan wars in order to achieve a basic goal, which is winning with any means.

 Cold War Entrepreneurs

     To the disappointment of Cold War entrepreneurs, the new designated enemies did not accept the label. Iraq allowed the UN inspection teams to destroy its unconventional weapons. As a result of the embargo and the economic sanctions, Iraq not only no longer poses any threats to any of its neighbors but also is severely suffering. Iran has adopted a more friendly policy towards its neighboring Gulf states. Moreover, democratization made it more moderate than before, to most countries, including members of the European Union. Even the United States finally recognized the positive changes and lifted major restrictions on trade with Iran, in March 2000. Libya also has changed its foreign policy towards the West when it accepted to solve the problem of the Pan-Am plane. As a result, diplomatic and trade relations were restored between Libya and most European countries. The U.S. is also moving towards that direction as an official American delegation arrived in Tripoli, in March 2000, to explore ways of improving relations with Libya. The Sudanese government has changed, as well. It has demonstrated its cooperation with the West by handing in Carlos to France for trial.[ii] The Sudanese President also rid his government of the influence of Islamic fundamentalists, in a coup-like sudden change of policy in 1999. This left Western governments with no excuses to continue branding his country as anti-Western. Finally, Syria did its best to disappoint Cold War entrepreneurs. It participated in the Gulf War on the side of the Western-led coalition against a fellow Arab country. Then, it agreed to enter the peace process, which would end in the recognition of Israel. As a result, the West cannot claim that there are rebellious governments in the Middle East. In other words, Western hegemony is complete. Consequently, it was hard to argue that the region could qualify for the status of a new Cold War enemy throughout the 1990s.

     The attempt to install Islamic groups and Islamic countries as the new enemies to the West may be traced to the efforts of Cold War entrepreneurs, think tanks, and institutions like the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) and the Council on Foreign Relations. Since its inception in 1985, the WINEP published eleven major reports (policy papers) warning its pro-Israel audience against the threat of Islamic groups to the security of Israel. The first of these reports[iii] targeted Islamic activism in Jordan, which was described as “the most dangerous and destabilizing force inside Jordan.” The second report[iv] warned against the role of “activist Islam” in the Palestinian Uprising. In particular, the report pointed to the cooperation between the Palestinian resistance organizations of the Islamic Jihad, Hamas, the Islamic wing inside Fatah, and other PLO factions. The report concluded that the ideology of Islamic activism focused on that there was no room for Jewish sovereignty in Muslim land.

     The third report[v] accused Hizbullah of “seeking purpose and unity through confrontation with the West.” The report further pointed to the supreme goals of Hizbullah: the dissipation of Western influence and the elimination of Israel. The fourth report[vi] argued that Hamas viewed the Arab-Israeli conflict as a religious struggle between Islam and Judaism that can only be resolved by the destruction of Israel, not by peace talks. The fifth report[vii] alleged that Iran challenged the West in four areas. It had a drive to dominate the Gulf oil, confront Turkey, gain access to the Pakistani nuclear bomb, and provide support for Hamas and Hizbullah. The report recommended that “the best American response may be containment, similar to the American containment policy towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” The report also called for isolating Iran and weakening it economically, as economic weakness would increase the chances for containment to succeed. 

     The sixth report[viii] focused on Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, as posing a challenge to the U.S. Each of the four “radical regimes,” the report alleged, followed an agenda that conflicted with the long-term objectives of the U.S. In particular, these states were accused of seeking regional hegemony, promoting armed struggle against the Israeli occupation, which the report described as “terrorism,” and taking an antagonistic position towards the West. The report called for the continued containment and sanctions against them until they stop their hostile policies towards Israel.

     The seventh report[ix] warned against the danger that Algeria may pose if it becomes an Islamic republic. The report alleged that “an Islamist Algeria could adversely affect U.S. interests in the unhindered flow of oil and gas, the Arab-Israeli peace process, the security of pro-West Arab and African moderates, nonproliferation, counter terrorism, and human rights.” Therefore, the report recommended that the U.S. follow a policy of “active containment,” in case of an Islamist take over in that country.

