LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A WALL
IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
Jurisdiction of
the Court to give the advisory opinion requested.
Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute ¾
Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter ¾
Power of General Assembly to request advisory opinions ¾
Activities of Assembly.
Events leading to
the adoption of General Assembly resolution ES‑10/14 requesting the
advisory opinion.
Contention that
General Assembly acted ultra vires
under the Charter
¾ Article 12,
paragraph 1, and Article 24 of the Charter ¾
United Nations practice concerning the interpretation of Article 12,
paragraph 1, of Charter ¾
General Assembly did not exceed its competence.
Request for opinion adopted by the Tenth Emergency Special Session of
the General Assembly ¾
Session convened pursuant to resolution 377 A (V) (“Uniting for
Peace”) ¾
Conditions set by that resolution ¾
Regularity of procedure followed.
Alleged lack of
clarity of the terms of the question ¾
Purportedly abstract nature of the question ¾
Political aspects of the question ¾
Motives said to have inspired the request and opinion’s possible
implications ¾
“Legal” nature of question unaffected.
Court having
jurisdiction to give advisory opinion requested.
* *
Discretionary
power of Court to decide whether it should give an opinion.
Article 65,
paragraph 1, of Statute ¾
Relevance of lack of consent of a State concerned ¾
Question cannot be regarded only as a bilateral matter between Israel
and Palestine but is directly of concern to the United Nations ¾
Possible effects of opinion on a political, negotiated solution to the
Israeli‑Palestinian conflict ¾
Question representing only one aspect of Israeli‑Palestinian conflict ¾
Sufficiency of information and evidence available to Court ¾
Useful purpose of opinion ¾
Nullus commodum capere potest de sua
injuria propria ¾
Opinion to be given to the General Assembly, not to a specific State
or entity.
No “compelling
reason” for Court to use its discretionary power not to give an
advisory opinion.
* *
“Legal
consequences” of the construction of a wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem
¾
Scope of question posed ¾
Request for opinion limited to the legal consequences of the
construction of those parts of the wall situated in Occupied
Palestinian Territory ¾
Use of the term “wall”.
Historical
background.
Description of
the wall.
* *
Applicable law.
United Nations
Charter ¾
General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) ¾
Illegality of any territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or
use of force ¾
Right of peoples to self‑determination.
International
humanitarian law ¾
Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 ¾
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 ¾
Applicability of Fourth Geneva Convention in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory ¾
Human rights law ¾
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ¾
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ¾
Convention on the Rights of the Child ¾
Relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights
law ¾
Applicability of human rights instruments outside national territory ¾
Applicability of those instruments in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory.
* *
Settlements
established by Israel in breach of international law in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory ¾
Construction of the wall and its associated régime create a “fait
accompli” on the ground that could well become permanent ¾
Risk of situation tantamount to de facto
annexation ¾
Construction of the wall severely impedes the exercise by the
Palestinian people of its right to self‑determination and is therefore
a breach of Israel’s obligation to respect that right.
Applicable
provisions of international humanitarian law and human rights
instruments relevant to the present case ¾
Destruction and requisition of properties ¾
Restrictions on freedom of movement of inhabitants of the Occupied
Palestinian Territory ¾
Impediments to the exercise by those concerned of the right to work,
to health, to education and to an adequate standard of living ¾
Demographic changes in the Occupied Palestinian Territory ¾
Provisions of international humanitarian law enabling account to be
taken of military exigencies ¾
Clauses in human rights instruments qualifying rights guaranteed or
providing for derogation ¾
Construction of the wall and its associated régime cannot be justified
by military exigencies or by the requirements of national security or
public order ¾
Breach by Israel of various of its
obligations under the applicable
provisions of international humanitarian law and human rights
instruments.
Self-defence ¾
Article 51 of the Charter ¾
Attacks against Israel not imputable to a foreign State ¾
Threat invoked to justify the construction of the wall originating
within a territory over which Israel exercises control ¾
Article 51 not relevant in the present case.
State of
necessity ¾
Customary international law ¾
Conditions ¾
Construction of the wall not the only means to safeguard Israel’s
interests against the peril invoked.
Construction of
the wall and its associated régime are contrary to international law.
* *
Legal
consequences of the violation by Israel of its obligations.
Israel’s
international responsibility ¾
Israel obliged to comply with the international obligations it has
breached by the construction of the wall ¾
Israel obliged to put an end to the violation of its international
obligations ¾
Obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall,
to dismantle it forthwith and to repeal or render ineffective
forthwith the legislative and regulatory acts relating to its
construction, save where relevant for compliance by Israel with its
obligation to make reparation for the damage caused ¾
Israel obliged to make reparation for the damage caused to all natural
or legal persons affected by construction of the wall.
Legal
consequences for States other than Israel ¾
Erga omnes character of certain
obligations violated by Israel ¾
Obligation for all States not to
recognize the illegal situation resulting from construction of the
wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation
created by such construction ¾
Obligation for all States, while respecting the Charter and
international law, to see to it that any impediment, resulting from
the construction of the wall, to the exercise by the Palestinian
people of its right to self‑determination is brought to an end ¾
Obligation for all States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention,
while respecting the Charter and international law, to ensure
compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as
embodied in that Convention ¾
Need for the United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and
the Security Council, to consider what further action is required to
bring to an end the illegal situation resulting from the construction
of the wall and its associated régime, taking due account of the
Advisory Opinion.
* *
Construction of
the wall must be placed in a more general context ¾
Obligation of Israel and Palestine scrupulously to observe
international
humanitarian law ¾
Implementation in good faith of all relevant Security Council
resolutions, in particular resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) ¾
“Roadmap” ¾
Need for efforts to be encouraged with a view to achieving as soon as
possible, on the basis of international law,
a negotiated solution to the outstanding
problems and the establishment of a Palestinian State, with peace and
security for all in the region.
ADVISORY OPINION
Present:
President
Shi; Vice-President
Ranjeva; Judges
Guillaume, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra‑Aranguren, Kooijmans,
Rezek, Al‑Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Tomka;
Registrar Couvreur.
On the legal
consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory,
The
Court,
Composed as above,
Gives the
following Advisory Opinion:
1. The question on
which the advisory opinion of the Court has been requested is set
forth in resolution ES‑10/14 adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations (hereinafter the “General Assembly”) on 8 December 2003
at its Tenth Emergency Special Session. By a letter dated
8 December 2003 and received in the Registry by facsimile on
10 December 2003, the original of which reached the Registry
subsequently, the Secretary‑General of the United Nations officially
communicated to the Court the decision taken by the General Assembly
to submit the question for an advisory opinion. Certified true copies
of the English and French versions of resolution ES‑10/14 were
enclosed with the letter. The resolution reads as follows:
“The General Assembly,
Reaffirming its
resolution ES‑10/13 of 21 October 2003,
Guided by the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
Aware of the
established principle of international law on the inadmissibility of
the acquisition of territory by force,
Aware also that
developing friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self‑determination of peoples is among
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
Recalling
relevant General Assembly resolutions, including resolution 181 (II)
of 29 November 1947, which partitioned mandated Palestine into two
States, one Arab and one Jewish,
Recalling also
the resolutions of the tenth emergency special session of the General
Assembly,
Recalling further
relevant Security Council resolutions, including
resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of
22 October 1973, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969, 298 (1971) of
25 September 1971, 446 (1979) of 22 March 1979, 452 (1979) of
20 July 1979, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980, 476 (1980) of 30 June 1980,
478 (1980) of 20 August 1980, 904 (1994) of 18 March 1994, 1073 (1996)
of 28 September 1996, 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002 and 1515 (2003) of
19 November 2003,
Reaffirming the
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention1 as well as
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions2 to the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
Recalling the
Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land of 19073,
Welcoming
the convening of the Conference of High Contracting Parties to the
Fourth Geneva Convention on measures to enforce the Convention in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, at Geneva on
15 July 1999,
Expressing its
support for the declaration adopted by the reconvened Conference
of High Contracting Parties at Geneva on 5 December 2001,
Recalling in
particular relevant United Nations resolutions affirming that
Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, are illegal and an obstacle to peace and to economic
and social development as well as those demanding the complete
cessation of settlement activities,
Recalling
relevant United Nations resolutions affirming that actions taken by
Israel, the occupying Power, to change the status and demographic
composition of Occupied East Jerusalem have no legal validity and are
null and void,
Noting the
agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization in the context of the Middle East peace
process,
Gravely concerned
at the commencement and continuation of construction by Israel, the
occupying Power, of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem, which is in departure from the
Armistice Line of 1949 (Green Line) and which has involved the
confiscation and destruction of Palestinian land and resources, the
disruption of the lives of thousands of protected civilians and the
de facto annexation of large areas of territory, and underlining the
unanimous opposition by the international community to the
construction of that wall,
Gravely concerned
also at the even more devastating impact of the projected parts of
the wall on the Palestinian civilian population and on the prospects
for solving the Palestinian‑Israeli conflict and establishing peace in
the region,
Welcoming the
report of 8 September 2003 of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission
on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian
territories occupied by Israel since 19674,
in particular the section regarding the wall,
Affirming the
necessity of ending the conflict on the basis of the two‑State
solution of Israel and Palestine living side by side in peace and
security based on the Armistice Line of 1949, in accordance with
relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions,
Having received with
appreciation the report of the Secretary‑General, submitted in
accordance with resolution ES‑10/135,
Bearing in mind
that the passage of time further compounds the difficulties on the
ground, as Israel, the occupying Power, continues to refuse to comply
with international law vis‑à‑vis its construction of the
above‑mentioned wall, with all its detrimental implications and
consequences,
Decides, in
accordance with Article 96 of the Charter of the United Nations, to
request the International Court of Justice, pursuant to Article 65 of
the Statute of the Court, to urgently render an advisory opinion on
the following question:
What are the
legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being
built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the
report of the Secretary‑General, considering the rules and principles
of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949,
and relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?
_______________
1United
Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 75, No. 973.
2Ibid.,
Vol. 1125, No. 17512.
3See
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Hague Conventions
and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (New York, Oxford University
Press, 1915).
4E/CN.4/2004/6.
5A/ES‑10/248.”
Also
enclosed with the letter were the certified English and French texts
of the report of the Secretary‑General dated 24 November 2003,
prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution ES‑10/13
(A/ES‑10/248), to which resolution ES‑10/14 makes reference.
2. By letters dated
10 December 2003, the Registrar notified the request for an advisory
opinion to all States entitled to appear before the Court, in
accordance with Article 66, paragraph 1, of the Statute.
3. By a letter
dated 11 December 2003, the Government of Israel informed the Court of
its position on the request for an advisory opinion and on the
procedure to be followed.
4. By an Order of
19 December 2003, the Court decided that the United Nations and its
Member States were likely, in accordance with Article 66, paragraph 2,
of the Statute, to be able to furnish information on all aspects
raised by the question submitted to the Court for an advisory opinion
and fixed 30 January 2004 as the time‑limit within which written
statements might be submitted to it on the question in accordance with
Article 66, paragraph 4, of the Statute. By the same Order, the Court
further decided that, in the light of resolution ES‑10/14 and the
report of the Secretary‑General transmitted with the request, and
taking into account the fact that the General
Assembly had granted
Palestine a special status of observer and that the latter was
co‑sponsor of the draft resolution requesting the advisory opinion,
Palestine might also submit a written statement on the question within
the above time‑limit.
5. By the aforesaid
Order, the Court also decided, in accordance with Article 105,
paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, to hold public hearings during
which oral statements and comments might be presented to it by the
United Nations and its Member States, regardless of whether or not
they had submitted written statements, and fixed 23 February 2004 as
the date for the opening of the said hearings. By the same Order, the
Court decided that, for the reasons set out above (see paragraph 4),
Palestine might also take part in the hearings. Lastly, it invited
the United Nations and its Member States, as well as Palestine, to
inform the Registry, by 13 February 2004 at the latest, if they were
intending to take part in the above‑mentioned hearings. By letters of
19 December 2004, the Registrar informed them of the Court’s decisions
and transmitted to them a copy of the Order.
6. Ruling on
requests submitted subsequently by the League of Arab States and the
Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Court decided, in
accordance with Article 66 of its Statute, that those two
international organizations were likely to be able to furnish
information on the question submitted to the Court, and that
consequently they might for that purpose submit written statements
within the time‑limit fixed by the Court in its Order of
19 December 2003 and take part in the hearings.
7. Pursuant to
Article 65, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Secretary‑General of the
United Nations communicated to the Court a dossier of documents likely
to throw light upon the question.
8. By a reasoned
Order of 30 January 2004 regarding its composition in the case, the
Court decided that the matters brought to its attention by the
Government of Israel in a letter of 31 December 2003, and in a
confidential letter of 15 January 2004 addressed to the President
pursuant to Article 34, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, were not
such as to preclude Judge Elaraby from sitting in the case.
9. Within the
time‑limit fixed by the Court for that purpose, written statements
were filed by, in order of their receipt: Guinea, Saudi Arabia,
League of Arab States, Egypt, Cameroon, Russian Federation, Australia,
Palestine, United Nations, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Canada, Syria,
Switzerland, Israel, Yemen, United States of America, Morocco,
Indonesia, Organization of the Islamic Conference, France, Italy,
Sudan, South Africa, Germany, Japan, Norway, United Kingdom, Pakistan,
Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland on its own behalf, Ireland on behalf
of the European Union, Cyprus, Brazil, Namibia, Malta, Malaysia,
Netherlands, Cuba, Sweden, Spain, Belgium, Palau, Federated States of
Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Senegal, Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea. Upon receipt of those statements, the Registrar transmitted
copies thereof to the United Nations and its Member States, to
Palestine, to the League of Arab States and to the Organization of the
Islamic Conference.
10. Various
communications were addressed to these latter by the Registry,
concerning in particular the measures taken for the organization of
the oral proceedings. By communications of 20 February 2004, the
Registry transmitted a detailed timetable of the hearings to those of
the latter who, within the time‑limit fixed for that purpose by the
Court, had expressed their intention of taking part in the
aforementioned proceedings.
11. Pursuant to
Article 106 of the Rules of Court, the Court decided to make the
written statements accessible to the public, with effect from the
opening of the oral proceedings.
12. In the course
of hearings held from 23 to 25 February 2004, the Court heard oral
statements, in the following order, by:
For Palestine:
H.E. Mr. Nasser Al‑Kidwa, Ambassador, Permanent Observer of Palestine
to the United Nations,
Ms Stephanie
Koury, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Counsel,
Mr. James
Crawford, S.C., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, Member of the Institute of International Law, Counsel and
Advocate,
Mr. Georges
Abi‑Saab, Professor of International Law, Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva, Member of the Institute of
International Law, Counsel and Advocate,
Mr. Vaughan
Lowe, Chichele Professor of International Law, University of Oxford,
Counsel and Advocate,
Mr. Jean
Salmon, Professor Emeritus of International Law, Université libre de
Bruxelles, Member of the Institute of International Law, Counsel and
Advocate;
For the Republic of South Africa:
H.E. Mr. Aziz Pahad, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Head of
Delegation,
Judge
M. R. W. Madlanga, S.C.;
For the People’s Democratic
Mr. Ahmed Laraba, Professor of International Law;
Republic of Algeria:
For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:
H.E. Mr. Fawzi A. Shobokshi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations in New York, Head
of Delegation;
For the People’s Republic
H.E. Mr. Liaquat Ali Choudhury, Ambassador of the
of Bangladesh: People’s
Republic of Bangladesh to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;
For Belize:
Mr. Jean‑Marc Sorel, Professor at the University of Paris I (Panthéon‑Sorbonne);
For the Republic of Cuba:
H.E. Mr. Abelardo Moreno Fernández, Deputy Minister for Foreign
Affairs;
For the Republic of Indonesia:
H.E. Mr. Mohammad Jusuf, Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia to
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Head of Delegation;
For the Hashemite Kingdom
H.R.H. Ambassador Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein,
of Jordan:
Permanent Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
to the United Nations, New York, Head of
Delegation,
Sir Arthur
Watts, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Senior Legal Adviser to the Government of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan;
For the Republic of Madagascar:
H.E. Mr. Alfred Rambeloson, Permanent Representative of Madagascar to
the Office of the United Nations at Geneva and to the Specialized
Agencies, Head of Delegation;
For Malaysia:
H.E. Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar, Foreign Minister of Malaysia, Head
of Delegation;
For the Republic of Senegal:
H.E. Mr. Saliou Cissé, Ambassador of the Republic of Senegal to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, Head of Delegation;
For the Republic of the Sudan:
H.E. Mr. Abuelgasim A. Idris, Ambassador of the Republic of the Sudan
to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;
For the League of Arab States:
Mr. Michael Bothe, Professor of Law, Head of the Legal Team;
For the Organization of the
H.E. Mr. Abdelouahed Belkeziz, Secretary General of the
Islamic Conference: Organization
of the Islamic Conference,
Ms Monique
Chemillier‑Gendreau, Professor of Public Law,
University of
Paris VII‑Denis Diderot, as Counsel.