     The eighth report[x] warned against the Iranian threats, particularly unconventional weapons production capability, the capacity for subversion in the Gulf states, and support for Hizbullah. The ninth report[xi] went even wilder than any previous reports. It warned against the admission of Muslim students to the U.S., particularly those from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria. The report called for requiring “special clearance procedures” to prevent these students who are already in the U.S. from studying science and technology. Moreover, the report wanted these students to obtain visas every time they leave for their countries and come back, similar to Israeli tactics of controlling the movement of Palestinians when they leave or come back to their country.

     The tenth report[xii] focused on highlighting the cooperation between Islamists in the Palestinian territories and Islamists in Israel. Since the beginning of the first Uprising in December 1987, the Islamist movement inside Israel started to support the armed struggle against the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories. Thus, it strengthened its relations with the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad organizations. It also mediated between Hamas and the PLO. Moreover, it has become a source of humanitarian and economic aid to Hamas facilities. 

     The eleventh report[xiii] cautioned that the U.S. should not be enthusiastic about moderation in Iran under Khatami. The report argued that the dialogue with Iran should be conducted under sanctions. In order for Iran to have normal relations with the U.S., the report emphasized, it has to follow a moderate policy towards Israel in rhetoric and actions. Rhetorically, Khatami should stop his pronouncements against the evils of Zionism, and that American foreign policy decisions are made in Tel Aviv, not in Washington. In action, the report wanted Iran to stop seeking the production and delivery of weapons of mass destruction. Until this happens, the report called the administration to continue imposing economic sanctions on that country.

     Obviously, the WINEP reports aimed at portraying these Muslim states and groups as enemies to the West, generally, and to the United States in particular. In fact, none of the allegations stands a moment of scrutiny. These states supported resistance against the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories. Any conflict with the West was a result of the biased Western policies, which support the Israeli occupation. Moreover, the WINEP reports considered the security of the Israeli occupation as an interest of the West generally and the U.S. in particular. The outcome is that the WINEP has been successful in its campaign to make Islamic groups and countries seem as enemies of the West, particularly the U.S.   

     The Council on Foreign Relations also contributed to the efforts of using the “Islamic threat” to promote a second Cold War. Through its Journal, Foreign Affairs, many authors attempted to argue in that direction. Bernard Lewis[xiv] described the coming conflict, after the Cold War, as a “clash of civilizations” between Islam and the West. He revisited the topic in 1997, stating that Western civilization won the battle and dominated Islam. Huntington[xv] picked up this idea from Lewis and argued that the Islamic and Western worlds were in a collision course. The media gave Lewis and Huntington more attention than their idea deserved.[xvi] Actually, they demonstrated basic ignorance of history and the world system. There may be clashes in the world between superpowers or between a superpower and an emerging power, but these are not clashes of civilizations. The lack of understanding of how the world capitalist system works has led them to believe that the clashes are on ideas and belief systems rather than on raw materials, markets, territories, and other material benefits. As Edward Said noted, Huntington picked up this simplistic notion of civilizations as if they were monolithic and homogeneous constructs.[xvii] He and Lewis erroneously have argued that cultures are rigid constructs that do not interact, which is in contradiction with the simplest facts about culture as adaptive and interactive. Moreover, they want people to believe that more than a billion Muslims living in all continents are enraged against the West and have nothing else to think about except clashing with Westerners. Whether they were really ignorant or misleading, the bottom line here is that such arguments have been used to justify the continuation of militarism after the Cold War. Huntington[xviii] finally revealed his objective bluntly. He argued shamelessly that it was necessary to find an enemy for America to save it from disintegration. He added that only through identifying enemies, America can define itself and keep its identity from breaking down! The Power Elite in the United States made it possible for people like Lewis and Huntington to capitalize on such absurdities.