*
* *
13. When seised of
a request for an advisory opinion, the Court must first consider
whether it has jurisdiction to give the opinion requested and whether,
should the answer be in the affirmative, there is any reason why it
should decline to exercise any such jurisdiction (see Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
1996 (I), p. 232, para. 10).
* *
14. The Court will
thus first address the question whether it possesses jurisdiction to
give the advisory opinion requested by the General Assembly on
8 December 2003. The competence of the Court in this regard is based
on Article 65, paragraph 1, of its Statute, according to which the
Court “may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the
request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request”. The Court
has already had occasion to indicate that:
“It is . . . a
precondition of the Court’s competence that the advisory opinion be
requested by an organ duly authorized to seek it under the Charter,
that it be requested on a legal question, and that, except in the case
of the General Assembly or the Security Council, that question should
be one arising within the scope of the activities of the requesting
organ.” (Application for Review of Judgement No. 273 of the United
Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
1982, pp. 333‑334, para. 21.)
15. It is for the
Court to satisfy itself that the request for an advisory opinion comes
from an organ or agency having competence to make it. In the present
instance, the Court notes that the General Assembly, which seeks the
advisory opinion, is authorized to do so by Article 96, paragraph 1,
of the Charter, which provides: “The General Assembly or the Security
Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an
advisory opinion on any legal question.”
16. Although the
above‑mentioned provision states that the General Assembly may seek an
advisory opinion “on any legal question”, the Court has sometimes in
the past given certain indications as to the relationship between the
question the subject of a request for an advisory opinion and the
activities of the General Assembly (Interpretation of Peace
Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, I.C.J. Reports 1950,
p. 70; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J.
Reports 1996 (I), pp. 232 and 233, paras. 11 and 12).
17. The Court will
so proceed in the present case. The Court would observe that
Article 10 of the Charter has conferred upon the General Assembly a
competence relating to “any questions or any matters” within the scope
of the Charter, and that Article 11, paragraph 2, has specifically
provided it with competence on “questions relating to the maintenance
of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of
the United Nations . . .” and to make recommendations under certain
conditions fixed by those Articles. As will be explained below, the
question of the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory was brought before
the General Assembly by a
number of Member States in the context of the Tenth Emergency Special
Session of the Assembly, convened to deal with what the Assembly, in
its resolution ES‑10/2 of 25 April 1997, considered to constitute a
threat to international peace and security.
*
18. Before further
examining the problems of jurisdiction that have been raised in the
present proceedings, the Court considers it necessary to describe the
events that led to the adoption of resolution ES‑10/14, by which the
General Assembly requested an advisory opinion on the legal
consequences of the construction of the wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory.
19. The Tenth
Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, at which that
resolution was adopted, was first convened following the rejection by
the Security Council, on 7 March and 21 March 1997, as a result of
negative votes by a permanent member, of two draft resolutions
concerning certain Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory (see, respectively, S/1997/199 and S/PV.3747, and S/1997/241
and S/PV.3756). By a letter of 31 March 1997, the Chairman of the
Arab Group then requested “that an emergency special session of the
General Assembly be convened pursuant to resolution 377 A (V) entitled
‘Uniting for Peace’” with a view to discussing “Illegal Israeli
actions in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied
Palestinian Territory” (letter dated 31 March 1997 from the Permanent
Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary‑General, A/ES‑10/1, 22 April 1997, Annex). The majority of
Members of the United Nations having concurred in this request, the
first meeting of the Tenth Emergency Special Session of the General
Assembly took place on 24 April 1997 (see A/ES‑10/1, 22 April 1997).
Resolution ES‑10/2 was adopted the following day; the General
Assembly thereby expressed its conviction that:
“the repeated violation by Israel,
the occupying Power, of international law and its failure to comply
with relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and
the agreements reached between the parties undermine the Middle East
peace process and constitute a threat to international peace and
security”,
and condemned the “illegal
Israeli actions” in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, in particular the construction of
settlements in that territory. The Tenth Emergency Special Session
was then adjourned temporarily and has since been reconvened 11 times
(on 15 July 1997, 13 November 1997, 17 March 1998, 5 February 1999,
18 October 2000, 20 December 2001, 7 May 2002, 5 August 2002,
19 September 2003, 20 October 2003 and 8 December 2003).
20. By a letter
dated 9 October 2003, the Chairman of the Arab Group, on behalf of the
States Members of the League of Arab States, requested an immediate
meeting of the Security Council to consider the “grave and ongoing
Israeli violations of international law, including international
humanitarian law, and to take the necessary measures in this regard”
(letter of 9 October 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the
Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations to the President of the
Security Council, S/2003/973, 9 October 2003). This letter was
accompanied by a draft resolution for consideration by the Council,
which condemned as illegal the construction by Israel of a wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory departing from the Armistice Line of
1949. The Security Council held its 4841st and 4842nd meetings on
14 October 2003 to consider the item entitled “The situation in the
Middle East, including the Palestine question”. It then had before it
another draft resolution proposed on the same day by Guinea, Malaysia,
Pakistan and the Syrian Arab Republic, which also condemned the
construction of the wall. This latter draft resolution was put to a
vote after an open debate and was not adopted owing to the negative
vote of a permanent member of the Council (S/PV.4841 and S/PV.4842).
On 15 October 2003,
the Chairman of the Arab Group, on behalf of the States Members of the
League of Arab States, requested the resumption of the Tenth Emergency
Special Session of the General Assembly to consider the item of
“Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of
the Occupied Palestinian Territory” (A/ES‑10/242); this request was
supported by the Non-Aligned Movement (A/ES‑10/243) and the
Organization of the Islamic Conference Group at the United Nations
(A/ES‑10/244). The Tenth Emergency Special Session resumed its work
on 20 October 2003.
21. On
27 October 2003, the General Assembly adopted resolution ES‑10/13, by
which it demanded that “Israel stop and reverse the construction of
the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and
around East Jerusalem, which is in departure of the Armistice Line of
1949 and is in contradiction to relevant provisions of international
law” (para. 1). In paragraph 3, the Assembly requested the
Secretary‑General “to report on compliance with the . . . resolution
periodically, with the first report on compliance with paragraph 1 [of
that resolution] to be submitted within one month . . .”. The Tenth
Emergency Special Session was temporarily adjourned and, on
24 November 2003, the report of the Secretary‑General prepared
pursuant to General Assembly resolution ES-10/13 (hereinafter the
“report of the Secretary‑General”) was issued (A/ES‑10/248).
22. Meanwhile, on
19 November 2003, the Security Council adopted resolution 1515 (2003),
by which it “Endorse[d] the Quartet Performance‑based Roadmap
to a Permanent Two‑State Solution to the Israeli‑Palestinian
Conflict”. The Quartet consists of representatives of the United
States of America, the European Union, the Russian Federation and the
United Nations. That resolution
“Call[ed] on the
parties to fulfil their obligations under the Roadmap in cooperation
with the Quartet and to achieve the vision of two States living side
by side in peace and security.”
Neither the “Roadmap” nor
resolution 1515 (2003) contained any specific provision concerning the
construction of the wall, which was not discussed by the Security
Council in this context.
23. Nineteen days
later, on 8 December 2003, the Tenth Emergency Special Session of the
General Assembly again resumed its work, following a new request by
the Chairman of the Arab Group, on behalf of the States Members of the
League of Arab States, and pursuant to resolution ES‑10/13 (letter
dated 1 December 2003 to the President of the General Assembly from
the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Kuwait to the
United Nations, A/ES‑10/249, 2 December 2003). It was during the
meeting convened on that day that resolution ES‑10/14 requesting the
present Advisory Opinion was adopted.
*
24. Having thus
recalled the sequence of events that led to the adoption of
resolution ES‑10/14, the Court will now turn to the questions of
jurisdiction that have been raised in the present proceedings. First,
Israel has alleged that, given the active engagement of the Security
Council with the situation in the Middle East, including the
Palestinian question, the General Assembly acted ultra vires
under the Charter when it requested an advisory opinion on the legal
consequences of the construction of the wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory.
25.
The Court has already indicated that the subject of the present
request for an advisory opinion falls within the competence of the
General Assembly under the Charter (see paragraphs 15‑17 above).
However, Article 12, paragraph 1, of the Charter provides that:
“While the Security
Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the
functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly
shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or
situation unless the Security Council so requests.”
A request for an advisory
opinion is not in itself a “recommendation” by the General Assembly
“with regard to [a] dispute or situation”. It has however been argued
in this case that the adoption by the General Assembly of
resolution ES-10/14 was ultra vires as not in accordance with
Article 12. The Court thus considers that it is appropriate for it to
examine the significance of that Article, having regard to the
relevant texts and the practice of the United Nations.
26. Under
Article 24 of the Charter the Security Council has “primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security”. In that regard it can impose on States “an explicit
obligation of compliance if for example it issues an order or
command . . . under Chapter VII” and can, to that end, “require
enforcement by coercive action” (Certain Expenses of
the United Nations
(Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July
1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 163).
However, the Court would emphasize that Article 24 refers to a
primary, but not necessarily exclusive, competence. The General
Assembly does have the power, inter alia, under Article 14 of
the Charter, to “recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment” of
various situations (Certain Expenses of the United Nations, ibid.,
p. 163). “[T]he only limitation which Article 14 imposes on the
General Assembly is the restriction found in Article 12, namely, that
the Assembly should not recommend measures while the Security Council
is dealing with the same matter unless the Council requests it to do
so.” (Ibid.).
27. As regards the
practice of the United Nations, both the General Assembly and the
Security Council initially interpreted and applied Article 12 to the
effect that the Assembly could not make a recommendation on a question
concerning the maintenance of international peace and security while
the matter remained on the Council’s agenda. Thus the Assembly during
its fourth session refused to recommend certain measures on the
question of Indonesia, on the ground, inter alia, that the
Council remained seised of the matter (Official Records of the
General Assembly, Fourth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee,
Summary Records of Meetings, 27 September‑7 December 1949,
56th Meeting, 3 December 1949, p. 339, para. 118). As for the
Council, on a number of occasions it deleted items from its agenda in
order to enable the Assembly to deliberate on them (for example, in
respect of the Spanish question (Official Records of the Security
Council, First Year: Second Series, No. 21, 79th Meeting,
4 November 1946, p. 498), in connection with incidents on the Greek
border (Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year,
No. 89, 202nd Meeting, 15 September 1947, pp. 2404‑2405) and in
regard to the Island of Taiwan (Formosa) (Official Records of the
Security Council, Fifth Year, No. 48, 506th Meeting,
29 September 1950, p. 5)). In the case of the Republic of Korea, the
Council decided on 31 January 1951 to remove the relevant item from
the list of matters of which it was seised in order to enable the
Assembly to deliberate on the matter (Official Records of the
Security Council, Sixth Year, S/PV.531, 531st Meeting,
31 January 1951, pp. 11‑12, para. 57).
However, this
interpretation of Article 12 has evolved subsequently. Thus the
General Assembly deemed itself entitled in 1961 to adopt
recommendations in the matter of the Congo (resolutions 1955 (XV) and
1600 (XVI)) and in 1963 in respect of the Portuguese colonies
(resolution 1913 (XVIII)) while those cases still appeared on the
Council’s agenda, without the Council having adopted any recent
resolution concerning them. In response to a question posed by Peru
during the Twenty‑third session of the General Assembly, the Legal
Counsel of the United Nations confirmed that the Assembly interpreted
the words “is exercising the functions” in Article 12 of the Charter
as meaning “is exercising the functions at this moment” (Twenty‑third
General Assembly, Third Committee, 1637th meeting, A/C.3/SR.1637, para. 9).
Indeed, the Court notes that there has been an increasing tendency
over time for the General Assembly and the Security Council to deal in
parallel with the same matter concerning the maintenance of
international peace and security (see, for example, the matters
involving Cyprus, South Africa, Angola, Southern Rhodesia and more
recently Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia). It is often the case
that, while the Security Council has tended to focus on the aspects of
such matters related to international peace and security, the General
Assembly has taken a broader view, considering also their
humanitarian, social and economic aspects.
28. The Court considers that the accepted practice
of the General Assembly, as it has evolved, is consistent with
Article 12, paragraph 1, of the Charter.
The Court is
accordingly of the view that the General Assembly, in adopting
resolution ES‑10/14, seeking an advisory opinion from the Court, did
not contravene the provisions of Article 12, paragraph 1, of the
Charter. The Court concludes that by submitting that request the
General Assembly did not exceed its competence.
29. It has however
been contended before the Court that the present request for an
advisory opinion did not fulfil the essential conditions set by
resolution 377 A (V), under which the Tenth Emergency Special Session
was convened and has continued to act. In this regard, it has been
said, first, that “The Security Council was never seised of a draft
resolution proposing that the Council itself should request an
advisory opinion from the Court on the matters now in contention”,
and, that specific issue having thus never been brought before the
Council, the General Assembly could not rely on any inaction by the
Council to make such a request. Secondly, it has been claimed that,
in adopting resolution 1515 (2003), which endorsed the “Roadmap”,
before the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution ES‑10/14,
the Security Council continued to exercise its responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security and that, as a result,
the General Assembly was not entitled to act in its place. The
validity of the procedure followed by the Tenth Emergency Special
Session, especially the Session’s “rolling character” and the fact
that its meeting was convened to deliberate on the request for the
advisory opinion at the same time as the General Assembly was meeting
in regular session, has also been questioned.
30. The Court would
recall that resolution 377 A (V) states that:
“if the Security Council, because
of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall
consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate
recommendations to Members for collective measures . . .”
The procedure provided for by
that resolution is premised on two conditions, namely that the Council
has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security as a result of a negative vote of
one or more permanent members, and that the situation is one in which
there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression. The Court must accordingly ascertain whether these
conditions were fulfilled as regards the convening of the Tenth
Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, in particular at
the time when the Assembly decided to request an advisory opinion from
the Court.
31. In the light of
the sequence of events described in paragraphs 18 to 23 above, the
Court observes that, at the time when the Tenth Emergency Special
Session was convened in 1997, the Council had been unable to take a
decision on the case of certain Israeli settlements in the
Occupied Palestinian
Territory, due to negative votes of a permanent member; and that, as
indicated in resolution ES‑10/2 (see paragraph 19 above), there
existed a threat to international peace and security.
The Court further
notes that, on 20 October 2003, the Tenth Emergency Special Session of
the General Assembly was reconvened on the same basis as in 1997 (see
the statements by the representatives of Palestine and Israel,
A/ES‑10/PV.21, pp. 2 and 5), after the rejection by the Security
Council, on 14 October 2003, again as a result of the negative vote of
a permanent member, of a draft resolution concerning the construction
by Israel of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The
Court considers that the Security Council again failed to act as
contemplated in resolution 377 A (V). It does not appear to the Court
that the situation in this regard changed between 20 October 2003 and
8 December 2003, since the Council neither discussed the construction
of the wall nor adopted any resolution in that connection. Thus, the
Court is of the view that, up to 8 December 2003, the Council had not
reconsidered the negative vote of 14 October 2003. It follows that,
during that period, the Tenth Emergency Special Session was duly
reconvened and could properly be seised, under resolution 377 A (V),
of the matter now before the Court.
32. The Court would
also emphasize that, in the course of this Emergency Special Session,
the General Assembly could adopt any resolution falling within the
subject-matter for which the Session had been convened, and otherwise
within its powers, including a resolution seeking the Court’s
opinion. It is irrelevant in that regard that no proposal had been
made to the Security Council to request such an opinion.