     Of course, Lewis and Huntington were not the only Cold War entrepreneurs who tried to install Muslims as the new enemies of the West. Richard Bulliet[xix] warned that Islamic groups from Algeria to Lebanon may try to break the fragile peace between the PLO and Israel. Stanley Reed[xx] warned that Islamic militants want to establish a fundamentalist government in Egypt. Judith Miller[xxi] argued that Islamic fundamentalists have no commitment to democracy, pluralism, and human rights. Edward Shirley[xxii] criticized the Clinton administration for opening talks with Algeria’s Islamic “militants.” He suggested that Washington should ignore “radical” Islam and let it burn itself out because time is on the West’s side. Finally, Fouad Ajami[xxiii] argued that the rise of political Islam in the Middle East was accompanied by severe economic decline in the region. His alternative modernist view requires that Arabs and Muslims come to terms to the “two bogymen –- America and Israel.”

     In addition to WINEP and Foreign Affairs writers, the Cold War II enterprise was boosted by the efforts of a third group of entrepreneurs, more commonly known as “terrorism experts.” These argued throughout the 1990s that the West was threatened by Middle Eastern “terrorists.” One of these experts, Steve Emerson, was interviewed by almost all American TV stations, following the Oklahoma City explosion of 1994. During the first few hours after the explosion, he thought that he finally found evidence to support his argument. He kept repeating his view that the explosion was the work of Middle Easterners, particularly Islamic groups. Soon, he was proven wrong after the arrest of Timothy McVeigh, who admitted responsibility for the explosion. Neither Emerson nor the media that broadcast his inaccurate and extremely biased views apologized for their malicious accusations of Arab and Muslim Americans.[xxiv]

     In fact, many of these Cold War II entrepreneurs are pro-Israel activists who did everything in their power to smear Arab and Islamic groups that have resisted the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories. These “terrorism experts” did their best to divert attention from the evil action, the Israeli occupation, to the reaction of resistance. In this sense, resistance groups, such as Hamas, Jihad, and Hizbullah were branded by these “experts” as “terrorist” groups, just like branding the PLO before them with the same label. To the disappointment of these “experts,” Palestinian armed struggle has dramatically decreased since the 1993 PLO-Israeli agreement. Actually, the Palestinian Islamic groups of Hamas and Jihad have stopped their military activities, particularly from the Palestinian-administered territories until the second Uprising which started in September 2000. The Lebanese Islamic resistance organization, Hizbullah, started its armed struggle as a reaction to the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon. That struggle continued until Israelis withdrew from South Lebanon, in May 2000. Actually, during the entire period of the Israeli military occupation, it was Israelis who terrorized Lebanese civilians, not the other way around. In the final analysis, “terrorism experts” have been providing the beneficiaries of the Cold War with the fuel they need to move on to Cold War II. They have been trying to use Islamic groups as the new threat to the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union. While they succeeded in the first half of the 1990s, they could no not continue using that argument later in the decade when the peace process was moving progressively between Arabs and Israelis. However, they have finally found tremendous support to their argument after the September 11 attacks.


             Militarism in the U.S. has a vested interest in having a new Cold War, in order to maintain its hegemonic status in society, including benefits obtained through arms sales nationally and internationally, particularly in the Middle East. Almost a decade ago, the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait helped American militarism to maintain its hegemonic status nationally and internationally after the looming disaster (the end of the Cold War). The 1991 Gulf War was mainly a Western campaign to destroy the military machine that Iraq had bought and built during the preceding fifteen years. The military and industrial equipment that Iraq used in developing its conventional and strategic weapon systems was legally purchased from more than 445 Western companies.[xxv] Indeed, during the Iran-Iraq war, 1980-1988, Western governments promoted the carnage by encouraging business arms deals. When the war was over in 1988, however, the Western policy makers were a bit uncomfortable with all these weapon systems in Iraq. They were perceived as a potential threat to the security of Israel and to the Western interests in the Middle East.

     The Gulf War has represented a striking example of the historical hegemonic pattern of action that the "core" Western societies have been conducting towards Third World "peripheral" societies. Moreover, the world military industry has been exceedingly aggressive in promoting its products in the region. Western governments have become the official protectors of the region's autocratic and dictatorial regimes. These are easily persuaded to buy weapons to protect themselves from their internal and external opponents. Stockpiling of weapons and expanding military budgets have led to more influence for the military in society (militarism) in the West and the Middle East alike. A major negative consequence of militarism is that the process of militarization deprives underdeveloped societies of the financial resources that are badly needed for development. Even in such developed societies as the United States, the federal government sinks in debt while the military-industrial complex is allotted huge amounts of money as a result of military spending.

     In his Farewell Address in 1961, President Eisenhower warned that the combination of a large permanent military establishment and an immense military-industrial complex may threaten democratic government and the pursuit of world peace. The military-industrial complex may become an independent power in setting priorities in domestic and foreign relations. Funds may be diverted from social programs in order to support the arms build up. With billions of dollars in profits and thousands of jobs at stake, the complex would have a vested interest in world conflict rather than peace. Eisenhower's fears became reality.[xxvi]

     Even in 1992, when the Cold War was over, about 44 percent of the federal tax revenues were spent on the military establishment. This amounted to about $419 billion out of the $944 billion of taxes collected by the federal government.[xxvii] Although direct military spending has started to decrease, it is still claiming the highest percentage of the federal budget. In 1996, out of a total U.S. budget of 1.5 trillion dollars, over 17 percent, or 261 billion dollars, was earmarked for military spending. In comparison, roughly 1.5 percent is allotted for Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and another 14 percent is paid as interest on the national debt.[xxviii]

     The previously bought weapons are destroyed or become outdated when new weapons are developed and manufactured. This opens the door for buying new generations of weapon systems. The purchasing policies of the Pentagon inspired Chuck Spinney to write a Department of Defense brochure titled, "Welcome to the Pentagon." Chuck revealed that the amount of mismatch between President Reagan's spending plans and funding from Congress was about $500 billion. The proposed Reagan defense buildup was going to cost about $500 billion more than Congress and the public had been told. One explanation of these huge extra costs was that:

"Weapon developers, when given a choice, always go for the complex, elaborate solution at the expense of the simple one. Complexity leads to higher costs--purchase costs, operations costs, and maintenance costs."[xxix]  

     Higher military costs ultimately lead to more national debt. Before President Reagan had taken office, the U.S. national debt was about $900 billion. During his two terms, he increased it to more than $3 trillion. That is why Reagan is adorned by the military-industrial complex.[xxx] Adopting the same borrow-and-spend policies, President Bush added about $1.2 trillion more to the debt.[xxxi] The U.S. direct military spending during the Reagan and Bush administrations (1981-1993) amounted to about $3.95 trillion, which demonstrates the close relationship between military spending and the national debt. The U.S. military spending to win the Cold War (1945-1991) cost the American people about $12.8 trillion (Table 1). It represented about 46.2 percent of the personal income of the American taxpayers during these years.[xxxii] While the Cold War and its national debt offspring have been a bonanza for the wealthy and the powerful in the military-industrial complex, they represented a huge burden on taxpayers and meant less spending on the poor.

     Between 1977 and 1992, the top 1 percent of Americans received 91 percent more income. The top one-fifth of the population increased their income by 28 percent. However, the bottom 40 percent of Americans suffered a decrease of their income. There was actually a 17 percent decrease in the income of the poorest 20 percent of American families. The next poorest fifth of families experienced a 7 percent decrease in their income, during the same period.[xxxiii] President Eisenhower summarized it all, on April 18, 1953, when he said:

"Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, and the hopes of its children. The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities."[xxxiv]

     During the ten-year period extending between 1984 and 1993, the U.S. spent about $3.1 trillion on the military. At the same time, the U.S. other two major Western allies spent about $825 billion for the same purpose (the U.K. about $408 billion and France about $417 billion). Thus, the U.S. spent about 3.7 times more on the military than did Britain and France together.[xxxv] This huge military spending has affected the Third World, particularly oil-exporting countries. Instead of spending their oil wealth on social and economic development, the wealthy states in the Middle East found themselves in competition for the acquisition of weapons. This resulted in the delay of economic development and the accumulation of foreign debts.