33. Turning now to
alleged further procedural irregularities of the Tenth Emergency
Special Session, the Court does not consider that the “rolling”
character of that Session, namely the fact of its having been convened
in April 1997 and reconvened 11 times since then, has any relevance
with regard to the validity of the request by the General Assembly.
The Court observes in that regard that the Seventh Emergency Special
Session of the General Assembly, having been convened on 22 July 1980,
was subsequently reconvened four times (on 20 April 1982,
25 June 1982, 16 August 1982 and 24 September 1982), and that the
validity of resolutions or decisions of the Assembly adopted under
such circumstances was never disputed. Nor has the validity of any
previous resolutions adopted during the Tenth Emergency Special
Session been challenged.
34. The Court also
notes the contention by Israel that it was improper to reconvene the
Tenth Emergency Special Session at a time when the regular Session of
the General Assembly was in progress. The Court considers that, while
it may not have been originally contemplated that it would be
appropriate for the General Assembly to hold simultaneous emergency
and regular sessions, no rule of the Organization has been identified
which would be thereby violated, so as to render invalid the
resolution adopting the present request for an advisory opinion.
35. Finally, the
Tenth Emergency Special Session appears to have been convened in
accordance with Rule 9 (b) of the Rules of Procedure of the
General Assembly, and the relevant meetings have been convened in
pursuance of the applicable rules. As the Court stated in its
Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971 concerning the Legal Consequences
for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
a “resolution of a properly constituted organ of the United Nations
which is passed in accordance with that organ’s rules of procedure,
and is declared by its President to have been so passed, must be
presumed to have been validly adopted” (I.C.J. Reports 1971,
p. 22, para. 20). In view of the foregoing, the Court cannot see any
reason why that presumption is to be rebutted in the present case.
*
36. The Court now
turns to a further issue related to jurisdiction in the present
proceedings, namely the contention that the request for an advisory
opinion by the General Assembly is not on a “legal question” within
the meaning of Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter and Article 65,
paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court. It has been contended in
this regard that, for a question to constitute a “legal question” for
the purposes of these two provisions, it must be reasonably specific,
since otherwise it would not be amenable to a response by the Court.
With regard to the request made in the present advisory proceedings,
it has been argued that it is not possible to determine with
reasonable certainty the legal meaning of the question asked of the
Court for two reasons.
First, it has been
argued that the question regarding the “legal consequences” of the
construction of the wall only allows for two possible interpretations,
each of which would lead to a course of action that is precluded for
the Court. The question asked could first be interpreted as a request
for the Court to find that the construction of the wall is illegal,
and then to give its opinion on the legal consequences of that
illegality. In this case, it has been contended, the Court should
decline to respond to the question asked for a variety of reasons,
some of which pertain to jurisdiction and others rather to the issue
of propriety. As regards jurisdiction, it is said that, if the
General Assembly had wished to obtain the view of the Court on the
highly complex and sensitive question of the legality of the
construction of the wall, it should have expressly sought an opinion
to that effect (cf. Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations,
Advisory Opinion, 1925, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 10, p. 17). A
second possible interpretation of the request, it is said, is that the
Court should assume that the construction of the wall is illegal, and
then give its opinion on the legal consequences of that assumed
illegality. It has been contended that the Court should also decline
to respond to the question on this hypothesis, since the request would
then be based on a questionable assumption and since, in any event, it
would be impossible to rule on the legal consequences of illegality
without specifying the nature of that illegality.
Secondly, it has
been contended that the question asked of the Court is not of a
“legal” character because of its imprecision and abstract nature. In
particular, it has been argued in this regard that the question fails
to specify whether the Court is being asked to address legal
consequences for “the General
Assembly or some other organ of the United Nations”, “Member States of
the United Nations”, “Israel”, “Palestine” or “some combination of the
above, or some different entity”.
37. As regards the
alleged lack of clarity of the terms of the General Assembly’s request
and its effect on the “legal nature” of the question referred to the
Court, the Court observes that this question is directed to the legal
consequences arising from a given factual situation considering the
rules and principles of international law, including the Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War of 12 August 1949 (hereinafter the “Fourth Geneva Convention”) and
relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. The
question submitted by the General Assembly has thus, to use the
Court’s phrase in its Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, “been
framed in terms of law and raise[s] problems of international law”;
it is by its very nature susceptible of a reply based on law; indeed
it is scarcely susceptible of a reply otherwise than on the basis of
law. In the view of the Court, it is indeed a question of a legal
character (see Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
1975, p. 18, para. 15).
38. The Court would
point out that lack of clarity in the drafting of a question does not
deprive the Court of jurisdiction. Rather, such uncertainty will
require clarification in interpretation, and such necessary
clarifications of interpretation have frequently been given by the
Court.
In the past, both
the Permanent Court and the present Court have observed in some cases
that the wording of a request for an advisory opinion did not
accurately state the question on which the Court’s opinion was being
sought (Interpretation of the Greco‑Turkish Agreement of
1 December 1926 (Final Protocol, Article IV), Advisory Opinion, 1928,
P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 16 (I), pp. 14‑16), or did not correspond
to the “true legal question” under consideration (Interpretation of
the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1980, pp. 87‑89, paras. 34‑36). The Court
noted in one case that “the question put to the Court is, on the face
of it, at once infelicitously expressed and vague” (Application for
Review of Judgement No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 348, para. 46).
Consequently, the
Court has often been required to broaden, interpret and even
reformulate the questions put (see the three Opinions cited above;
see also Jaworzina, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series B,
No. 8; Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the
Committee on South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1956,
p. 25; Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17,
paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962,
pp. 157‑162).
In the present
instance, the Court will only have to do what it has often done in the
past, namely “identify the existing principles and rules, interpret
them and apply them . . ., thus offering a reply to the question posed
based on law” (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 234, para. 13).
39. In the present
instance, if the General Assembly requests the Court to state the
“legal consequences” arising from the construction of the wall, the
use of these terms necessarily encompasses an assessment of whether
that construction is or is not in breach of certain rules and
principles of international law. Thus, the Court is first called upon
to determine whether such rules and principles have been and are still
being breached by the construction of the wall along the planned
route.
40. The Court does
not consider that what is contended to be the abstract nature of the
question posed to it raises an issue of jurisdiction. Even when the
matter was raised as an issue of propriety rather than one of
jurisdiction, in the case concerning the Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court took the position that to
contend that it should not deal with a question couched in abstract
terms is “a mere affirmation devoid of any justification” and that
“the Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question,
abstract or otherwise” (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 236, para. 15,
referring to Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in
the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1948,
I.C.J. Reports 1947‑1948, p. 61; Effect of Awards of
Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal,
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 51; and Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971,
p. 27, para. 40). In any event, the Court considers that the question
posed to it in relation to the legal consequences of the construction
of the wall is not an abstract one, and moreover that it would be for
the Court to determine for whom any such consequences arise.
41. Furthermore,
the Court cannot accept the view, which has also been advanced in the
present proceedings, that it has no jurisdiction because of the
“political” character of the question posed. As is clear from its
long‑standing jurisprudence on this point, the Court considers that
the fact that a legal question also has political aspects,
“as, in the nature of things, is
the case with so many questions which arise in international life,
does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a ‘legal question’
and to ‘deprive the Court of a competence expressly conferred on it by
its Statute’(Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J,
Reports 1973, p. 172, para. 14). Whatever its political aspects,
the Court cannot refuse to admit the legal character of a question
which invites it to discharge an essentially judicial task, namely, an
assessment of the legality of the possible conduct of States with
regard to the obligations imposed upon them by international law (cf.
Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United
Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1948, I.C.J.
Reports 1947‑1948, pp. 61‑62; Competence of the General
Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, pp. 6‑7; Certain Expenses of the
United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 155).” (Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 234,
para. 13.)
In its Opinion concerning the
Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO
and Egypt, the Court indeed emphasized that, “in situations in
which political considerations are prominent it may be particularly
necessary for an international organization to obtain an advisory
opinion from the Court as to the legal principles applicable with
respect to the matter under debate . . .” (I.C.J. Reports 1980,
p. 87, para. 33). Moreover, the Court has affirmed in its Opinion on
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that “the
political nature of the motives which may be said to have inspired the
request and the political implications that the opinion given might
have are of no relevance in the establishment of its jurisdiction to
give such an opinion” (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 234, para. 13).
The Court is of the view that there is no element in the present
proceedings which could lead it to conclude otherwise.
*
42. The Court
accordingly has jurisdiction to give the advisory opinion requested by
resolution ES‑10/14 of the General Assembly.
* *
43. It has been
contended in the present proceedings, however, that the Court should
decline to exercise its jurisdiction because of the presence of
specific aspects of the General Assembly’s request that would render
the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction improper and inconsistent
with the Court’s judicial function.
44. The Court has
recalled many times in the past that Article 65, paragraph 1, of its
Statute, which provides that “The Court may give an advisory
opinion . . .” (emphasis added), should be interpreted to mean that
the Court has a discretionary power to decline to give an advisory
opinion even if the conditions of jurisdiction are met (Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1996 (I), p. 234, para. 14). The Court however is mindful
of the fact that its answer to a request for an advisory opinion
“represents its participation in the activities of the Organization,
and, in principle, should not be refused” (Interpretation of Peace
Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 71; see also, for example,
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special
Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1999 (I), pp. 78‑79, para. 29.) Given its
responsibilities as the “principal judicial organ of the United
Nations” (Article 92 of the Charter), the Court should in principle
not decline to give an advisory opinion. In accordance with its
consistent jurisprudence, only “compelling reasons” should lead the
Court to refuse its opinion
(Certain Expenses of the
United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 155; see also, for example,
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special
Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1999 (I), pp. 78‑79, para. 29.)
The present Court
has never, in the exercise of this discretionary power, declined to
respond to a request for an advisory opinion. Its decision not to
give the advisory opinion on the Legality of the Use by a State of
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict requested by the World Health
Organization was based on the Court’s lack of jurisdiction, and not on
considerations of judicial propriety (see I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I),
p. 235, para. 14). Only on one occasion did the Court’s predecessor,
the Permanent Court of International Justice, take the view that it
should not reply to a question put to it (Status of Eastern Carelia,
Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 5), but this was
due to
“the very particular circumstances
of the case, among which were that the question directly concerned an
already existing dispute, one of the States parties to which was
neither a party to the Statute of the Permanent Court nor a Member of
the League of Nations, objected to the proceedings, and refused to
take part in any way” (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), pp. 235‑236, para. 14).
45. These
considerations do not release the Court from the duty to satisfy
itself, each time it is seised of a request for an opinion, as to the
propriety of the exercise of its judicial function, by reference to
the criterion of “compelling reasons” as cited above. The Court will
accordingly examine in detail and in the light of its jurisprudence
each of the arguments presented to it in this regard.
*
46. The first such
argument is to the effect that the Court should not exercise its
jurisdiction in the present case because the request concerns a
contentious matter between Israel and Palestine, in respect of which
Israel has not consented to the exercise of that jurisdiction.
According to this view, the subject‑matter of the question posed by
the General Assembly “is an integral part of the wider
Israeli‑Palestinian dispute concerning questions of terrorism,
security, borders, settlements, Jerusalem and other related matters”.
Israel has emphasized that it has never consented to the settlement of
this wider dispute by the Court or by any other means of compulsory
adjudication; on the contrary, it contends that the parties repeatedly
agreed that these issues are to be settled by negotiation, with the
possibility of an agreement that recourse could be had to
arbitration. It is accordingly contended that the Court should
decline to give the present Opinion, on the basis inter alia of
the precedent of the decision of the Permanent Court of International
Justice on the Status of Eastern Carelia.
47. The Court
observes that the lack of consent to the Court’s contentious
jurisdiction by interested States has no bearing on the Court’s
jurisdiction to give an advisory opinion. In an Advisory Opinion of
1950, the Court explained that:
“The consent of States,
parties to a dispute, is the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction in
contentious cases. The situation is different in regard to advisory
proceedings even where the Request for an Opinion relates to a legal
question actually pending between States. The Court’s reply is only
of an advisory character: as such, it has no binding force. It
follows that no State, whether a Member of the United Nations or not,
can prevent the giving of an Advisory Opinion which the United Nations
considers to be desirable in order to obtain enlightenment as to the
course of action it should take. The Court’s Opinion is given not to
the States, but to the organ which is entitled to request it; the
reply of the Court, itself an ‘organ of the United Nations’,
represents its participation in the activities of the Organization,
and, in principle, should not be refused.” (Interpretation of
Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase,
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 71; see also Western
Sahara, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 24, para. 31.)
It followed from this that, in
those proceedings, the Court did not refuse to respond to the request
for an advisory opinion on the ground that, in the particular
circumstances, it lacked jurisdiction. The Court did however examine
the opposition of certain interested States to the request by the
General Assembly in the context of issues of judicial propriety.
Commenting on its 1950 decision, the Court explained in its Advisory
Opinion on Western Sahara that it had “Thus . . . recognized
that lack of consent might constitute a ground for declining to give
the opinion requested if, in the circumstances of a given case,
considerations of judicial propriety should oblige the Court to refuse
an opinion.” The Court continued:
“In certain
circumstances . . . the lack of consent of an interested State may
render the giving of an advisory opinion incompatible with the Court’s
judicial character. An instance of this would be when the
circumstances disclose that to give a reply would have the effect of
circumventing the principle that a State is not obliged to allow its
disputes to be submitted to judicial settlement without its consent.”
(Western Sahara, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 25, paras. 32‑33.)
In applying that principle to
the request concerning Western Sahara, the Court found that a
legal controversy did indeed exist, but one which had arisen during
the proceedings of the General Assembly and in relation to matters
with which the Assembly was dealing. It had not arisen independently
in bilateral relations (ibid., p. 25, para. 34).
48. As regards the
request for an advisory opinion now before it, the Court acknowledges
that Israel and Palestine have expressed radically divergent views on
the legal consequences of Israel’s construction of the wall, on which
the Court has been asked to pronounce. However, as the Court has
itself noted, “Differences of views . . . on legal issues have existed
in practically every advisory proceeding” (Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 24, para. 34).
49. Furthermore,
the Court does not consider that the subject‑matter of the General
Assembly’s request can be regarded as only a bilateral matter between
Israel and Palestine. Given the powers and responsibilities of the
United Nations in questions relating to international peace
and security, it is the
Court’s view that the construction of the wall must be deemed to be
directly of concern to the United Nations. The responsibility of the
United Nations in this matter also has its origin in the Mandate and
the Partition Resolution concerning Palestine (see paragraphs 70 and
71 below). This responsibility has been described by the General
Assembly as “a permanent responsibility towards the question of
Palestine until the question is resolved in all its aspects in a
satisfactory manner in accordance with international legitimacy”
(General Assembly resolution 57/107 of 3 December 2002). Within the
institutional framework of the Organization, this responsibility has
been manifested by the adoption of many Security Council and General
Assembly resolutions, and by the creation of several subsidiary bodies
specifically established to assist in the realization of the
inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.
50. The object of
the request before the Court is to obtain from the Court an opinion
which the General Assembly deems of assistance to it for the proper
exercise of its functions. The opinion is requested on a question
which is of particularly acute concern to the United Nations, and one
which is located in a much broader frame of reference than a bilateral
dispute. In the circumstances, the Court does not consider that to
give an opinion would have the effect of circumventing the principle
of consent to judicial settlement, and the Court accordingly cannot,
in the exercise of its discretion, decline to give an opinion on that
ground.
*
51. The Court now
turns to another argument raised in the present proceedings in support
of the view that it should decline to exercise its jurisdiction. Some
participants have argued that an advisory opinion from the Court on
the legality of the wall and the legal consequences of its
construction could impede a political, negotiated solution to the
Israeli‑Palestinian conflict. More particularly, it has been
contended that such an opinion could undermine the scheme of the
“Roadmap” (see paragraph 22 above), which requires Israel and
Palestine to comply with certain obligations in various phases
referred to therein. The requested opinion, it has been alleged,
could complicate the negotiations envisaged in the “Roadmap”, and the
Court should therefore exercise its discretion and decline to reply to
the question put.