     Between 1986 and 1995, the Middle East imported $78.5 billion worth of conventional weapons out of the total $321.1 billion of the world trade. This represented about 24.5 percent of the total world imports of these weapons (Table 2). Europe and North America exported about $186.2 billion worth of conventional weapons during the same decade. This represented about 58 percent of the world trade in conventional weapons (Table 3). Russia (previously USSR) exported about $91.5 billion of conventional weapons. During the same period, the world's major four weapon-producing countries (the U.S., Russia, Britain, and France) exported $243.4 billion worth of weapons. This represented about 76 percent of the world arms market.[xxxvi]

     The Middle Eastern states have also competed in their military spending. In particular, there were three major factors that influenced armament in the region. The first was the 1967 Israeli occupation of the Arab territories. To maintain its military occupation of these territories, Israel spent about $72.4 billion during the period extending from 1984 and 1994 thus outspending its neighbors altogether. Egypt spent $25.59 billion, Jordan spent $3.66 billion, and Syria spent $31 billion on their military establishments (Table 4). The Iranian policies represented the second major factor that contributed to tensions in the region, consequently to armament. The Shah's government bought huge quantities of weapons that were used in threatening its neighboring Arab states and occupying Arab islands in the Gulf. Iran's support for Kurdish separatists had left Iraq with little choice but to arm itself to fight the rebels and preserve the unity of the country. Both countries continued to buy weapons to combat each other throughout the long 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Between 1984 and 1994, the Iranian military spending reached about $139 billion and the Iraqi military spending reached more than $85 billion. The Iran-Iraq war and its consequences represented the third factor that led to a new cycle of military spending in the region. Fearing the outcome of the war, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states spent about $257.4 billion on their military during the same period, 1984-1995. Saudi Arabia took the lead, spending about $187 billion, followed by Kuwait $31.2 billion, Oman $17.5 billion, the United Arab Emirates 17, and Bahrain $2.3 billion.[xxxvii] If military spending is added in all the Middle Eastern countries (including Israel), it amounts to about $622.8 billion (Table 4).

     The military spending in the Middle East represented about 21 percent of government budget and 17 percent of the general domestic products (GDP). National debt in the region, as a result of military spending, represented 35 percent of exports, in 1981. However, it increased to 113 percent in 1991.[xxxviii] All these amounts of money are wasted in efforts and hardware that is of no use for anything except destruction of achievements of the previous generations. Because of this huge military spending, the Middle Eastern region has been deprived of a golden opportunity to catch up in development with the other regions of the world. Moreover, majority of these countries are sinking in debt just like the United States (which has accumulated more than $6 trillion in debt), despite the huge Arab oil wealth.

 Arab Oil Wealth

      The total proven Arab oil reserves amount to about 592 billion barrels (bb). According to EIA,[xxxix] Saudi Arabia has the largest reserves (259 bb), followed by Iraq (100 bb), UAE (96.5 bb), Kuwait (94 bb), Libya (29.5), Algeria (9.2 bb), and Qatar (3.7 bb). Using the beginning of the year 2000 oil prices of about $25 per barrel, the Arab oil wealth may be estimated at about $14.8 trillion. However, this figure is expected to be much higher because oil prices are more likely to increase throughout the 21st century. Because oil is a finite resource, it becomes scarcer with more use. Therefore, its prices are more likely to become higher. If the world consumption of oil continues according to the rates of the 1990s, oil-exporting countries may provide the world with this source of energy for most of the 21st century. However, Saudi Arabia may be the only source of the "black gold" in the 22nd century.

     During the 1985-1995 decade (1986 excluded), the major oil-exporting Arab states had about $755 billion of oil revenues. Saudi Arabia was the leader by earning about $310 billion, followed by Kuwait $77.5 billion, U.A.E. $114 billion, Libya $84 billion, Algeria $83 billion, Iraq $58 billion, and Qatar $28 billion. If the Iranian oil revenues ($137 billion) for the same period were added, the Middle Eastern earnings as a whole would reach about $892 billion.[xl]

     It is troubling to observe that about 62 percent of what the Arabs and Iranians earned from oil sales, in the same period, was wasted on the military spending ($550 b/$8932 b).[xli] The Arab-Israeli arms race, the two Gulf wars, and the military spending in general left every single Arab state in debt. From the total Arab foreign debt of about $304 billion, war-hit states had about 80 percent of that debt.[xlii] By 1995, Iraq accumulated about $95 billion of debt. The states that confronted Israel (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) were $65.9 billion in debt. The Palestinian people under the Israeli occupation have suffered the lowest per capita income in the area (about $1,192). Even the super rich six Gulf states had about $44.7 billion of debts.

The Power Elite Realism

     The Power Elite sociological model[xliii] analyzes the state as controlled not only by elected politicians but also by the non-elected military and business leaders. The most influential among the three power elite groups are corporate business leaders. As a result of their important donations for politicians, they have a great influence on who is going to be appointed to senior positions of various government departments and agencies. Actually, most of these appointees come directly from corporate management backgrounds, the most prestigious legal firms, and “defense” professors in major universities. Therefore, it is not a surprise that Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski were proteges of David Rokefeller. Brent Scowcroft and Lawrence Eagleburger were proteges of Kissinger, as they were his employees. McGeorge Bundy headed the Ford Foundation after leaving his NSC post, in 1969. Former Secretaries of Defense Charles E. Wilson, Neil H. McElroy, Thomas S. Gates, Robert S. McNamara, and Casper W. Weinberger held the highest positions in General Motors, Proctor & Gamble, Morgan Guaranty Trust, Ford, and Bechtel Corporation, respectively.  With the exception of Wineberger, who was the vice President of Bechtel Corporation, all were presidents or board chairmen of their corporations. The influence of these representatives of the power elite was not limited only to the government departments or agencies but extended to influence the President himself. They became his companions and tutors, socializing with him and teaching him about their world- view and America’s place in it.[xliv]

     The Realpolitik theory, or realism, is an over-simplified view of war based on the game of power politics. It represents the prevailing view among American politicians and political scientists. The “Realist” school places a major emphasis on winning war by any means. Adherents to this school are not concerned with such issues as fairness, joint gains, or costs. They are aliens to the principle of inseparability between national interests and moral duties that Thomas Jefferson called for.[xlv] Secretary of State, James Baker, described himself as a realist who was together with President Bush (Sr.) members of a generation that embraced wholeheartedly the concept of Pax Americana.[xlvi] This concept has meant (at least according to Webster’s Dictionary) engaging America as a dominant military power in maintaining stability in international affairs, or wielding a worldwide influence, according to Brzezinski.[xlvii] The Bush Jr. administration is not different. It is actually a continuation to the Bush Sr. administration. In addition to the President, who is a continuation to his father, the Vice President (Dick Chenney), the Secretary of State (Colin Powell), the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Paul Wolfuwitz), the National Security Adivisor (Condi Rice) and her Assistant (Richard Haass) all served in the Bush Sr. administration and all share the same view about the world. 

     Henry Kissenger was an architect and a master of realpolitik, in East-West relations. James Baker followed him in that. A basic reflection of this policy was linking any agreement on arms control with political issues of interest to the administration. They called themselves “realist” in contrast with the U.S. negotiating team leader Gerard Smith, the “idealist” who was so naive that he wanted to negotiate just arms for arms. They knew that the U.S. was in a stronger position, which allowed them to demand Soviet concessions in areas like Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The policy continued more aggressively when Smith was replaced first by Eugene Rostow then by Ken Adelman.[xlviii]

     Morgenthau [xlix] attributes this position to the “anarchic” international relations. Those who are in power decide national interests and use calculated power to achieve war ends. Thus, it is not the size and capabilities of the enemy that decide how much power will be used in war. Rather, the perceived war ends do. This means that there are no permanent and known national interests. Instead, influential groups in society decide national interests in a way that protects their own interests, which are articulated as policies by their representatives in government.[l]


     The September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington were a long-awaited event for the Cold War beneficiaries to make the case for the necessity of Cold War II and ultimately launch it. If these attacks did not happen, they would be waiting for any other opportunity to continue maintaining their hegemonic status in the U.S. and the world.