This is a submission
of a kind which the Court has already had to consider several times in
the past. For instance, in its Advisory opinion on the Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court stated:
“It has . . . been
submitted that a reply from the Court in this case might adversely
affect disarmament negotiations and would, therefore, be contrary to
the interest of the United Nations. The Court is aware that, no
matter what might be its conclusions in any opinion it might give,
they would have relevance for the continuing debate on the matter in
the General Assembly and would present an additional element
in the negotiations on the
matter. Beyond that, the effect of the opinion is a matter of
appreciation. The Court has heard contrary positions advanced and
there are no evident criteria by which it can prefer one assessment to
another.” (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 237, para. 17; see
also Western Sahara, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 37, para. 73.)
52. One participant
in the present proceedings has indicated that the Court, if it were to
give a response to the request, should in any event do so keeping in
mind
“two key aspects of the peace
process: the fundamental principle that permanent status issues must
be resolved through negotiations; and the need during the interim
period for the parties to fulfill their security responsibilities so
that the peace process can succeed”.
53. The Court is
conscious that the “Roadmap”, which was endorsed by the Security
Council in resolution 1515 (2003) (see paragraph 22 above),
constitutes a negotiating framework for the resolution of the
Israeli‑Palestinian conflict. It is not clear, however, what
influence the Court’s opinion might have on those negotiations:
participants in the present proceedings have expressed differing
views in this regard. The Court cannot regard this factor as a
compelling reason to decline to exercise its jurisdiction.
54. It was also put
to the Court by certain participants that the question of the
construction of the wall was only one aspect of the
Israeli‑Palestinian conflict, which could not be properly addressed in
the present proceedings. The Court does not however consider this a
reason for it to decline to reply to the question asked. The Court is
indeed aware that the question of the wall is part of a greater whole,
and it would take this circumstance carefully into account in any
opinion it might give. At the same time, the question that the
General Assembly has chosen to ask of the Court is confined to the
legal consequences of the construction of the wall, and the Court
would only examine other issues to the extent that they might be
necessary to its consideration of the question put to it.
*
55. Several
participants in the proceedings have raised the further argument that
the Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction because it does
not have at its disposal the requisite facts and evidence to enable it
to reach its conclusions. In particular, Israel has contended,
referring to the Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of Peace
Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, that the Court could
not give an opinion on issues which raise questions of fact that
cannot be elucidated without hearing all parties to the conflict.
According to Israel, if the Court decided to give the requested
opinion, it would be forced to speculate about essential facts and
make assumptions about arguments of law. More specifically, Israel
has argued that the Court could not rule on the legal consequences of
the construction of the wall without enquiring, first,
into the nature and scope of
the security threat to which the wall is intended to respond and the
effectiveness of that response, and, second, into the impact of the
construction for the Palestinians. This task, which would already be
difficult in a contentious case, would be further complicated in an
advisory proceeding, particularly since Israel alone possesses much of
the necessary information and has stated that it chooses not to
address the merits. Israel has concluded that the Court, confronted
with factual issues impossible to clarify in the present proceedings,
should use its discretion and decline to comply with the request for
an advisory opinion.
56. The Court
observes that the question whether the evidence available to it is
sufficient to give an advisory opinion must be decided in each
particular instance. In its Opinion concerning the Interpretation
of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (I.C.J.
Reports 1950, p. 72) and again in its Opinion on the Western
Sahara, the Court made it clear that what is decisive in these
circumstances is “whether the Court has before it sufficient
information and evidence to enable it to arrive at a judicial
conclusion upon any disputed questions of fact the determination of
which is necessary for it to give an opinion in conditions compatible
with its judicial character” (Western Sahara, I.C.J. Reports 1975,
pp. 28‑29, para. 46). Thus, for instance, in the proceedings
concerning the Status of Eastern Carelia, the Permanent Court
of International Justice decided to decline to give an Opinion
inter alia because the question put “raised a question of fact
which could not be elucidated without hearing both parties” (Interpretation
of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, I.C.J. Reports
1950, p. 72; see Status of Eastern Carelia, P.C.I.J.,
Series B, No. 5, p. 28). On the other hand, in the Western
Sahara Opinion, the Court observed that it had been provided with
very extensive documentary evidence of the relevant facts (I.C.J.
Reports 1975, p. 29, para. 47).
57. In the present
instance, the Court has at its disposal the report of the
Secretary‑General, as well as a voluminous dossier submitted by him to
the Court, comprising not only detailed information on the route of
the wall but also on its humanitarian and socio‑economic impact on the
Palestinian population. The dossier includes several reports based on
on‑site visits by special rapporteurs and competent organs of the
United Nations. The Secretary-General has further submitted to the
Court a written statement updating his report, which supplemented the
information contained therein. Moreover, numerous other participants
have submitted to the Court written statements which contain
information relevant to a response to the question put by the General
Assembly. The Court notes in particular that Israel’s Written
Statement, although limited to issues of jurisdiction and judicial
propriety, contained observations on other matters, including Israel’s
concerns in terms of security, and was accompanied by corresponding
annexes; many other documents issued by the Israeli Government on
those matters are in the public domain.
58. The Court finds
that it has before it sufficient information and evidence to enable it
to give the advisory opinion requested by the General Assembly.
Moreover, the circumstance that others may evaluate and interpret
these facts in a subjective or political manner can be no argument
for a court of law to
abdicate its judicial task. There is therefore in the present case no
lack of information such as to constitute a compelling reason for the
Court to decline to give the requested opinion.
*
59. In their
written statements, some participants have also put forward the
argument that the Court should decline to give the requested opinion
on the legal consequences of the construction of the wall because such
opinion would lack any useful purpose. They have argued that the
advisory opinions of the Court are to be seen as a means to enable an
organ or agency in need of legal clarification for its future action
to obtain that clarification. In the present instance, the argument
continues, the General Assembly would not need an opinion of the Court
because it has already declared the construction of the wall to be
illegal and has already determined the legal consequences by demanding
that Israel stop and reverse its construction, and further, because
the General Assembly has never made it clear how it intended to use
the opinion.
60. As is clear
from the Court’s jurisprudence, advisory opinions have the purpose of
furnishing to the requesting organs the elements of law necessary for
them in their action. In its Opinion concerning Reservations to
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, the Court observed: “The object of this request for an
Opinion is to guide the United Nations in respect of its own action.”
(I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 19.) Likewise, in its Opinion on the
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), the Court noted: “The request is put
forward by a United Nations organ with reference to its own decisions
and it seeks legal advice from the Court on the consequences and
implications of these decisions.” (I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 24,
para. 32.) The Court found on another occasion that the advisory
opinion it was to give would “furnish the General Assembly with
elements of a legal character relevant to its further treatment of the
decolonization of Western Sahara” (Western Sahara, I.C.J. Reports
1975, p. 37, para. 72).
61. With regard to
the argument that the General Assembly has not made it clear what use
it would make of an advisory opinion on the wall, the Court would
recall, as equally relevant in the present proceedings, what it stated
in its Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons:
“Certain States have
observed that the General Assembly has not explained to the Court for
what precise purposes it seeks the advisory opinion. Nevertheless, it
is not for the Court itself to purport to decide whether or not an
advisory opinion is needed by the Assembly for the performance of its
functions. The General Assembly has the right to decide for itself on
the usefulness of an opinion in the light of its own needs.” (I.C.J.
Reports 1996 (I), p. 237, para. 16.)
62. It follows that
the Court cannot decline to answer the question posed based on the
ground that its opinion would lack any useful purpose. The Court
cannot substitute its assessment of the usefulness of the opinion
requested for that of the organ that seeks such opinion, namely the
General Assembly. Furthermore, and in any event, the Court considers
that the General Assembly has not yet determined all the possible
consequences of its own resolution. The Court’s task would be to
determine in a comprehensive manner the legal consequences of the
construction of the wall, while the General Assembly ¾
and the Security Council ¾
may then draw conclusions from the Court’s findings.
*
63. Lastly, the
Court will turn to another argument advanced with regard to the
propriety of its giving an advisory opinion in the present
proceedings. Israel has contended that Palestine, given its
responsibility for acts of violence against Israel and its population
which the wall is aimed at addressing, cannot seek from the Court a
remedy for a situation resulting from its own wrongdoing. In this
context, Israel has invoked the maxim nullus commodum capere potest
de sua injuria propria, which it considers to be as relevant in
advisory proceedings as it is in contentious cases. Therefore, Israel
concludes, good faith and the principle of “clean hands” provide a
compelling reason that should lead the Court to refuse the General
Assembly’s request.
64. The Court does
not consider this argument to be pertinent. As was emphasized
earlier, it was the General Assembly which requested the advisory
opinion, and the opinion is to be given to the General Assembly, and
not to a specific State or entity.
* *
65. In the light of
the foregoing, the Court concludes not only that it has jurisdiction
to give an opinion on the question put to it by the General Assembly
(see paragraph 42 above), but also that there is no compelling reason
for it to use its discretionary power not to give that opinion.
*
* *
66. The Court will
now address the question put to it by the General Assembly in
resolution ES‑10/14. The Court recalls that the question is as
follows:
“What are the legal
consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by
Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the report of
the Secretary‑General, considering the rules and principles of
international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and
relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?”
67. As explained in
paragraph 82 below, the “wall” in question is a complex construction,
so that that term cannot be understood in a limited physical sense.
However, the other terms used, either by Israel (“fence”) or by the
Secretary‑General (“barrier”), are no more accurate if understood in
the physical sense. In this Opinion, the Court has therefore chosen
to use the terminology employed by the General Assembly.
The Court notes furthermore that the request of the General
Assembly concerns the legal consequences of the wall being built “in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East
Jerusalem”. As also explained below (see paragraphs 79‑84 below),
some parts of the complex are being built, or are planned to be built,
on the territory of Israel itself; the Court does not consider that
it is called upon to examine the legal consequences arising from the
construction of those parts of the wall.
68. The question
put by the General Assembly concerns the legal consequences of the
construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
However, in order to indicate those consequences to the General
Assembly the Court must first determine whether or not the
construction of that wall breaches international law (see paragraph 39
above). It will therefore make this determination before dealing with
the consequences of the construction.
69. To do so, the
Court will first make a brief analysis of the status of the territory
concerned, and will then describe the works already constructed or in
course of construction in that territory. It will then indicate the
applicable law before seeking to establish whether that law has been
breached.
* *
70. Palestine was
part of the Ottoman Empire. At the end of the First World War, a
class “A” Mandate for Palestine was entrusted to Great Britain by the
League of Nations, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the
Covenant, which provided that:
“Certain communities,
formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of
development where their existence as independent nations can be
provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative
advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able
to stand alone.”
The Court recalls
that in its Advisory Opinion on the International Status of
South West Africa, speaking of mandates in general, it observed
that “The Mandate was created, in the interest of the inhabitants of
the territory, and of humanity in general, as an international
institution with an international object ¾
a sacred trust of civilization.” (I.C.J. Reports 1950,
p. 132.) The Court also held in this regard that “two principles were
considered to be of paramount importance: the principle of
non‑annexation and the principle that the well‑being and development
of . . . peoples [not yet able to govern themselves] form[ed] ‘a
sacred trust of civilization’” (ibid., p. 131).
The territorial
boundaries of the Mandate for Palestine were laid down by various
instruments, in particular on the eastern border by a British
memorandum of 16 September 1922 and an Anglo‑Transjordanian Treaty of
20 February 1928.
71. In 1947 the
United Kingdom announced its intention to complete evacuation of the
mandated territory by 1 August 1948, subsequently advancing that date
to 15 May 1948. In the meantime, the General Assembly had on
29 November 1947 adopted resolution 181 (II) on the future government
of Palestine, which “Recommends to the United Kingdom . . . and
to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and
implementation . . . of the Plan of Partition” of the territory, as
set forth in the resolution, between two independent States, one Arab,
the other Jewish, as well as the creation of a special international
régime for the City of Jerusalem. The Arab population of Palestine
and the Arab States rejected this plan, contending that it was
unbalanced; on 14 May 1948, Israel proclaimed its independence on the
strength of the General Assembly resolution; armed conflict then
broke out between Israel and a number of Arab States and the Plan of
Partition was not implemented.
72. By resolution
62 (1948) of 16 November 1948, the Security Council decided that “an
armistice shall be established in all sectors of Palestine” and called
upon the parties directly involved in the conflict to seek agreement
to this end. In conformity with this decision, general armistice
agreements were concluded in 1949 between Israel and the neighbouring
States through mediation by the United Nations. In particular, one
such agreement was signed in Rhodes on 3 April 1949 between Israel and
Jordan. Articles V and VI of that Agreement fixed the armistice
demarcation line between Israeli and Arab forces (often later called
the “Green Line” owing to the colour used for it on maps; hereinafter
the “Green Line”). Article III, paragraph 2, provided that “No
element of the . . . military or para‑military forces of either
Party . . . shall advance beyond or pass over for any purpose
whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Lines . . .” It was agreed in
Article VI, paragraph 8, that these provisions would not be
“interpreted as prejudicing, in any sense, an ultimate political
settlement between the Parties”. It was also stated that “the
Armistice
Demarcation Lines defined in
articles V and VI of [the] Agreement [were] agreed upon by the Parties
without prejudice to future territorial settlements or boundary lines
or to claims of either Party relating thereto”. The Demarcation Line
was subject to such rectification as might be agreed upon by the
parties.
73. In the 1967
armed conflict, Israeli forces occupied all the territories which had
constituted Palestine under British Mandate (including those known as
the West Bank, lying to the east of the Green Line).
74. On 22 November
1967, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 242 (1967),
which emphasized the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by
war and called for the “Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from
territories occupied in the recent conflict”, and “Termination of all
claims or states of belligerency”.
75. From 1967
onwards, Israel took a number of measures in these territories aimed
at changing the status of the City of Jerusalem. The Security
Council, after recalling on a number of occasions “the principle that
acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible”,
condemned those measures and, by resolution 298 (1971) of
25 September 1971, confirmed in the clearest possible terms that:
“all legislative and
administrative actions taken by Israel to change the status of the
City of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties,
transfer of populations and legislation aimed at the incorporation of
the occupied section, are totally invalid and cannot change that
status”.
Later, following the
adoption by Israel on 30 July 1980 of the Basic Law making Jerusalem
the “complete and united” capital of Israel, the Security Council, by
resolution 478 (1980) of 20 August 1980, stated that the enactment of
that Law constituted a violation of international law and that “all
legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel,
the occupying Power, which have altered or purport to alter the
character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem . . . are null and
void”. It further decided “not to recognize the ‘basic law’ and such
other actions by Israel that, as a result of this law, seek to alter
the character and status of Jerusalem”.
76. Subsequently, a
peace treaty was signed on 26 October 1994 between Israel and Jordan.
That treaty fixed the boundary between the two States “with reference
to the boundary definition under the Mandate as is shown in Annex I (a) . . .
without prejudice to the status of any territories that came under
Israeli military government control in 1967” (Article 3, paragraphs 1
and 2). Annex I provided the corresponding maps and added that, with
regard to the “territory that came under Israeli military government
control in 1967”, the line indicated “is the administrative boundary”
with Jordan.
77. Lastly, a
number of agreements have been signed since 1993 between Israel and
the Palestine Liberation Organization imposing various obligations on
each party. Those agreements inter alia required Israel to
transfer to Palestinian authorities certain powers and
responsibilities exercised in the Occupied Palestinian Territory by
its military authorities and civil administration. Such transfers
have taken place, but, as a result of subsequent events, they remained
partial and limited.
78. The Court would
observe that, under customary international law as reflected (see
paragraph 89 below) in Article 42 of the Regulations Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention
of 18 October 1907 (hereinafter “the Hague Regulations of 1907”),
territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the
authority of the hostile army, and the occupation extends only to the
territory where such authority has been established and can be
exercised.
The territories
situated between the Green Line (see paragraph 72 above) and the
former eastern boundary of Palestine under the Mandate were occupied
by Israel in 1967 during the armed conflict between Israel and
Jordan. Under customary international law, these were therefore
occupied territories in which Israel had the status of occupying
Power. Subsequent events in these territories, as described in
paragraphs 75 to 77 above, have done nothing to alter this situation.
All these territories (including East Jerusalem) remain occupied
territories and Israel has continued to have the status of occupying
Power.
*
79. It is
essentially in these territories that Israel has constructed or plans
to construct the works described in the report of the
Secretary‑General. The Court will now describe those works, basing
itself on that report. For developments subsequent to the publication
of that report, the Court will refer to complementary information
contained in the Written Statement of the United Nations, which was
intended by the Secretary‑General to supplement his report
(hereinafter “Written Statement of the Secretary‑General”).