YEAR    $    YEAR    $    YEAR    $    YEAR    $

 1945  922.8  1958  295.7  1971  307.9  1984  312.1

1946  519.0  1959  288.9  1972  284.5  1985  337.3

1947  134.4  1960  281.4  1973  254.6  1986  356.9

1948   83.8  1961  288.4  1974  239.3  1987  364.2

1949  112.9  1962  297.0  1975  237.5  1988  365.8

1950  122.2  1963  288.5  1976  229.6  1989  369.2

1951  220.2  1964  290.9  1977  228.3  1990  351.6

1952  384.4  1965  264.9  1978  228.8  1991  361.3

1953  407.0  1966  296.5  1979  233.0  1992  323.1

1954  375.4  1967  354.6  1980  241.6  1993  304.4

1955  316.0  1968  386.8  1981  255.9  1994  284.2

1956  296.4  1969  366.0  1982  276.7  1995  271.6

1957  303.3  1970  341.4  1983  297.5

 COST OF THE 1948-1991 COLD WAR: $12,800,000,000,000.

                               ($12.8 trillion).

 SOURCE: Center for Defense Information (1996: 17).




YEAR   WORLD          MIDDLE       % OF

                TOTAL         EAST            TOTAL

1986     44.854               14.060         31.35

1987     46.534               14.831         31.87

1988     39.455                8.846         22.42

1989     38.284                5.871         15.34

1990     31.296                6.354         20.30

1991     25.819                5.394         20.89

1992     24.532                5.310         21.65

1993     24.743                6.853         27.70

1994     22.842                5.727         25.07

1995     22.797                5.295         23.23

TOTAL   321.156          78.541         24.46 (AVERAGE)

SOURCE: SIPRI Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmaments, and     International Security.




YEAR   WORLD    NORTH              % OF THE TOTAL           

              TOTAL   AMERICA & EU

1986     44.854           20.494              45.69

1987     46.535           20.779              44.65

1988     39.455           18.519              46.94

1989     38.284           18.724              48.91

1990     31.296           17.072              54.55

1991     25.819           18.204              70.51

1992     24.533           18.873              76.93

1993     24.744           18.232              73.68

1994     22.841           19.374              84.82

1995     22.797           15.974              70.01

TOTAL   321.158          186.245     Average: 57.99

SOURCE: SIPRI Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmaments, and

        International Security.                   






1984  1.0  1.0  2.0  21  2.2  3.60 .40  5.1  14  14  9.0

1985  1.0  1.0  2.0  20  2.2  3.60 .45  4.8  17  12  7.2

1986  1.0  1.0  2.2  17  2.1  3.25 .50  3.7  16  11  7.3

1987  1.0  1.0  1.7  17  1.6  2.75 .50  2.1  12  12  7.0

1988  1.0  1.0  1.7  15  1.6  2.25 .46  1.8  10  12  6.2

1989  1.0  1.2  1.6  14  1.6  1.75 .35  1.9  10  12  6.0

1990  1.0  9.0  1.7  14  1.5  1.75 .30  1.8  11  12  6.2

1991  1.0 11.0  1.4  25  1.5  1.75 .40  2.8  11  --  6.0

1992  1.3  5.0  1.7  14  1.4  1.75 .30  2.5  10  --  6.0

1993  1.6  ---  1.5  15  1.3  1.75 ---  2.3  14  --  5.8

1994  2.2  ---  ---  15  ---  1.75 ---  2.2  14  --  5.7

TOTAL13.1 31.2 17.5 187  17  25.95 3.66 31  139  85 72.4


SOURCE: SIPRI Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmaments, and

        International Security (Except for Iraq).         

--- No data.

* AL (Algeria), KT (Kuwait), OM (Oman), SA (Saudi Arabia), UAE       (United Arab Emirates), EG (Egypt), JR (Jordan), SR (Syria), IRN (Iran), IRQ (Iraq), ISR (Israel).

** The years 1992-1994 of the Egyptian military spending are estimates.



[i] U.S. Department of State: Human Rights Annual Reports (1991-1999).

[ii] Carlos is a Latin American revolutionary who joined the ranks of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, during the armed struggle to end the Israeli occupation. He was wanted by several European countries. He took refuge in the Sudan in the 1990s.

[iii] WINEP (1986).

[iv] WINEP (1988).

[v] WINEP (1989).

[vi] WINEP (1992).

[vii] WINEP (1993-a).