80. The report of
the Secretary‑General states that “The Government of Israel has since
1996 considered plans to halt infiltration into Israel from the
central and northern West Bank . . .” (Para. 4.) According to that
report, a plan of this type was approved for the first time by the
Israeli Cabinet in July 2001. Then, on 14 April 2002, the Cabinet
adopted a decision for the construction of works, forming what Israel
describes as a “security fence”, 80 kilometres in length, in three
areas of the West Bank.
The project was
taken a stage further when, on 23 June 2002, the Israeli Cabinet
approved the first phase of the construction of a “continuous fence”
in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem). On 14 August 2002, it
adopted the line of that “fence” for the work in Phase A, with a view
to the construction of a complex 123 kilometres long in the northern
West Bank, running
from the Salem checkpoint
(north of Jenin) to the settlement at Elkana. Phase B of the work was
approved in December 2002. It entailed a stretch of some
40 kilometres running east from the Salem checkpoint towards Beth
Shean along the northern part of the Green Line as far as the Jordan
Valley. Furthermore, on 1 October 2003, the Israeli Cabinet approved
a full route, which, according to the report of the Secretary‑General,
“will form one continuous line stretching 720 kilometres along the
West Bank”. A map showing completed and planned sections was posted
on the Israeli Ministry of Defence website on 23 October 2003.
According to the particulars provided on that map, a continuous
section (Phase C) encompassing a number of large settlements will link
the north‑western end of the “security fence” built around Jerusalem
with the southern point of Phase A construction at Elkana. According
to the same map, the “security fence” will run for 115 kilometres from
the Har Gilo settlement near Jerusalem to the Carmel settlement
south‑east of Hebron (Phase D). According to Ministry of Defence
documents, work in this sector is due for completion in 2005. Lastly,
there are references in the case file to Israel’s planned construction
of a “security fence” following the Jordan Valley along the mountain
range to the west.
81. According to the Written Statement of the
Secretary‑General, the first part of these works (Phase A), which
ultimately extends for a distance of 150 kilometres, was declared
completed on 31 July 2003. It is reported that approximately
56,000 Palestinians would be encompassed in enclaves. During this
phase, two sections totalling 19.5 kilometres were built around
Jerusalem. In November 2003 construction of a new section was begun
along the Green Line to the west of the Nazlat Issa‑Baqa al‑Sharqiya
enclave, which in January 2004 was close to completion at the time
when the Secretary‑General submitted his Written Statement.
According to the
Written Statement of the Secretary‑General, the works carried out
under Phase B were still in progress in January 2004. Thus an initial
section of this stretch, which runs near or on the Green Line to the
village of al‑Mutilla, was almost complete in January 2004. Two
additional sections diverge at this point. Construction started in
early January 2004 on one section that runs due east as far as the
Jordanian border. Construction of the second section, which is
planned to run from the Green Line to the village of Taysir, has
barely begun. The United Nations has, however, been informed that
this second section might not be built.
The Written
Statement of the Secretary‑General further states that Phase C of the
work, which runs from the terminus of Phase A, near the Elkana
settlement, to the village of Nu’man, south‑east of Jerusalem, began
in December 2003. This section is divided into three stages. In
Stage C1, between inter alia the villages of Rantis and Budrus,
approximately 4 kilometres out of a planned total of 40 kilometres
have been constructed. Stage C2, which will surround the so‑called
“Ariel Salient” by cutting 22 kilometres into the West Bank, will
incorporate 52,000 Israeli settlers. Stage C3 is to involve the
construction of two “depth barriers”; one of these is to run
north‑south, roughly parallel with the section of Stage C1 currently
under construction between Rantis and Budrus, whilst the other runs
east‑west along a ridge said to be part of the route of Highway 45, a
motorway under construction. If construction of the two barriers were
completed, two enclaves would be formed, encompassing
72,000 Palestinians in 24 communities.
Further construction
also started in late November 2003 along the south‑eastern part of the
municipal boundary of Jerusalem, following a route that, according to
the Written Statement of the Secretary‑General, cuts off the suburban
village of El‑Ezariya from Jerusalem and splits the neighbouring Abu
Dis in two.
As at
25 January 2004, according to the Written Statement of the
Secretary‑General, some 190 kilometres of construction had been
completed, covering Phase A and the greater part of Phase B. Further
construction in Phase C had begun in certain areas of the central West
Bank and in Jerusalem. Phase D, planned for the southern part of the
West Bank, had not yet begun.
The Israeli
Government has explained that the routes and timetable as described
above are subject to modification. In February 2004, for example, an
8‑kilometre section near the town of Baqa al‑Sharqiya was demolished,
and the planned length of the wall appears to have been slightly
reduced.
82. According to
the description in the report and the Written Statement of the
Secretary‑General, the works planned or completed have resulted or
will result in a complex consisting essentially of:
(1) a fence with electronic
sensors;
(2) a ditch (up to 4 metres deep);
(3) a two‑lane asphalt patrol
road;
(4) a trace road (a strip of sand
smoothed to detect footprints) running parallel to the fence;
(5) a stack of six coils of barbed
wire marking the perimeter of the complex.
The complex has a
width of 50 to 70 metres, increasing to as much as 100 metres in some
places. “Depth barriers” may be added to these works.
The approximately
180 kilometres of the complex completed or under construction as of
the time when the Secretary‑General submitted his report included some
8.5 kilometres of concrete wall. These are generally found where
Palestinian population centres are close to or abut Israel (such as
near Qalqiliya and Tulkarm or in parts of Jerusalem).
83. According to
the report of the Secretary‑General, in its northernmost part, the
wall as completed or under construction barely deviates from the Green
Line. It nevertheless lies within occupied territories for most of
its course. The works deviate more than 7.5 kilometres from the Green
Line in certain places to encompass settlements, while encircling
Palestinian population areas. A stretch of 1 to 2 kilometres west of
Tulkarm appears to run on the Israeli side of the Green Line.
Elsewhere, on the other hand, the planned route would deviate eastward
by up to
22 kilometres. In the case
of Jerusalem, the existing works and the planned route lie well beyond
the Green Line and even in some cases beyond the eastern municipal
boundary of Jerusalem as fixed by Israel.
84. On the basis of
that route, approximately 975 square kilometres (or 16.6 per cent of
the West Bank) would, according to the report of the
Secretary‑General, lie between the Green Line and the wall. This area
is stated to be home to 237,000 Palestinians. If the full wall were
completed as planned, another 160,000 Palestinians would live in
almost completely encircled communities, described as enclaves in the
report. As a result of the planned route, nearly 320,000 Israeli
settlers (of whom 178,000 in East Jerusalem) would be living in the
area between the Green Line and the wall.
85. Lastly, it
should be noted that the construction of the wall has been accompanied
by the creation of a new administrative régime. Thus in October 2003
the Israeli Defence Forces issued Orders establishing the part of the
West Bank lying between the Green Line and the wall as a “Closed
Area”. Residents of this area may no longer remain in it, nor may
non‑residents enter it, unless holding a permit or identity card
issued by the Israeli authorities. According to the report of the
Secretary‑General, most residents have received permits for a limited
period. Israeli citizens, Israeli permanent residents and those
eligible to immigrate to Israel in accordance with the Law of Return
may remain in, or move freely to, from and within the Closed Area
without a permit. Access to and exit from the Closed Area can only be
made through access gates, which are opened infrequently and for short
periods.
* *
86. The Court will
now determine the rules and principles of international law which are
relevant in assessing the legality of the measures taken by Israel.
Such rules and principles can be found in the United Nations Charter
and certain other treaties, in customary international law and in the
relevant resolutions adopted pursuant to the Charter by the General
Assembly and the Security Council. However, doubts have been
expressed by Israel as to the applicability in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory of certain rules of international humanitarian
law and human rights instruments. The Court will now consider these
various questions.
87. The Court first
recalls that, pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United
Nations Charter:
“All Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations.”
On 24 October 1970, the
General Assembly adopted resolution 2625 (XXV), entitled “Declaration
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Co‑operation among States” (hereinafter “resolution 2625 (XXV)”), in
which it emphasized that “No territorial acquisition resulting from
the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal.” As the
Court stated in its Judgment in the case concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States of America), the principles as to the use of force
incorporated in the Charter reflect customary international law (see
I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 98‑101, paras. 187‑190); the same is
true of its corollary entailing the illegality of territorial
acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force.
88. The Court also
notes that the principle of self‑determination of peoples has been
enshrined in the United Nations Charter and reaffirmed by the General
Assembly in resolution 2625 (XXV) cited above, pursuant to which
“Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which
deprives peoples referred to [in that resolution] . . . of their right
to self‑determination.” Article 1 common to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reaffirms the right of all
peoples to self‑determination, and lays upon the States parties the
obligation to promote the realization of that right and to respect it,
in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.
The Court would recall that in 1971 it emphasized that
current developments in “international law in regard to
non‑self‑governing territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the
United Nations, made the principle of self‑determination applicable to
all [such territories]”. The Court went on to state that “These
developments leave little doubt that the ultimate objective of the
sacred trust” referred to in Article 22, paragraph 1, of the Covenant
of the League of Nations “was the self‑determination . . . of the
peoples concerned” (Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 31, paras. 52‑53). The Court has
referred to this principle on a number of occasions in its
jurisprudence (ibid.; see also Western Sahara, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 68, para. 162). The Court indeed
made it clear that the right of peoples to self‑determination is today
a right erga omnes (see East Timor (Portugal v.
Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 102, para. 29).
89. As regards
international humanitarian law, the Court would first note that Israel
is not a party to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, to which the
Hague Regulations are annexed. The Court observes that, in the words
of the Convention, those Regulations were prepared “to revise the
general laws and customs of war” existing at that time. Since then,
however, the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg has found
that the “rules laid down in the Convention were recognised by all
civilised nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws
and customs of war” (Judgment of the International Military Tribunal
of Nuremberg, 30 September and 1 October 1946, p. 65). The Court
itself reached the same conclusion when examining the rights and
duties of belligerents in their conduct of military operations (Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1996 (I), p. 256, para. 75). The Court considers that the
provisions of the Hague Regulations have become part of customary law,
as is in fact recognized by all the participants in the proceedings
before the Court.
The Court also observes that, pursuant to
Article 154 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, that Convention is
supplementary to Sections II and III of the Hague Regulations.
Section III of those Regulations, which concerns “Military authority
over the territory of the hostile State”, is particularly pertinent in
the present case.
90. Secondly, with
regard to the Fourth Geneva Convention, differing views have been
expressed by the participants in these proceedings. Israel, contrary
to the great majority of the other participants, disputes the
applicability de jure of the Convention to the Occupied
Palestinian Territory. In particular, in paragraph 3 of Annex I to
the report of the Secretary‑General, entitled “Summary Legal Position
of the Government of Israel”, it is stated that Israel does not agree
that the Fourth Geneva Convention “is applicable to the occupied
Palestinian Territory”, citing “the lack of recognition of the
territory as sovereign prior to its annexation by Jordan and Egypt”
and inferring that it is “not a territory of a High Contracting Party
as required by the Convention”.
91. The Court would
recall that the Fourth Geneva Convention was ratified by Israel on
6 July 1951 and that Israel is a party to that Convention. Jordan has
also been a party thereto since 29 May 1951. Neither of the two
States has made any reservation that would be pertinent to the present
proceedings.
Furthermore,
Palestine gave a unilateral undertaking, by declaration of
7 June 1982, to apply the Fourth Geneva Convention. Switzerland, as
depositary State, considered that unilateral undertaking valid. It
concluded, however, that it “[was] not ¾
as a depositary ¾
in a position to decide whether” “the request [dated 14 June 1989]
from the Palestine Liberation Movement in the name of the ‘State of
Palestine’ to accede” inter alia to the Fourth Geneva
Convention “can be considered as an instrument of accession”.
92. Moreover, for
the purpose of determining the scope of application of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, it should be recalled that under common Article 2
of the four Conventions of 12 August 1949:
“In addition to the
provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one
of them.
The Convention shall
also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the
territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation
meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the
Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the
Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their
mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention
in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the
provisions thereof.”
93. After the
occupation of the West Bank in 1967, the Israeli authorities issued an
order No. 3 stating in its Article 35 that:
“the Military Court . . . must
apply the provisions of the Geneva Convention dated 12 August 1949
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War with
respect to judicial procedures. In case of conflict between this
Order and the said Convention, the Convention shall prevail.”
Subsequently, the Israeli
authorities have indicated on a number of occasions that in fact they
generally apply the humanitarian provisions of the Fourth Geneva
Convention within the occupied territories. However, according to
Israel’s position as briefly recalled in paragraph 90 above, that
Convention is not applicable de jure within those territories
because, under Article 2, paragraph 2, it applies only in the case of
occupation of territories falling under the sovereignty of a High
Contracting Party involved in an armed conflict. Israel explains that
Jordan was admittedly a party to the Fourth Geneva Convention in 1967,
and that an armed conflict broke out at that time between Israel and
Jordan, but it goes on to observe that the territories occupied by
Israel subsequent to that conflict had not previously fallen under
Jordanian sovereignty. It infers from this that that Convention is
not applicable de jure in those territories. According however
to the great majority of other participants in the proceedings, the
Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable to those territories pursuant
to Article 2, paragraph 1, whether or not Jordan had any rights in
respect thereof prior to 1967.
94. The Court would
recall that, according to customary international law as expressed in
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of
23 May 1969, a treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose. Article 32 provides that:
“Recourse may be had to
supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work
of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or
to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to
article 31 . . . leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or . . .
leads to a result which is manifestly obscure or unreasonable.” (See
Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of
America), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II),
p. 812, para. 23; see, similarly, Kasikili/Sedudu Island
(Botswana/Namibia), I.C.J. Reports 1999 (II), p. 1059, para. 18,
and Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan
(Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 645, para. 37.)
95. The Court notes
that, according to the first paragraph of Article 2 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, that Convention is applicable when two conditions
are fulfilled: that there exists an armed conflict (whether or not a
state of war has been recognized); and that the conflict has arisen
between two contracting parties. If those two conditions are
satisfied, the Convention applies, in particular, in any territory
occupied in the course of the conflict by one of the contracting
parties.
The object of the
second paragraph of Article 2 is not to restrict the scope of
application of the Convention, as defined by the first paragraph, by
excluding therefrom territories not falling under the sovereignty of
one of the contracting parties. It is directed simply to making it
clear that, even if occupation effected during the conflict met no
armed resistance, the Convention is still applicable.
This interpretation
reflects the intention of the drafters of the Fourth Geneva Convention
to protect civilians who find themselves, in whatever way, in the
hands of the occupying Power. Whilst the drafters of the Hague
Regulations of 1907 were as much concerned with protecting the rights
of a State whose territory is occupied, as with protecting the
inhabitants of that territory, the drafters of the Fourth Geneva
Convention sought to guarantee the protection of civilians in time of
war, regardless of the status of the occupied territories, as is shown
by Article 47 of the Convention.
That interpretation
is confirmed by the Convention’s travaux préparatoires. The
Conference of Government Experts convened by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (hereinafter, “ICRC”) in the aftermath of
the Second World War for the purpose of preparing the new Geneva
Conventions recommended that these conventions be applicable to any
armed conflict “whether [it] is or is not recognized as a state of war
by the parties” and “in cases of occupation of territories in the
absence of any state of war” (Report on the Work of the Conference
of Government Experts for the Study of the Conventions for the
Protection of War Victims, Geneva, 14‑26 April 1947, p. 8). The
drafters of the second paragraph of Article 2 thus had no intention,
when they inserted that paragraph into the Convention, of restricting
the latter’s scope of application. They were merely seeking to
provide for cases of occupation without combat, such as the occupation
of Bohemia and Moravia by Germany in 1939.
96. The Court would
moreover note that the States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention
approved that interpretation at their Conference on 15 July 1999.
They issued a statement in which they “reaffirmed the applicability of
the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem”. Subsequently, on 5 December 2001, the High
Contracting Parties, referring in particular to Article 1 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, once again reaffirmed the
“applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem”. They further
reminded the Contracting Parties participating in the Conference, the
parties to the conflict, and the State of Israel as occupying Power,
of their respective obligations.
97. Moreover, the
Court would observe that the ICRC, whose special position with respect
to execution of the Fourth Geneva Convention must be “recognized and
respected at all times” by the parties pursuant to Article 142 of the
Convention, has also expressed its opinion on the interpretation to be
given to the Convention. In a declaration of 5 December 2001, it
recalled that “the ICRC has always affirmed the de jure
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the territories
occupied since 1967 by the State of Israel, including East Jerusalem”.
98. The Court notes
that the General Assembly has, in many of its resolutions, taken a
position to the same effect. Thus on 10 December 2001 and
9 December 2003, in resolutions 56/60 and 58/97, it reaffirmed “that
the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and other Arab
territories occupied by Israel since 1967”.
99. The Security
Council, for its part, had already on 14 June 1967 taken the view in
resolution 237 (1967) that “all the obligations of the Geneva
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War . . . should
be complied with by the parties involved in the conflict”.
Subsequently, on
15 September 1969, the Security Council, in resolution 271 (1969),
called upon “Israel scrupulously to observe the provisions of the
Geneva Conventions and international law governing military
occupation”.
Ten years later, the
Security Council examined “the policy and practices of Israel in
establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories
occupied since 1967”. In resolution 446 (1979) of 22 March 1979, the
Security Council considered that those settlements had “no legal
validity” and affirmed “once more that the Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of
12 August 1949, is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by
Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem”. It called “once more upon
Israel, as the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously” by that
Convention.
On 20 December 1990,
the Security Council, in resolution 681 (1990), urged “the Government
of Israel to accept the de jure applicability of the Fourth
Geneva Convention . . . to all the territories occupied by Israel
since 1967 and to abide scrupulously by the provisions of the
Convention”. It further called upon “the high contracting parties to
the said Fourth Geneva Convention to ensure respect by Israel, the
occupying Power, for its obligations under the Convention in
accordance with article 1 thereof”.
Lastly, in
resolutions 799 (1992) of 18 December 1992 and 904 (1994) of
18 March 1994, the Security Council reaffirmed its position concerning
the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention in the occupied
territories.
100. The Court
would note finally that the Supreme Court of Israel, in a judgment
dated 30 May 2004, also found that:
“The military operations
of the [Israeli Defence Forces] in Rafah, to the extent they affect
civilians, are governed by Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land 1907 . . . and the Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 1949.”
101. In view of the
foregoing, the Court considers that the Fourth Geneva Convention is
applicable in any occupied territory in the event of an armed conflict
arising between two or more High Contracting Parties. Israel and
Jordan were parties to that Convention when the 1967 armed conflict
broke out. The Court accordingly finds that that Convention is
applicable in the Palestinian territories which before the conflict
lay to the east of the Green Line and which, during that conflict,
were occupied by Israel, there being no need for any enquiry into the
precise prior status of those territories.
*
102. The
participants in the proceedings before the Court also disagree whether
the international human rights conventions to which Israel is party
apply within the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Annex I to the
report of the Secretary‑General states:
“4. Israel denies that
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both
of which it has signed, are applicable to the occupied Palestinian
territory. It asserts that humanitarian law is the protection granted
in a conflict situation such as the one in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, whereas human rights treaties were intended for the protection
of citizens from their own Government in times of peace.”
Of the other
participants in the proceedings, those who addressed this issue
contend that, on the contrary, both Covenants are applicable within
the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
103. On
3 October 1991 Israel ratified both the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 19 December 1966 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the same date,
as well as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of
20 November 1989. It is a party to these three instruments.
104. In order to
determine whether these texts are applicable in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, the Court will first address the issue of the
relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights
law and then that of the applicability of human rights instruments
outside national territory.
105. In its
Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 on the Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court had occasion to address the
first of these issues in relation to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. In those proceedings certain States had
argued that “the Covenant was directed to the protection of human
rights in peacetime, but that questions relating to unlawful loss of
life in hostilities were governed by the law applicable in armed
conflict” (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 239, para. 24).
The Court rejected
this argument, stating that:
“the protection of the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not cease in
times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby
certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national
emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a
provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of
one’s life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an
arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by
the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in
armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of
hostilities.” (Ibid., p. 240, para. 25.)
106. More
generally, the Court considers that the protection offered by human
rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save
through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be
found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. As regards the relationship between international
humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible
situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international
humanitarian law; others may
be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters
of both these branches of international law. In order to answer the
question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration
both these branches of international law, namely human rights law and,
as lex specialis, international humanitarian law.
107. It remains to
be determined whether the two international Covenants and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child are applicable only on the
territories of the States parties thereto or whether they are also
applicable outside those territories and, if so, in what
circumstances.
108. The scope of
application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights is defined by Article 2, paragraph 1, thereof, which provides:
“Each State Party to the
present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.”
This provision can
be interpreted as covering only individuals who are both present
within a State’s territory and subject to that State’s jurisdiction.
It can also be construed as covering both individuals present within a
State’s territory and those outside that territory but subject to that
State’s jurisdiction. The Court will thus seek to determine the
meaning to be given to this text.
109. The Court
would observe that, while the jurisdiction of States is primarily
territorial, it may sometimes be exercised outside the national
territory. Considering the object and purpose of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it would seem natural that,
even when such is the case, States parties to the Covenant should be
bound to comply with its provisions.
The constant
practice of the Human Rights Committee is consistent with this. Thus,
the Committee has found the Covenant applicable where the State
exercises its jurisdiction on foreign territory. It has ruled on the
legality of acts by Uruguay in cases of arrests carried out by
Uruguayan agents in Brazil or Argentina (case No. 52/79, López
Burgos v. Uruguay; case No. 56/79, Lilian Celiberti de
Casariego v. Uruguay). It decided to the same effect in
the case of the confiscation of a passport by a Uruguayan consulate in
Germany (case No. 106/81, Montero v. Uruguay).
The travaux
préparatoires of the Covenant confirm the Committee’s
interpretation of Article 2 of that instrument. These show that, in
adopting the wording chosen, the drafters of the Covenant did not
intend to allow States to escape from their obligations when they
exercise jurisdiction outside their national territory. They only
intended to prevent persons residing abroad from asserting, vis‑à‑vis
their State of origin, rights that do not fall within the competence
of that State, but of that of the State of residence (see the
discussion of the preliminary draft in the Commission on Human Rights,
E/CN.4/SR.194, para. 46; and United Nations, Official Records of
the General Assembly, Tenth Session, Annexes, A/2929, Part II,
Chap. V, para. 4 (1955)).
110. The Court
takes note in this connection of the position taken by Israel, in
relation to the applicability of the Covenant, in its communications
to the Human Rights Committee, and of the view of the Committee.
In 1998, Israel stated that, when preparing its report to
the Committee, it had had to face the question “whether individuals
resident in the occupied territories were indeed subject to Israel’s
jurisdiction” for purposes of the application of the Covenant (CCPR/C/SR.1675,
para. 21). Israel took the position that “the Covenant and similar
instruments did not apply directly to the current situation in the
occupied territories” (ibid., para. 27).
The Committee, in its concluding observations after
examination of the report, expressed concern at Israel’s attitude and
pointed “to the long‑standing presence of Israel in [the occupied]
territories, Israel’s ambiguous attitude towards their future status,
as well as the exercise of effective jurisdiction by Israeli security
forces therein” (CCPR/C/79/Add.93, para. 10). In 2003 in face of
Israel’s consistent position, to the effect that “the Covenant does
not apply beyond its own territory, notably in the West Bank and
Gaza . . .”, the Committee reached the following conclusion:
“in the current circumstances, the
provisions of the Covenant apply to the benefit of the population of
the Occupied Territories, for all conduct by the State party’s
authorities or agents in those territories that affect the enjoyment
of rights enshrined in the Covenant and fall within the ambit of State
responsibility of Israel under the principles of public international
law” (CCPR/CO/78/ISR, para. 11).
111. In conclusion,
the Court considers that the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights is applicable in respect of acts done by a State in
the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory.
112. The
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
contains no provision on its scope of application. This may be
explicable by the fact that this Covenant guarantees rights which are
essentially territorial. However, it is not to be excluded that it
applies both to territories over which a State party has sovereignty
and to those over which that State exercises territorial
jurisdiction. Thus Article 14 makes provision for transitional
measures in the case of any State which “at the time of becoming a
Party, has not been able to secure in its metropolitan territory or
other territories under its jurisdiction compulsory primary education,
free of charge”.
It is not without
relevance to recall in this regard the position taken by Israel in its
reports to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In
its initial report to the Committee of 4 December 1998, Israel
provided “statistics indicating the enjoyment of the rights enshrined
in the Covenant by Israeli settlers in the occupied Territories”. The
Committee noted that, according to Israel, “the Palestinian population
within the same jurisdictional areas were excluded from both the
report and the protection of the Covenant” (E/C.12/1/Add. 27, para. 8).
The Committee expressed
its concern in this regard, to
which Israel replied in a further report of 19 October 2001 that it
has “consistently maintained that the Covenant does not apply to areas
that are not subject to its sovereign territory and jurisdiction” (a
formula inspired by the language of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights). This position, continued Israel, is
“based on the well‑established distinction between human rights and
humanitarian law under international law”. It added: “the
Committee’s mandate cannot relate to events in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, inasmuch as they are part and parcel of the context of
armed conflict as distinct from a relationship of human rights”
(E/1990/6/Add. 32, para. 5). In view of these observations, the
Committee reiterated its concern about Israel’s position and
reaffirmed “its view that the State party’s obligations under the
Covenant apply to all territories and populations under its effective
control” (E/C.12/1/Add.90, paras. 15 and 31).
For the reasons
explained in paragraph 106 above, the Court cannot accept Israel’s
view. It would also observe that the territories occupied by Israel
have for over 37 years been subject to its territorial jurisdiction as
the occupying Power. In the exercise of the powers available to it on
this basis, Israel is bound by the provisions of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Furthermore, it is
under an obligation not to raise any obstacle to the exercise of such
rights in those fields where competence has been transferred to
Palestinian authorities.
113. As regards the
Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, that
instrument contains an Article 2 according to which “States Parties
shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the . . . Convention
to each child within their jurisdiction . . .”. That Convention is
therefore applicable within the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
* *
114. Having
determined the rules and principles of international law relevant to
reply to the question posed by the General Assembly, and having ruled
in particular on the applicability within the Occupied Palestinian
Territory of international humanitarian law and human rights law, the
Court will now seek to ascertain whether the construction of the wall
has violated those rules and principles.
*
115. In this
regard, Annex II to the report of the Secretary‑General, entitled
“Summary Legal Position of the Palestine Liberation Organization”,
states that “The construction of the Barrier is an attempt to annex
the territory contrary to international law” and that “The de facto
annexation of land interferes with the territorial sovereignty and
consequently with the right of the Palestinians to
self‑determination.” This
view was echoed in certain of the written statements submitted to the
Court and in the views expressed at the hearings. Inter alia,
it was contended that: “The wall severs the territorial sphere over
which the Palestinian people are entitled to exercise their right of
self‑determination and constitutes a violation of the legal principle
prohibiting the acquisition of territory by the use of force.” In
this connection, it was in particular emphasized that “The route of
the wall is designed to change the demographic composition of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, by
reinforcing the Israeli settlements” illegally established on the
Occupied Palestinian Territory. It was further contended that the
wall aimed at “reducing and parcelling out the territorial sphere over
which the Palestinian people are entitled to exercise their right of
self‑determination”.
116. For its part,
Israel has argued that the wall’s sole purpose is to enable it
effectively to combat terrorist attacks launched from the West Bank.
Furthermore, Israel has repeatedly stated that the Barrier is a
temporary measure (see report of the Secretary‑General, para. 29). It
did so inter alia through its Permanent Representative to the
United Nations at the Security Council meeting of 14 October 2003,
emphasizing that “[the fence] does not annex territories to the State
of Israel”, and that Israel is “ready and able, at tremendous cost, to
adjust or dismantle a fence if so required as part of a political
settlement” (S/PV.4841, p. 10). Israel’s Permanent Representative
restated this view before the General Assembly on 20 October and
8 December 2003. On this latter occasion, he added: “As soon as the
terror ends, the fence will no longer be necessary. The fence is not
a border and has no political significance. It does not change the
legal status of the territory in any way.” (A/ES‑10/PV.23, p. 6.)
117. The Court
would recall that both the General Assembly and the Security Council
have referred, with regard to Palestine, to the customary rule of “the
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” (see
paragraphs 74 and 87 above). Thus in resolution 242 (1967) of
22 November 1967, the Security Council, after recalling this rule,
affirmed that:
“the fulfilment of Charter
principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in
the Middle East which should include the application of both the
following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israel
armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all
claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement
of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence
of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within
secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force”.
It is on this same
basis that the Council has several times condemned the measures taken
by Israel to change the status of Jerusalem (see paragraph 75 above).
118. As regards the
principle of the right of peoples to self‑determination, the Court
observes that the existence of a “Palestinian people” is no longer in
issue. Such existence has moreover been recognized by Israel in the
exchange of letters of 9 September 1993 between Mr. Yasser Arafat,
President of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and
Mr. Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Prime Minister. In that correspondence,
the President of the PLO recognized “the right of the State of Israel
to exist in peace and security” and made various other commitments.
In reply, the Israeli Prime Minister informed him that, in the light
of those commitments, “the Government of Israel has decided to
recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people”.
The Israeli‑Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip of 28 September 1995 also refers a number of times to the
Palestinian people and its “legitimate rights” (Preamble, paras. 4,
7, 8; Article II, para. 2; Article III, paras. 1
and 3; Article XXII, para. 2). The Court considers that those rights
include the right to self‑determination, as the General Assembly has
moreover recognized on a number of occasions (see, for example,
resolution 58/163 of 22 December 2003).
119. The Court
notes that the route of the wall as fixed by the Israeli Government
includes within the “Closed Area” (see paragraph 85 above) some
80 per cent of the settlers living in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory. Moreover, it is apparent from an examination of the map
mentioned in paragraph 80 above that the wall’s sinuous route has been
traced in such a way as to include within that area the great majority
of the Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian Territory
(including East Jerusalem).
120. As regards
these settlements, the Court notes that Article 49, paragraph 6, of
the Fourth Geneva Convention provides: “The Occupying Power shall not
deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the
territory it occupies.” That provision prohibits not only
deportations or forced transfers of population such as those carried
out during the Second World War, but also any measures taken by an
occupying Power in order to organize or encourage transfers of parts
of its own population into the occupied territory.
In this respect, the
information provided to the Court shows that, since 1977, Israel has
conducted a policy and developed practices involving the establishment
of settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, contrary to the
terms of Article 49, paragraph 6, just cited.
The Security Council
has thus taken the view that such policy and practices “have no legal
validity”. It has also called upon “Israel, as the occupying Power,
to abide scrupulously” by the Fourth Geneva Convention and:
“to rescind its previous measures
and to desist from taking any action which would result in changing
the legal status and geographical nature and materially affecting the
demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967,
including Jerusalem and, in particular, not to transfer parts of its
own civilian population into the occupied Arab territories”
(resolution 446 (1979) of 22 March 1979).
The Council reaffirmed its
position in resolutions 452 (1979) of 20 July 1979 and 465 (1980) of
1 March 1980. Indeed, in the latter case it described “Israel’s
policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new
immigrants in [the occupied] territories” as a “flagrant violation” of
the Fourth Geneva Convention.
The Court concludes
that the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
(including East Jerusalem) have been established in breach of
international law.
121. Whilst the
Court notes the assurance given by Israel that the construction of the
wall does not amount to annexation and that the wall is of a temporary
nature (see paragraph 116 above), it nevertheless cannot remain
indifferent to certain fears expressed to it that the route of the
wall will prejudge the future frontier between Israel and Palestine,
and the fear that Israel may integrate the settlements and their means
of access. The Court considers that the construction of the wall and
its associated régime create a “fait accompli” on the ground that
could well become permanent, in which case, and notwithstanding the
formal characterization of the wall by Israel, it would be tantamount
to de facto annexation.
122. The Court
recalls moreover that, according to the report of the
Secretary‑General, the planned route would incorporate in the area
between the Green Line and the wall more than 16 per cent of the
territory of the West Bank. Around 80 per cent of the settlers living
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, that is 320,000 individuals,
would reside in that area, as well as 237,000 Palestinians. Moreover,
as a result of the construction of the wall, around 160,000 other
Palestinians would reside in almost completely encircled communities
(see paragraphs 84, 85 and 119 above).