[viii] WINEP (1993-b).

[ix] WINEP (1995).

[x] WINEP (1996).

[xi] WINEP (1997-a).

[xii] WINEP (1997-b).

[xiii] WINEP (1998).

[xiv] Lewis (1990).

[xv] Huntington (1993, 1996).

[xvi] In a video-taped lecture, responding to “the Clash of Civilizations” absurdity, Edward Said mentions that Lewis is much listened to at the Council of Foreign Relations and its Journal of Foreign Affairs, where Huntington published his 1993 article. The objective is to influence policy makers to drift toward the idea, in order to extend the mindset of the Cold War into a different time and for a new audience (Said, 1997).

[xvii] Said (1997).

[xviii] Huntington (1997).

[xix] Bulliet (1993).

[xx] Reed (1993).

[xxi] Miller (1993).

[xxii] Shirley (1995).

[xxiii] Ajami (1997).

[xxiv]  The major TV networks participated in that efforts. Ted Kople based his show that night on the assumption that it was a Middle Eastern work. ABC reporters, in particular, were fast in linking it to the Middle Eastern groups. During a 2000 CNN show dedicated to the bomb anniversary, Larry King Live, Dan Rather admitted that the media was fast in accusing Middle Easterners as responsible for the explosion.

[xxv] Timmerman (1991: 397).

[xxvi] Hess, Markson, and Stein (1996: 347-348).

[xxvii] In 1992, the federal military spending included $295 billion as direct military spending, $33 billion in Veteran’s benefits, $7 billion for military foreign aid (mainly to Israel and Egypt), $5 billion for military NASA and Coast Guard costs, and $79 billion for the military’s share of interest payments due to past borrowings (Marullo, 1993: 157).

[xxviii] Hess, Markson, and Stein (1996: 347-348).

[xxix] Burton (1993: 41, 9, 31, 76, 274).

[xxx] The military-industrial complex includes those who benefit directly or indirectly from increasing military spending. On top of these are owners and workers of the military industries, weapon systems, contractors, researchers, professors and journalists who receive direct or indirect funding from the military industry.

[xxxi] Stevenson (1996: 7).

[xxxii] Center for Defense Information (1996).

[xxxiii] U.S. News and World Report (January 22, 1996).

[xxxiv] Center for Defense Information (1996).

[xxxv] Actually, these SIPRI (1996) figures for the American military spending are very conservative. The CDI figures reach about $3.4 trillion (Table 1).

[xxxvi] SIPRI (1996).

[xxxvii] SIPRI (1996).

[xxxviii] Peres (1993: 88-89).

[xxxix] EIA (1997).

[xl] EIU (1996).

[xli] Although the calculations include Libyan revenues, they do not include Libyan military spending. The calculations also include oil revenues of the Gulf states and military spending of both the Gulf and states neighboring to Israel because the Gulf states finance major portions of the military spending in these states, too.

[xlii] While Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria were involved in regional wars, Algeria and Sudan are still involved in civil wars. By 1995, Iraq accumulated about $95 billion of debt. It was followed by Egypt $34.6 billion, Algeria $33.5 billion, Saudi Arabia $22.4 billion, Syria $22.2 billion, Morocco $22 billion, Sudan $17 billion, Tunisia $9.9 billion, Kuwait $9 billion, Yemen $8.9 billion, Jordan $5.9 billion, Libya $4.3 billion, Qatar $3.9 billion, the U.A.E. $3.9 billion, Lebanon $3.2 billion, Bahrain $2.8 billion, Oman 2.7 billion, Somalia $2.5 billion, Mauritania $2.3 billion, Djibouti $225 million, and Comoros $189 million (EIU, 1996; Table 2).

[xliii]  Mills (1956); Domhoff (1990; 1998).

[xliv]  McCormick (1995: 13-15).

[xlv]  Tucker and Hendrickson (1990: 137).

[xlvi]  Baker (1995: 276).

[xlvii]  Brzezinski (1988: 681).

[xlviii]  Marullo (1993: 78).

[xlix]  Morgenthau (1985).

[l]  Silverstein and Holt (1989); Marullo (1993: 108).



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