In other terms, the route chosen for the wall gives
expression in loco to the illegal measures taken by Israel with
regard to Jerusalem and the settlements, as deplored by the Security
Council (see paragraphs 75 and 120 above). There is also a risk of
further alterations to the demographic composition of the Occupied
Palestinian Territory resulting from the construction of the wall
inasmuch as it is contributing, as will be further explained in
paragraph 133 below, to the departure of Palestinian populations from
certain areas. That construction, along with measures taken
previously, thus severely impedes the exercise by the Palestinian
people of its right to self‑determination, and is therefore a breach
of Israel’s obligation to respect that right.
*
123. The
construction of the wall also raises a number of issues in relation to
the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law and of human
rights instruments.
124. With regard to
the Hague Regulations of 1907, the Court would recall that these deal,
in Section II, with hostilities and in particular with “means of
injuring the enemy, sieges, and bombardments”. Section III deals with
military authority in occupied territories. Only Section III is
currently applicable in the West Bank and Article 23 (g) of the
Regulations, in Section II, is thus not pertinent.
Section III of the
Hague Regulations includes Articles 43, 46 and 52, which are
applicable in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Article 43 imposes
a duty on the occupant to “take all measures within his power to
restore, and, as far as possible, to insure public order and life,
respecting the laws in force in the country”. Article 46 adds that
private property must be “respected” and that it cannot “be
confiscated”. Lastly, Article 52 authorizes, within certain limits,
requisitions in kind and services for the needs of the army of
occupation.
125. A distinction
is also made in the Fourth Geneva Convention between provisions
applying during military operations leading to occupation and those
that remain applicable throughout the entire period of occupation. It
thus states in Article 6:
“The present Convention
shall apply from the outset of any conflict or occupation mentioned in
Article 2.
In the territory of
Parties to the conflict, the application of the present Convention
shall cease on the general close of military operations.
In the case of occupied
territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease one
year after the general close of military operations; however, the
Occupying Power shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to
the extent that such Power exercises the functions of government in
such territory, by the provisions of the following Articles of the
present Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61
to 77, 143.
Protected persons whose
release, repatriation or re‑establishment may take place after such
dates shall meanwhile continue to benefit by the present Convention.”
Since the military
operations leading to the occupation of the West Bank in 1967 ended a
long time ago, only those Articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention
referred to in Article 6, paragraph 3, remain applicable in that
occupied territory.
126. These
provisions include Articles 47, 49, 52, 53 and 59 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention.
According to Article 47:
“Protected persons who
are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any
manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any
change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory,
into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any
agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied
territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the
latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory.”
Article 49 reads as
follows:
“Individual or mass
forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from
occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that
of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of
their motive.
Nevertheless, the
Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given
area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons
so demand. Such evacuations may not involve the displacement of
protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied territory except
when for material reasons it is impossible to avoid such
displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to
their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have
ceased.
The Occupying Power
undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall ensure, to the
greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to
receive the protected persons, that the removals are effected in
satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition, and
that members of the same family are not separated.
The Protecting Power
shall be informed of any transfers and evacuations as soon as they
have taken place.
The Occupying Power
shall not detain protected persons in an area particularly exposed to
the dangers of war unless the security of the population or imperative
military reasons so demand.
The Occupying Power
shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into
the territory it occupies.”
According to
Article 52:
“No contract, agreement
or regulation shall impair the right of any worker, whether voluntary
or not and wherever he may be, to apply to the representatives of the
Protecting Power in order to request the said Power’s intervention.
All measures aiming at
creating unemployment or at restricting the opportunities offered to
workers in an occupied territory, in order to induce them to work for
the Occupying Power, are prohibited.”
Article 53 provides
that:
“Any destruction by the
Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or
collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public
authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited,
except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by
military operations.”
Lastly, according to
Article 59:
“If the whole or part of
the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the
Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said
population, and shall facilitate them by all the means at its
disposal.
Such schemes, which may
be undertaken either by States or by impartial humanitarian
organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross,
shall consist, in particular, of the provision of consignments of
foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing.
All Contracting Parties
shall permit the free passage of these consignments and shall
guarantee their protection.
A Power granting free
passage to consignments on their way to territory occupied by an
adverse Party to the conflict shall, however, have the right to search
the consignments, to regulate their passage according to prescribed
times and routes, and to be reasonably satisfied through the
Protecting Power that these consignments are to be used for the relief
of the needy population and are not to be used for the benefit of the
Occupying Power.”
127. The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also contains
several relevant provisions. Before further examining these, the
Court will observe that Article 4 of the Covenant allows for
derogation to be made, under various conditions, to certain provisions
of that instrument. Israel made use of its right of derogation under
this Article by addressing the following communication to the
Secretary‑General of the United Nations on 3 October 1991:
“Since its
establishment, the State of Israel has been the victim of continuous
threats and attacks on its very existence as well as on the life and
property of its citizens.
These have taken the
form of threats of war, of actual armed attacks, and campaigns of
terrorism resulting in the murder of and injury to human beings.
In view of the above,
the State of Emergency which was proclaimed in May 1948 has remained
in force ever since. This situation constitutes a public emergency
within the meaning of article 4 (1) of the Covenant.
The Government of Israel
has therefore found it necessary, in accordance with the said
article 4, to take measures to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, for the defence of the State and for the
protection of life and property, including the exercise of powers of
arrest and detention.
In so far as any of
these measures are inconsistent with article 9 of the Covenant, Israel
thereby derogates from its obligations under that provision.”
The Court notes that
the derogation so notified concerns only Article 9 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which deals with
the right to liberty and security of person and lays down the rules
applicable in cases of arrest or detention. The other Articles of the
Covenant therefore remain applicable not only on Israeli territory,
but also on the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
128. Among these
mention must be made of Article 17, paragraph 1 of which reads as
follows: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.”
Mention must also be
made of Article 12, paragraph 1, which provides: “Everyone lawfully
within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.”
129. In addition to
the general guarantees of freedom of movement under Article 12 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, account must
also be taken of specific guarantees of access to the Christian,
Jewish and Islamic Holy Places. The status of the Christian Holy
Places in the Ottoman Empire dates far back in time, the latest
provisions relating thereto having been incorporated into Article 62
of the Treaty of Berlin of 13 July 1878. The Mandate for Palestine
given to the British Government on 24 July 1922 included an
Article 13, under which:
“All responsibility in
connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in
Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of
securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites
and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of
public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory . . .”
Article 13 further stated:
“nothing in this mandate shall be construed as conferring . . .
authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely
Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed”.
In the aftermath of
the Second World War, the General Assembly, in adopting
resolution 181 (II) on the future government of Palestine, devoted an
entire chapter of the Plan of Partition to the Holy Places, religious
buildings and sites. Article 2 of this Chapter provided, in so far as
the Holy Places were concerned:
“the liberty of access, visit and
transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to
all residents and citizens [of the Arab State, of the Jewish State]
and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without
distinction as to nationality, subject to requirements of national
security, public order and decorum”.
Subsequently, in the aftermath
of the armed conflict of 1948, the 1949 General Armistice Agreement
between Jordan and Israel provided in Article VIII for the
establishment of a special committee for “the formulation of agreed
plans and arrangements for such matters as either Party may submit to
it” for the purpose of enlarging the scope of the Agreement and of
effecting improvement in its application. Such matters, on which an
agreement of principle had already been concluded, included “free
access to the Holy Places”.
This commitment
concerned mainly the Holy Places located to the east of the Green
Line. However, some Holy Places were located west of that Line. This
was the case of the Room of the Last Supper and the Tomb of David, on
Mount Zion. In signing the General Armistice Agreement, Israel thus
undertook, as did Jordan, to guarantee freedom of access to the Holy
Places. The Court
considers that this
undertaking by Israel has remained valid for the Holy Places which
came under its control in 1967. This undertaking has further been
confirmed by Article 9, paragraph 1, of the 1994 Peace Treaty between
Israel and Jordan, by virtue of which, in more general terms, “Each
party will provide freedom of access to places of religious and
historical significance.”
130. As regards the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, that
instrument includes a number of relevant provisions, namely: the
right to work (Articles 6 and 7); protection and assistance accorded
to the family and to children and young persons (Article 10); the
right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food,
clothing and housing, and the right “to be free from hunger”
(Art. 11); the right to health (Art. 12); the right to education
(Arts. 13 and 14).
131. Lastly, the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of
20 November 1989 includes similar provisions in Articles 16, 24, 27
and 28.
*
132. From the
information submitted to the Court, particularly the report of the
Secretary‑General, it appears that the construction of the wall has
led to the destruction or requisition of properties under conditions
which contravene the requirements of Articles 46 and 52 of the Hague
Regulations of 1907 and of Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
133. That
construction, the establishment of a closed area between the Green
Line and the wall itself and the creation of enclaves have moreover
imposed substantial restrictions on the freedom of movement of the
inhabitants of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (with the exception
of Israeli citizens and those assimilated thereto). Such restrictions
are most marked in urban areas, such as the Qalqiliya enclave or the
City of Jerusalem and its suburbs. They are aggravated by the fact
that the access gates are few in number in certain sectors and opening
hours appear to be restricted and unpredictably applied. For example,
according to the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights
on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories
occupied by Israel since 1967, “Qalqiliya, a city with a population of
40,000, is completely surrounded by the Wall and residents can only
enter and leave through a single military checkpoint open from 7 a.m.
to 7 p.m.” (Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights, John Dugard, on the situation of human rights in the
Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, submitted in
accordance with Commission resolution 1993/2 A and entitled “Question
of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories,
including Palestine”, E/CN.4/2004/6, 8 September 2003, para. 9.)
There have also been
serious repercussions for agricultural production, as is attested by a
number of sources. According to the Special Committee to Investigate
Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People
and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories
“an estimated 100,000 dunums
[approximately 10,000 hectares] of the West Bank’s most fertile
agricultural land, confiscated by the Israeli Occupation Forces, have
been destroyed during the first phase of the wall construction, which
involves the disappearance of vast amounts of property, notably
private agricultural land and olive trees, wells, citrus grows and
hothouses upon which tens of thousands of Palestinians rely for their
survival” (Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli
Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and
Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, A/58/311, 22 August 2003,
para. 26).
Further, the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian
territories occupied by Israel since 1967 states that “Much of the
Palestinian land on the Israeli side of the Wall consists of fertile
agricultural land and some of the most important water wells in the
region” and adds that “Many fruit and olive trees had been destroyed
in the course of building the barrier.” (E/CN.4/2004/6,
8 September 2003, para. 9.) The Special Rapporteur on the Right to
Food of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights states that
construction of the wall “cuts off Palestinians from their
agricultural lands, wells and means of subsistence” (Report by the
Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,
Jean Ziegler, “The Right to Food”, Addendum, Mission to the Occupied
Palestinian Territories, E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2, 31 October 2003, para. 49).
In a recent survey conducted by the World Food Programme, it is stated
that the situation has aggravated food insecurity in the region, which
reportedly numbers 25,000 new beneficiaries of food aid (report of the
Secretary‑General, para. 25).
It has further led
to increasing difficulties for the population concerned regarding
access to health services, educational establishments and primary
sources of water. This is also attested by a number of different
information sources. Thus the report of the Secretary‑General states
generally that “According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of
Statistics, so far the Barrier has separated 30 localities from health
services, 22 from schools, 8 from primary water sources and 3 from
electricity networks.” (Report of the Secretary‑General, para. 23.)
The Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories
occupied by Israel since 1967 states that “Palestinians between the
Wall and Green Line will effectively be cut off from their land and
workplaces, schools, health clinics and other social services.”
(E/CN.4/2004/6, 8 September 2003, para. 9.) In relation specifically
to water resources, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food of the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights observes that “By
constructing the fence Israel will also effectively annex most of the
western aquifer system (which provides 51 per cent of the West Bank’s
water resources).” (E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2, 31 October 2003, para. 51.)
Similarly, in regard to access to health services, it has been stated
that, as a result of the enclosure of Qalqiliya, a United Nations
hospital in that town has recorded a 40 per cent decrease in its
caseload (report of the Secretary‑General, para. 24).
At Qalqiliya,
according to reports furnished to the United Nations, some 600 shops
or businesses have shut down, and 6,000 to 8,000 people have already
left the region (E/CN.4/2004/6, 8 September 2003, para. 10;
E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2, 31 October 2003, para. 51). The Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Food of the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights has also observed that “With the fence/wall cutting
communities off from their land and water without other
means of subsistence, many of
the Palestinians living in these areas will be forced to leave.”
(E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2, 31 October 2003, para. 51.) In this respect
also the construction of the wall would effectively deprive a
significant number of Palestinians of the “freedom to choose [their]
residence”. In addition, however, in the view of the Court, since a
significant number of Palestinians have already been compelled by the
construction of the wall and its associated régime to depart from
certain areas, a process that will continue as more of the wall is
built, that construction, coupled with the establishment of the
Israeli settlements mentioned in paragraph 120 above, is tending to
alter the demographic composition of the Occupied Palestinian
Territory.
134. To sum up, the
Court is of the opinion that the construction of the wall and its
associated régime impede the liberty of movement of the inhabitants of
the Occupied Palestinian Territory (with the exception of Israeli
citizens and those assimilated thereto) as guaranteed under
Article 12, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. They also impede the exercise by the persons
concerned of the right to work, to health, to education and to an
adequate standard of living as proclaimed in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and in the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Lastly, the
construction of the wall and its associated régime, by contributing to
the demographic changes referred to in paragraphs 122 and 133 above,
contravene Article 49, paragraph 6, of the Fourth Geneva Convention
and the Security Council resolutions cited in paragraph 120 above.
135. The Court
would observe, however, that the applicable international humanitarian
law contains provisions enabling account to be taken of military
exigencies in certain circumstances.
Neither Article 46
of the Hague Regulations of 1907 nor Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention contain any qualifying provision of this type. With regard
to forcible transfers of population and deportations, which are
prohibited under Article 49, paragraph 1, of the Convention,
paragraph 2 of that Article provides for an exception in those cases
in which “the security of the population or imperative military
reasons so demand”. This exception however does not apply to
paragraph 6 of that Article, which prohibits the occupying Power from
deporting or transferring parts of its own civilian population into
the territories it occupies. As to Article 53 concerning the
destruction of personal property, it provides for an exception “where
such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military
operations”.
The Court considers
that the military exigencies contemplated by these texts may be
invoked in occupied territories even after the general close of the
military operations that led to their occupation. However, on the
material before it, the Court is not convinced that the destructions
carried out contrary to the prohibition in Article 53 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention were rendered absolutely necessary by military
operations.
136. The Court
would further observe that some human rights conventions, and in
particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
contain provisions which States parties may invoke in order to
derogate, under various conditions, from certain of their conventional
obligations. In this respect, the Court would however recall that the
communication notified by
Israel to the
Secretary‑General of the United Nations under Article 4 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights concerns only
Article 9 of the Covenant, relating to the right to freedom and
security of person (see paragraph 127 above); Israel is accordingly
bound to respect all the other provisions of that instrument.
The Court would
note, moreover, that certain provisions of human rights conventions
contain clauses qualifying the rights covered by those provisions.
There is no clause of this kind in Article 17 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. On the other hand,
Article 12, paragraph 3, of that instrument provides that restrictions
on liberty of movement as guaranteed under that Article “shall not be
subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law,
are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre
public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of
others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the
present Covenant”. As for the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Article 4 thereof contains a general
provision as follows:
“The States Parties to
the present Covenant recognize that, in the enjoyment of those rights
provided by the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the
State may subject such rights only to such limitations as are
determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the
nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the
general welfare in a democratic society.”
The Court would
observe that the restrictions provided for under Article 12,
paragraph 3, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights are, by the very terms of that provision, exceptions to the
right of freedom of movement contained in paragraph 1. In addition,
it is not sufficient that such restrictions be directed to the ends
authorized; they must also be necessary for the attainment of those
ends. As the Human Rights Committee put it, they “must conform to the
principle of proportionality” and “must be the least intrusive
instrument amongst those which might achieve the desired result” (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9,
General Comment No. 27, para. 14). On the basis of the information
available to it, the Court finds that these conditions are not met in
the present instance.
The Court would
further observe that the restrictions on the enjoyment by the
Palestinians living in the territory occupied by Israel of their
economic, social and cultural rights, resulting from Israel’s
construction of the wall, fail to meet a condition laid down by
Article 4 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, that is to say that their implementation must be
“solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a
democratic society”.
137. To sum up, the
Court, from the material available to it, is not convinced that the
specific course Israel has chosen for the wall was necessary to attain
its security objectives. The wall, along the route chosen, and its
associated régime gravely infringe a number of rights of Palestinians
residing in the territory occupied by Israel, and the infringements
resulting from that route cannot be justified by military exigencies
or by the requirements of national security or public order. The
construction of such a wall accordingly constitutes breaches by Israel
of various of its obligations under the applicable international
humanitarian law and human rights instruments.
*
138. The Court has
thus concluded that the construction of the wall constitutes action
not in conformity with various international legal obligations
incumbent upon Israel. However, Annex I to the report of the
Secretary‑General states that, according to Israel: “the construction
of the Barrier is consistent with Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, its inherent right to self‑defence and Security
Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001)”. More specifically,
Israel’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations asserted in
the General Assembly on 20 October 2003 that “the fence is a measure
wholly consistent with the right of States to self‑defence enshrined
in Article 51 of the Charter”; the Security Council resolutions
referred to, he continued, “have clearly recognized the right of
States to use force in self‑defence against terrorist attacks”, and
therefore surely recognize the right to use non‑forcible measures to
that end (A/ES‑10/PV.21, p. 6).
139. Under the
terms of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations:
“Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self‑defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.”
Article 51 of the
Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of
self‑defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another
State. However, Israel does not claim that the attacks against it are
imputable to a foreign State.
The Court also notes
that Israel exercises control in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
and that, as Israel itself states, the threat which it regards as
justifying the construction of the wall originates within, and not
outside, that territory. The situation is thus different from that
contemplated by Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and
1373 (2001), and therefore Israel could not in any event invoke those
resolutions in support of its claim to be exercising a right of
self‑defence.
Consequently, the
Court concludes that Article 51 of the Charter has no relevance in
this case.
140. The Court has,
however, considered whether Israel could rely on a state of necessity
which would preclude the wrongfulness of the construction of the
wall. In this regard the Court is bound to note that some of the
conventions at issue in the present instance include qualifying
clauses of the rights guaranteed or provisions for derogation (see
paragraphs 135 and 136 above). Since those treaties already address
considerations of this kind within their own provisions, it might be
asked whether a state of necessity as recognized in customary
international law could be invoked with regard to those treaties as a
ground for precluding the wrongfulness of the measures or decisions
being challenged. However, the Court will not need to consider that
question. As the Court observed in the case concerning the
Gabčíkovo‑Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia),
“the state of necessity is a ground recognized by customary
international law” that “can only be accepted on an exceptional
basis”; it “can only be invoked under certain strictly defined
conditions which must be cumulatively satisfied; and the State
concerned is not the sole judge of whether those conditions have been
met” (I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 40, para. 51). One of those
conditions
was stated by the Court in
terms used by the International Law Commission, in a text which in its
present form requires that the act being challenged be “the only way
for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and
imminent peril” (Article 25 of the International Law Commission’s
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts; see also former Article 33 of the Draft Articles on the
International Responsibility of States, with slightly different
wording in the English text). In the light of the material before it,
the Court is not convinced that the construction of the wall along the
route chosen was the only means to safeguard the interests of Israel
against the peril which it has invoked as justification for that
construction.
141. The fact
remains that Israel has to face numerous indiscriminate and deadly
acts of violence against its civilian population. It has the right,
and indeed the duty, to respond in order to protect the life of its
citizens. The measures taken are bound nonetheless to remain in
conformity with applicable international law.
142. In conclusion,
the Court considers that Israel cannot rely on a right of self‑defence
or on a state of necessity in order to preclude the wrongfulness of
the construction of the wall resulting from the considerations
mentioned in paragraphs 122 and 137 above. The Court accordingly
finds that the construction of the wall, and its associated régime,
are contrary to international law.
*
* *
143. The Court
having concluded that, by the construction of the wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and by
adopting its associated régime, Israel has violated various
international obligations incumbent upon it (see paragraphs 114‑137
above), it must now, in order to reply to the question posed by the
General Assembly, examine the consequences of those violations.
* *
144. In their
written and oral observations, many participants in the proceedings
before the Court contended that Israel’s action in illegally
constructing this wall has legal consequences not only for Israel
itself, but also for other States and for the United Nations; in its
Written Statement, Israel, for its part, presented no arguments
regarding the possible legal consequences of the construction of the
wall.
145. As regards the
legal consequences for Israel, it was contended that Israel has,
first, a legal obligation to bring the illegal situation to an end by
ceasing forthwith the construction of the wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, and to give appropriate assurances and
guarantees of non‑repetition.
It was argued that,
secondly, Israel is under a legal obligation to make reparation for
the damage arising from its unlawful conduct. It was submitted that
such reparation should first of all take the form of restitution,
namely demolition of those portions of the wall constructed in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory and annulment of the legal acts
associated with its construction and the restoration of property
requisitioned or expropriated for that purpose; reparation should
also include appropriate compensation for individuals whose homes or
agricultural holdings have been destroyed.
It was further
contended that Israel is under a continuing duty to comply with all of
the international obligations violated by it as a result of the
construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and of
the associated régime. It was also argued that, under the terms of
the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel is under an obligation to search
for and bring before its courts persons alleged to have committed, or
to have ordered to be committed, grave breaches of international
humanitarian law flowing from the planning, construction and use of
the wall.
146. As regards the
legal consequences for States other than Israel, it was contended
before the Court that all States are under an obligation not to
recognize the illegal situation arising from the construction of the
wall, not to render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation
and to co‑operate with a view to putting an end to the alleged
violations and to ensuring that reparation will be made therefor.
Certain participants
in the proceedings further contended that the States parties to the
Fourth Geneva Convention are obliged to take measures to ensure
compliance with the Convention and that, inasmuch as the construction
and maintenance of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
constitutes grave breaches of that Convention, the States parties to
that Convention are under an obligation to prosecute or extradite the
authors of such breaches. It was further observed that “the United
Nations Security Council should consider flagrant and systematic
violation of international law norm[s] and principles by Israel,
particularly . . . international humanitarian law, and take all
necessary measures to put an end [to] these violations”, and that the
Security Council and the General Assembly must take due account of the
advisory opinion to be given by the Court.
* *
147. Since the
Court has concluded that the construction of the wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its
associated régime, are contrary to various of Israel’s international
obligations, it follows that the responsibility of that State is
engaged under international law.
148. The Court will
now examine the legal consequences resulting from the violations of
international law by Israel by distinguishing between, on the one
hand, those arising for Israel and, on the other, those arising for
other States and, where appropriate, for the United Nations. The
Court will begin by examining the legal consequences of those
violations for Israel.
*
149. The Court
notes that Israel is first obliged to comply with the international
obligations it has breached by the construction of the wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory (see paragraphs 114‑137 above).
Consequently, Israel is bound to comply with its obligation to respect
the right of the Palestinian people to self‑determination and its
obligations under international humanitarian law and international
human rights law. Furthermore, it must ensure freedom of access to
the Holy Places that came under its control following the 1967 War
(see paragraph 129 above).
150. The Court
observes that Israel also has an obligation to put an end to the
violation of its international obligations flowing from the
construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The
obligation of a State responsible for an internationally wrongful act
to put an end to that act is well established in general international
law, and the Court has on a number of occasions confirmed the
existence of that obligation (Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 149;
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1980, p. 44, para. 95; Haya de la Torre,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 82).
151. Israel
accordingly has the obligation to cease forthwith the works of
construction of the wall being built by it in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem. Moreover, in view
of the Court’s finding (see paragraph 143 above) that Israel’s
violations of its international obligations stem from the construction
of the wall and from its associated régime, cessation of those
violations entails the dismantling forthwith of those parts of that
structure situated within the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem. All legislative and
regulatory acts adopted with a view to its construction, and to the
establishment of its associated régime, must forthwith be repealed or
rendered ineffective, except in so far as such acts, by providing for
compensation or other forms of reparation for the Palestinian
population, may continue to be relevant for compliance by Israel with
the obligations referred to in paragraph 153 below.
152. Moreover,
given that the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory has, inter alia, entailed the requisition and
destruction of homes, businesses and agricultural holdings, the Court
finds further that Israel has the obligation to make reparation for
the damage caused to all the natural or legal persons concerned. The
Court would recall that the essential forms of reparation in customary
law were laid down by the Permanent Court of International Justice in
the following terms:
“The essential principle
contained in the actual notion of an illegal act ¾
a principle which seems to be established by international practice
and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals ¾
is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment
of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would
bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which
would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it ¾
such are the principles which should serve to determine the amount of
compensation due for an act contrary to international law.” (Factory
at Chorzów, Merits, Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17,
p. 47.)
153. Israel is
accordingly under an obligation to return the land, orchards, olive
groves and other immovable property seized from any natural or legal
person for purposes of construction of the wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory. In the event that such restitution should
prove to be materially impossible, Israel has an obligation to
compensate the persons in question for the damage suffered. The Court
considers that Israel also has an obligation to compensate, in
accordance with the applicable rules of international law, all natural
or legal persons having suffered any form of material damage as a
result of the wall’s construction.
*
154. The Court will
now consider the legal consequences of the internationally wrongful
acts flowing from Israel’s construction of the wall as regards other
States.
155. The Court
would observe that the obligations violated by Israel include certain
obligations erga omnes. As the Court indicated in the
Barcelona Traction case, such obligations are by their very nature
“the concern of all States” and, “In view of the importance of the
rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in
their protection.” (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company,
Limited, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 32, para. 33.)
The obligations erga omnes violated by Israel are the
obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to
self‑determination, and certain of its obligations under international
humanitarian law.
156. As regards the
first of these, the Court has already observed (paragraph 88 above)
that in the East Timor case, it described as “irreproachable”
the assertion that “the right of peoples to self‑determination, as it
evolved from the Charter and from United Nations practice, has an
erga omnes character” (I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 102, para. 29).
The Court would also recall that under the terms of General Assembly
resolution 2625 (XXV), already mentioned above (see paragraph 88),
“Every State has the
duty to promote, through joint and separate action, realization of the
principle of equal rights and self‑determination of peoples, in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and to render
assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the responsibilities
entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the implementation of the
principle . . .”
157. With regard to
international humanitarian law, the Court recalls that in its Advisory
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
it stated that “a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable in
armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human person
and ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ . . .”, that they are “to
be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the
conventions that contain them, because they constitute
intransgressible principles of international customary law” (I.C.J.
Reports 1996 (I), p. 257, para. 79). In the Court’s view, these
rules incorporate obligations which are essentially of an erga
omnes character.
158. The Court would also emphasize that Article 1 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, a provision common to the four Geneva
Conventions, provides that “The High Contracting Parties undertake to
respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all
circumstances.” It follows from that provision that every State party
to that Convention, whether or not it is a party to a specific
conflict, is under an obligation to ensure that the requirements of
the instruments in question are complied with.
159. Given the
character and the importance of the rights and obligations involved,
the Court is of the view that all States are under an obligation not
to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of
the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and
around East Jerusalem. They are also under an obligation not to
render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such
construction. It is also for all States, while respecting the United
Nations Charter and international law, to see to it that any
impediment, resulting from the construction of the wall, to the
exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self‑determination
is brought to an end. In addition, all the States parties to the
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War of 12 August 1949 are under an obligation, while
respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure
compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied
in that Convention.
160. Finally, the
Court is of the view that the United Nations, and especially the
General Assembly and the Security Council, should consider what
further action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation
resulting from the construction of the wall and the associated régime,
taking due account of the present Advisory Opinion.
*
* *
161. The Court,
being concerned to lend its support to the purposes and principles
laid down in the United Nations Charter, in particular the maintenance
of international peace and security and the peaceful settlement of
disputes, would emphasize the urgent necessity for the United Nations
as a whole to redouble its efforts to bring the Israeli‑Palestinian
conflict, which continues to pose a threat to international peace and
security, to a speedy conclusion, thereby establishing a just and
lasting peace in the region.
162. The Court has reached the conclusion that the
construction of the wall by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory is contrary to international law and has stated the legal
consequences that are to be drawn from that illegality. The Court
considers itself bound to add that this construction must be placed in
a more general context. Since 1947, the year when General Assembly
resolution 181 (II) was adopted and the Mandate for Palestine was
terminated, there has been a succession of armed conflicts, acts of
indiscriminate violence and repressive measures on the former mandated
territory. The Court would emphasize that both Israel and Palestine
are under an obligation scrupulously to observe the rules of
international humanitarian law, one of the paramount purposes of which
is to protect civilian life. Illegal actions and unilateral decisions
have been taken on all sides, whereas, in the Court’s view, this
tragic situation can be brought to an end only through implementation
in good faith of all relevant Security Council resolutions, in
particular resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). The “Roadmap”
approved by Security Council resolution 1515 (2003) represents the
most recent of efforts to initiate negotiations to this end. The
Court considers that it has a duty to draw the attention of the
General Assembly, to which the present Opinion is addressed, to the
need for these efforts to be encouraged with a view to achieving as
soon as possible, on the basis of international law, a negotiated
solution to the outstanding problems and the establishment of a
Palestinian State, existing side by side with Israel and its other
neighbours, with peace and security for all in the region.
*
* *
163. For these
reasons,
The
Court,
(1) Unanimously,
Finds that it
has jurisdiction to give the advisory opinion requested;
(2) By fourteen votes to one,
Decides to
comply with the request for an advisory opinion;
in favour: President
Shi; Vice‑President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma,
Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra‑Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al‑Khasawneh,
Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Tomka;
against: Judge
Buergenthal;
(3) Replies
in the following manner to the question put by the General Assembly:
A. By fourteen votes
to one,
The
construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power,
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East
Jerusalem, and its associated régime, are contrary to international
law;
in favour: President
Shi; Vice‑President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma,
Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra‑Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al‑Khasawneh,
Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Tomka;
against: Judge Buergenthal;
B. By fourteen votes
to one,
Israel is under an
obligation to terminate its breaches of international law; it is
under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of
the wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
in and around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure
therein situated, and to repeal or render ineffective forthwith all
legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto, in accordance with
paragraph 151 of this Opinion;
in favour: President Shi;
Vice‑President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma,
Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra‑Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al‑Khasawneh,
Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Tomka;
against: Judge Buergenthal;
C. By fourteen votes
to one,
Israel is under an
obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the
construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem;
in favour: President Shi;
Vice‑President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma,
Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra‑Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al‑Khasawneh,
Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Tomka;
against: Judge Buergenthal;
D. By thirteen votes
to two,
All States are under
an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from
the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in
maintaining the situation created by such construction; all States
parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of
War of 12 August 1949 have in addition the obligation, while
respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure
compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied
in that Convention;
in favour: President Shi;
Vice‑President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma,
Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra‑Aranguren, Rezek, Al‑Khasawneh, Elaraby,
Owada, Simma, Tomka;
against: Judges Kooijmans, Buergenthal;
E. By fourteen votes
to one,
The United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and
the Security Council, should consider what further action is required
to bring to an end the illegal situation resulting from the
construction of the wall and the associated régime, taking due account
of the present Advisory Opinion.
in favour: President Shi;
Vice‑President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma,
Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra‑Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al‑Khasawneh,
Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Tomka;
against: Judge Buergenthal.
Done in French and
in English, the French text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace,
The Hague, this ninth day of July, two thousand and four, in two
copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and
the other transmitted to the Secretary‑General of the United Nations.
(Signed)
Shi
Jiuyong,
President.
(Signed) Philippe
Couvreur,
Registrar.
Judges
Koroma, Higgins, Kooijmans and
Al‑Khasawneh
append separate opinions to the Advisory Opinion of the Court;
Judge
Buergenthal appends a declaration to the Advisory Opinion of
the Court; Judges
Elaraby and
Owada append separate opinions to the Advisory Opinion of the
Court.
(Initialled) J.Y.S.
(Initialled) Ph.C.
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